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ABSTRACT
The Arctic Council is an international institution made up of the eight states that have
territory in the Arctic, namely Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and
the United States, as well as six indigenous peoples’ organizations. When states created the
Council in 1996, it was a research institution that addressed environmental issues and a loosely
defined version of sustainable development. It was a weak institution, without a permanent
secretariat. By 2014, it had become a policy-making body, as well as a research body, that
addressed a wide range of issues, with the aid of a permanent secretariat. New states and
institutions sought to become a part of the Council, which potentially challenged the role of the
indigenous peoples’ organizations. This thesis answers the following question: how can we
explain this evolution of the Arctic Council? It examines the Council’s evolving mandate,
policy-making role, institutional capacity and membership. It addresses this question by
analyzing three international relations theories, namely functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal
institutionalism. This thesis concludes that the economic opportunities in the region made
possible by climate change best explain the evolution of the Arctic Council. Neoliberal
institutionalism best explains the evolution of the Council, while neorealism provides the best
explanation for the outcome of that process.
KEYWORDS
Arctic governance, Arctic Council, international institution evolution
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In 1996, many Arctic policy-makers1 and activists believed the newly created Arctic
Council was a weak, informal research institution offering limited opportunities to address issues
that are important to people who live in the Arctic region.2 By 2013, the Council appeared more
robust than ever as it created major international agreements that responded to the consequences
of climate change in the Arctic. The major research question addressed in this thesis is: how can
we explain this evolution of the Arctic Council? The Council is an international institution
charged with the promotion of environmental conservation and sustainable development in the
Arctic region. It is evolving from a research institution that addresses environmental issues to a
forum for policy-making on a wide variety of issues. This institution is worthy of serious
scholarly attention because the Council is the premier governance institution for the Arctic
region and it addresses profoundly important global issues such as climate change. The evolution
of this institution will have consequences for the global community. Thus, the trajectory of its
evolution is of interest not only to those who study the region, but also to those concerned with
broader global politics. This thesis explains the Council’s evolution by assessing the predictive
validity and reliability of three theories of international co-operation: functionalism, neorealism
and neoliberal institutionalism. This work argues that the Arctic’s economic potential has created
an incentive for states to facilitate governance through the Council, though great powers are the
1

In this thesis, “policy-maker” refers to an official who attended Council meetings representing a state, nongovernmental organization, international institution or indigenous peoples’ organization. This group includes
government officials, political activists, political actors (such as elected representatives) and scientists. I use the
term “policy-maker” as a generic term because 1) all of these actors sought to contribute to the development of
policy through the Council and 2) they were entrusted to represent the views of their organization in a diplomatic
capacity.
2
Interviews with eleven different Council policy-makers, winter, spring and summer 2013. This group includes a
former senior Canadian foreign affairs official, a junior Canadian foreign affairs official, two senior United States
Environmental Protection Agency officials, one former senior government of Alaska official, one senior United
States State Department official, one former senior United States Department of the Interior official, a senior
Norwegian foreign affairs official, two senior Icelandic foreign affairs officials and a Russian scientist who has
worked with the Council. The comment arose in response to a discussion that the Council, over time, has become a
more professional body.
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most influential actors in this process. Chapter 1 outlines the scope and method of this project, as
well as an overview of the necessary background information about the Council. It answers nine
major questions. First, what is the Arctic Council? Second, what is the history of the Arctic
Council and why did it come into being? Third, what is the mandate of the Arctic Council?
Fourth, how does the Council operate? Fifth, how is the Arctic Council evolving? Sixth, how
have others assessed the Council? Seventh, how is the thesis structured? Eighth, what is the
contribution of this thesis? Finally, what methodology is employed? The thesis consists of seven
chapters, including this introduction.
1.1 – What is the Arctic Council?
The Arctic Council is an international institution comprising the eight countries that have
some territory in the Arctic, namely Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia,
Sweden and the United States. It is the only Arctic regional organization that includes all eight
Arctic countries. It is also the only international institution that includes indigenous peoples’
organizations as members, albeit second-class members without voting rights. These groups have
many of the same rights as states, as they are able, for example, to participate in all Council
meetings,3 set the Council agenda4 and create Council projects.5
Six indigenous peoples’ organizations are members of the Council, although the rules of
procedure allow up to seven indigenous members. They are referred to as “permanent
participants.” The Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC) represents 32,000 Athabaskan people who

3

Arctic Council, Arctic Council Rules of Procedure (Iqaluit, Nunavut: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 1998),
Article 4 and Article 5.
4
Ibid., Article 12 and Article 19.
5
Ibid., Article 26.
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live mostly in northwestern Canada and Alaska.6 The group formed in 2000, specifically to
participate in the Arctic Council. It is currently the most recent group to join the institution. The
Aleut International Association (AIA) represents 18,000 Aleutian people who live in Greenland,
Russia and the United States.7 It formed in 1998, also to participate in the Council. The Gwich’in
Council International (GCI) represents 9,000 Gwich’in people who live in the Canada and the
United States.8 The organization formed in 1999 to advocate for Gwich’in people in the Council.
The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) represents 150,000 Inuit people who live in Canada,
Greenland, Russia and the United States.9 It came together in 1977 as a major international
advocacy association. The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON)
represents 300,000 Russian aboriginal peoples. It is an umbrella organization for 41 Russian
aboriginal groups that are part of 35 different indigenous peoples’ organizations.10 The
organization formed in 1990, specifically to participate in the precursor of the Arctic Council, the
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). RAIPON was originally called the USSR
Association of Small Peoples of the North. It was renamed in the wake of the collapse of the
Soviet Union. The Saami Council, originally called the Nordic Saami Council at the founding of
the AEPS in 1991, represents 150,000 people who live in Finland, Norway, Russia and

6

Arctic Council, “Arctic Athabaskan Council,” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011, http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/arctic-athabaskan-council-aac (accessed May 21, 2013).
7
Arctic Council, “Aleut International Association,” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011, http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/aleut-international-association-aia (accessed May 21,
2013).
8
Arctic Council, “Gwich’in Council International,” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011, http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/gwich-in-council-international (accessed May 21, 2013).
9
Arctic Council, “Inuit Circumpolar Council,” Permanent Participants, April 15, 2011, http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/permanent-participants/inuit-circumpolar-council (accessed May 21, 2013).
10
Arctic Council, “Permanent Participant Article Series: RAIPON,” Arctic Peoples, 2012, http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/arctic-peoples/indigenous-people/596-permanent-participant-article-series-raipon
(accessed January 14, 2013).
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Sweden.11 The group was founded in 1956 and is thus the oldest indigenous peoples’
organization in the Council. Together, these groups represent 659,000 people from all the
Council countries, except mainland Denmark and Iceland.
The Council also includes observers. The original observers of the precursor to the Arctic
Council, the AEPS, were West Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe, the United Nations Environmental Programme and the
International Arctic Science Committee.12 There are currently 32 permanent observers in the
Council. The Council’s rules of procedure officially refer to them as “accredited observers,”
although they are often referred to as permanent observers.13 This group includes twelve states,
eight international institutions and twelve non-governmental organizations.14 China, France and
Germany are examples of state observers. International institution observers include the Nordic
Council of Ministers and the United Nations Development Program. Examples of nongovernmental organizations are the Association of World Reindeer Herders and the World
Wildlife Fund. Observers can attend Council meetings, unless uninvited by states, and make
comments when states allow. They can propose, sponsor and participate in Council projects with
the permission of states.15 State delegations re-approve all observers every two years, in
summative Ministerial Meetings.16 At this point, states can remove an observer, though this has
never happened. In addition, Council meetings typically include “ad hoc observers” that can
attend with special permission. They have all the same rights as permanent observers, though
11

Arctic Council, “Permanent Participant Article Series: The Saami Council,” Arctic Peoples, 2012,
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/arctic-peoples/indigenous-people/589-permanent-participant-articleseries-saami-council (accessed January 14, 2013).
12
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, Declaration of the Protection of the Arctic Environment (Rovaniemi,
Finland: Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy, 1991).
13
Arctic Council, Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, Article 37.
14
Arctic Council, “Observers,” About Us, April 27, 2011, http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/aboutus/arctic-council/observers (accessed July 17, 2014).
15
Arctic Council, Arctic Council Rules of Procedure, Article 37.
16
Ibid.
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states need to re-approve their participation before every Council meeting.17 An example of a
high-profile organization or state that frequently acts as an ad-hoc observer is the European
Union. Typically, a new observer attends Council meetings for between two and five years
before states approve its status as a permanent observer. Observers are typically international
entities that have some broad interest in the Arctic region.
Most of the substantive work takes place in the Council’s working groups, of which there
are six: the Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP); Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Programme (AMAP); Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); Protection of the Arctic
Marine Environment (PAME); Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR); and
the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG). States formed the ACAP from an
AMAP project in 2006. The AMAP, CAFF, PAME and the EPPR were working groups of the
AEPS and so formed in 1991. States established the SDWG in 1996 along with the rest of the
Council. The ACAP takes action to research and address contaminants in the Arctic region. The
AMAP monitors levels of Arctic pollution. The CAFF researches levels of Arctic flora and fauna
and also helps develop conservation strategies by providing baseline information. Studying
Arctic marine pollution and developing strategies to combat pollution by providing baseline
information is the responsibility of the PAME. The EPPR identifies safety issues in the Arctic
and prepares for emergency situations. The SDWG broadly carries out projects to encourage
human social, political and economic development in the Arctic region. Government scientists
and academics serve in the working groups and usually meet bi-annually. The nature of the work
completed by the working groups reveals that the Council exists to facilitate action on
environmental issues and sustainable development.

17

Ibid.
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The official mandates of the working groups show they complete separate yet interrelated work. The ACAP exists to “reduce emissions of pollutants into the environment in order
to reduce the identified pollution risks.”18 It prepares proposals and supplies information for
technical projects to physically clean up contaminant sites, particularly in Russia. The mandate
of the AMAP is to supply “reliable and sufficient information on the status of, and threats to, the
Arctic environment, and providing scientific advice on actions to be taken in order to support
Arctic governments in their efforts to take remedial and preventive actions relating to
contaminants.”19 Examples of its work include projects to monitor UV radiation, radioactivity
and mercury levels in the Arctic.20 The CAFF exists to “address the conservation of Arctic
biodiversity, and to communicate its findings to the governments and residents of the Arctic,
helping to promote practices which ensure the sustainability of the Arctic’s living resources.”21
An example of its work is the ongoing Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program, which is
“an international network of scientists, government agencies, indigenous organizations and
conservation groups working together to harmonize and integrate efforts to monitor the Arctic's
living resources.”22 The mandate of the PAME is to “address policy and non-emergency
pollution prevention and control measures related to the protection of the Arctic marine
environment from both land and sea-based activities.”23 An example of this work is the ongoing

18

Ibid.
Arctic Council, “Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme,” Working Groups, April 15, 2011,
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/arctic-monitoring-and-assessmentprogramme-amap (accessed July 11, 2013).
20
Ibid.
21
Arctic Council, “Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna,” Working Groups, April 15, 2013, http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/conservation-of-arctic-flora-and-fauna-caff (accessed July 11,
2013).
22
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna, “Monitoring: The Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Programme
(CBMP),” Monitoring, 2013, http://www.caff.is/monitoring (accessed July 12, 2013).
23
Arctic Council, “Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment,” Working Groups, April 15, 2013,
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/protection-of-the-arctic-marine-environmentpame (accessed July 11, 2013).
19
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Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, which is an evaluation of the level of Arctic shipping.24 The
mandate of the EPPR is to “exchange information on best practices and conduct projects to
include development of guidance and risk assessment methodologies, response exercises, and
training.”25 An example of this work includes its ongoing Behaviour of Oil and Other Hazardous
Substances in Arctic Waters project, which studies what would happen to oil should it spill in
Arctic waters, thus helping states prepare for that possibility.26 These mandates all reveal a focus
on research rather than policy-making, as their missions seek to “promote,” “exchange” and
provide “advice” rather than to develop formal policy. They also emphasize that these groups
provide policy recommendations, particularly the mandates of the ACAP and the PAME. The
ACAP, AMAP, CAFF, PAME and the EPPR have mandates that are environmental.
The SDWG has a different type of mandate than those of the other working groups in that
it aims to “provide practical knowledge and contribute to building the capacity of indigenous
peoples and Arctic communities to respond to the challenges and benefit from the opportunities
emerging in the Arctic region.”27 Its work is broad and encompasses a wide variety of issue
areas, all under the rubric of human development and human security. Human security is an
understanding of security that emphasizes freedom from deprivation and threats to safety. The
group does not limit its work to projects that concern sustainable development in the traditional
sense. Sources often define sustainable development as “meeting the needs of today without

24

Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, “About AMSA,” Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, 2013,
http://www.pame.is/about-amsa (accessed March 1, 2013).
25
Arctic Council, “Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response,” Working Groups, April 15, 2013,
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/emergency-prevention-preparedness-andresponse-eppr (accessed July 11, 2013).
26
Ibid.
27
Arctic Council, “Sustainable Development Working Group,” Working Groups, April 14, 2011, http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/sustainable-development-working-group-sdwg (accessed July
11, 2013).
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compromising the needs of future generations.”28 In a practical sense, sustainable development
typically refers to “any construction that can be maintained over time without damaging the
environment.”29 However, the SDWG carries out the Council’s projects with the most direct
human element that need not include a strong environmental element. Its current priorities are
socio-economic problems, climate change adaptation, sustainable communities, resource
development, human health, cultural survival and language.30 An example of this work is the
2011 report Comparative Review of Circumpolar Health Systems, which provides an overview of
the contrasting qualities of health care in the Arctic region.31 It is a project with a strong human
security element but not a strong environmental element. The SDWG carries out more humancentric work than do the other working groups.
The Council employs task forces to carry out research projects outside of the mandate of
the working groups. Officially, there are four: the Task Force on Arctic Marine Pollution
Prevention, the Task Force on Black Carbon and Methane, the Scientific Co-operation Task
Force and the Task Force to Facilitate the Circumpolar Business Forum.32 Marine pollution
prevention, for example, is outside of the mandate of any one working group because it involves
the work of the PAME, CAFF and the EPPR. In addition, its work is more policy-centric than
those of the working groups. Black carbon and methane involves taking action on a type of air
pollution not covered by the other working groups. The AMAP might have been a venue to
address these issues, but it provides monitoring rather than policy action, which is a key goal of
the task force. A circumpolar business forum is not an environmental issue or a human security
28

Environment Canada, “Sustainable Development,” Sustainable Development, July 7, 2014,
http://www.ec.gc.ca/dd-sd/ (accessed July 22 2014).
29
Sustainable development, (n.d.), 21st Century Lexicon.
30
Arctic Council, “Sustainable Development Working Group.”
31
Ibid.
32
Arctic Council, “Task Forces of the Arctic Council,” Task Forces, December 29, 2011, http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/task-forces (accessed July 17, 2014).
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issue and so did not fit within any of the working groups. Three task forces have completed
projects and ceased operations, namely the Task Force on Institution Issues (2011-2013), the
Task Force on Search and Rescue (2009-2011) and the Task Force on Arctic Marine Oil
Pollution Preparedness and Response (2011-2013).33 The Council also has expert groups, made
up of academics and scientists, to execute projects mandated by states on an ongoing basis, in
contrast to temporary task forces that cease to exist when its project is completed. Currently,
there is one Council expert group, the Ecosystem-Based Management Expert Group.34 Individual
working groups have expert groups and task forces to carry out specific projects and provide
advice for the broader working groups. Task forces are becoming increasingly common as the
Council takes on policy-making work.
In September 2014, a new Council side-line institution came into being, called the Arctic
Economic Council. 35 Its goal is to “foster business development in the Arctic,” to “engage in
deeper circumpolar co-operation” and “provide a business perspective to the work of the Arctic
Council.”36 Each Council member state and permanent participant sends three business
representatives to review Council programs and provide recommendations to the Council.37 The
new institution represents an expansion of the mandate of the Council from an environmental
and sustainable development institution to one that facilitates economic development. The new
institution does not have an environmental component in that its work is to represent business
interests. Chapter 2 discusses this shift in detail.
33

Arctic Council, “Past Task Forces,” Task Forces, November 4, 2013, http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/task-forces/811-past-task-forces (accessed July 17, 2014).
34
Arctic Council, “EBM Experts Group,” Expert Groups, December 20, 2011, http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/expert-groups (accessed July 17, 2014).
35
Nunatsiaq News, “Nunavut MP Picks Iqaluit for Arctic Economic Council’s Founding Meeting,” July 10, 2014,
http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/stories/article/65674nunavut_mp_picks_iqaluit_for_arctic_economic_councils_foun
ding_meeting/ (accessed July 17, 2014).
36
Arctic Council, “Arctic Economic Council,” Arctic Economic Council, January 28, 2014, http://www.arcticcouncil.org/index.php/en/about-us/working-groups/aec (accessed July 17, 2014).
37
Ibid.
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1.2 – What is the History of the Arctic Council?
It is necessary to understand why the Council came into being in order to understand its
evolution. This chapter provides a brief history, with further elaboration provided in subsequent
chapters. The Council was established as an environmental organization to facilitate co-operation
in the wake of the end of the Cold War. From 1945 until 1989, the two Arctic great powers, the
Soviet Union and the United States, stood at opposite ends of an ideological divide marked by
the ever-present possibility of nuclear war. Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Norway were allies of
the United States through North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. Finland and
Sweden officially attempted to maintain neutrality, though these states were closer to the West
than the East. Relations between the two superpowers improved throughout the 1970s during the
period of détente, after strained relations in the 1960s. For example, the governments of the
United States and Soviet Union held various negotiations beginning in 1969 to discuss limits on
strategic arms, which resulted in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The United States
government issued an Arctic policy in 1983 indicating its openness to “mutually beneficial
international co-operation in the Arctic.”38 Still, tensions and military spending increased
throughout the 1980s as a new hawkish United States presidential administration upped its
rhetoric. The Arctic states, in particular the government of Finland, hoped that Arctic cooperation would ease Cold War tensions between West and East. In 1985, an article by political
scientist Oran Young proposed that the declaration of the Arctic as a “zone of peace” could ease
Cold War tensions.39 In October 1987, amid a weakening Soviet economy, the governments of
the Soviet Union and United States signed a nuclear stockpile reduction agreement marking the
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beginning of the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, Russian Premier Mikhail Gorbachev
delivered a speech in Murmansk, Russia, calling for the establishment of the Arctic as a “zone of
peace” and new environmental co-operation.40 At the same time, there was considerable interest
among policy-makers in international co-operation to understand the amount of pollution in
Russia’s Arctic, which experts in the other Arctic states expected would be very high and would
have trans-boundary consequences.41 The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster raised concerns over
Russian environmental standards.42 The other Arctic governments doubted whether Gorbachev’s
proposal for a “zone of peace” was serious.43 Murmansk is home to a large Russian military
base, which Gorbachev did not propose to close as part of his initiative.44 The government of
Finland, which sought to improve relations between the West and Russia, its closest neighbour,
attempted to organize a conference in response to Gorbachev’s proposal, which finally occurred
in Rovaniemi, Finland, in September 1989. The government of Finland had lobbied the United
States and Russia to draft an agreement on nuclear submarines in the Arctic (in 1983) and held a
summit on Cold War nuclear issues (in 1987). Three rounds of non-contentious negotiations,
slowed by the collapse of the Soviet Union, resulted in the creation of the AEPS in June 1991.45
The AEPS was mandated to “protect the Arctic ecosystem including humans.”46 It was a
joint research strategy, rather than an international institution. States created four working groups
(the AMAP, CAFF, EPPR, PAME) staffed by government scientists and academics from each
Arctic country, who would collect information and meet bi-annually to share their conclusions.
Indigenous peoples’ organizations were mere observers in the organization, without any
40
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privileged status. The AEPS was successful in uncovering the dangerous level of pollution in the
Russian Arctic, such as the fact that Russia had produced more than 180,000 tonnes of dangerous
polychlorinated biphenol coolants in the Arctic region during the Cold War without proper
environmental safety procedures.47 State officials also became aware that there were significant
human security challenges in the Arctic.48 Perhaps most alarmingly, the life expectancy of
indigenous peoples in Russia declined by 4.8 years between 1990 and 1995 due to poor
economic conditions leading to high stress levels and high alcohol consumption.49 From 1991 to
1996, indigenous peoples’ organizations lobbied governments to increase their role in Arctic
governance and to establish a more robust Arctic international institution to respond to these
environmental and social problems. In particular, the ICC lobbied the Government of Canada to
push such action.50 For example, its Canadian president at the time, Mary Simon, had access to
the Government of Canada through her work negotiating and implementing the 1993 Nunavut
Land Claims Agreement, which led to the creation of the Canadian northern territory Nunavut.
She helped organize a meeting between Canadian foreign affairs officials and advocates to
encourage Canada to create the Arctic Council in December 1992. This meeting did not yield
immediate results,51 but, the Arctic Council, in part, emerged from the lobbying work of the ICC.
After years of lobbying by indigenous peoples’ organizations, Canadian Prime Minister
Jean Chretien and United States President Bill Clinton held a meeting in February 1995, at which
Chretien proposed that the AEPS become a formal institution.52 Clinton agreed to the proposal.53
The Canadian government brought the other Arctic states on-board and negotiations occurred in
47
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1995 around AEPS meetings and through informal communication as well as a meeting in
Ottawa in June.54 There had been significant informal discussion among policy-makers to
formalize the co-operation that had begun in the AEPS and so states at least tentatively
undertook discussions to create the Arctic Council. State delegations debated and disagreed
about six items: 1) whether security would be a part of the new institution, perhaps signalling a
move toward earlier proposals for an Arctic “zone of peace;” 2) the role of human security and
sustainable development in the new institution, as the AEPS had increasingly dealt with
sustainable development issues; 3) the policy-making role of the institution; 4) whether the
institution would have a permanent secretariat; 5) the access of observers to the Council, and; 6)
whether the permanent participants would be full members of the Council.55 Subsequent chapters
elaborate on the process of these negotiations.
Canada and the Nordic delegations favoured a strong yet flexible Arctic Council that
could take action on a wide range of Arctic issues, while the United States and Russian
delegations favoured a less formal Council that would facilitate targeted action in a small number
of priority areas. Some negotiators characterized the United States and Russia as favouring the
continuation of the AEPS with a new name.56 The 1995 negotiations did not make major
headway on issues and gave way to three major formal negotiations in Ottawa in December
1995, as well as April and June 1996. The issue of the permanent participants dominated these
negotiations, leaving little time to address the other items. Delegations made major
breakthroughs in June, resolving the permanent participants issue and agreeing in principle to
resolutions on the other matters, allowing work to move forward on a document finalizing the
Council’s structure.
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The Council’s first meeting occurred in September 1996 in Ottawa, where state
delegations finalized the basic mandate and the structure of the Council. State officials agreed
that: 1) traditional military security would not be part of the new Council’s agenda; 2)
sustainable development would be part of the institution through the creation of the SDWG,
though its exact mandate would be negotiated over the next two years; 3) creating formal policy
would not be an immediate goal of the Council; 4) the institution would not have a permanent
secretariat because the rotating chair country would organize and host a rotating secretariat; 5)
observers would be allowed to attend Council meetings with permission, and; 6) indigenous
peoples’ organizations would be members of the Council but would not be able to vote on
Council matters. Each alignment could claim some success. Nothing prevented the Council from
becoming a robust body in the future, though at its onset it was a small, flexible body in line with
the preferences of the United States and Russian delegations. The Council had not yet developed
formal rules of procedure, which it would do at five Council meetings in 1997 and 1998.57 In
these years, it would transition the environmental work of the AEPS to the Council and establish
the mandate for the sustainable development program.58 A key difference between the AEPS and
Arctic Council was that the Arctic states’ environmental departments administered the AEPS and
set state preferences, whereas departments of foreign affairs administered and organized the
Council as well as determined official state positions.59 The Council emerged as an
environmental research institution with a new emphasis on human development issues through
the sustainable development program.
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1.3 – What is the Arctic Council’s Mandate?
The Council’s mandate is to promote co-operation on environmental issues and
sustainable development in the Arctic region. It is found in the 1998 Iqaluit Declaration, the
summative statement document that closed Canada’s inaugural two-year term as chair. The
Council is to “provide a means for promoting co-operation, coordination and interaction among
the Arctic States . . . with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic
inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and
environmental protection in the Arctic.”60 As noted, the Council’s work may address any issue
except military security.61 Its mandate allows it to discuss other types of security, such as human
security or environmental security, though in practice the Council does not use the language of
security to characterize issues. The mandate does not precisely define “sustainable development”
although it indicates it will include “areas of Arctic children and youth, health, telemedicine,
resource management, including fisheries, cultural and eco-tourism, technology transfer to
improve Arctic sanitation systems, and national sustainable development strategies.”62 The
document establishes that all projects with a strong “human” element will fall under the rubric of
sustainable development. In practice, about 80 per cent of the Council’s work is strongly
environmental in nature, as exhibited by the fact that only one of the Council’s six working
groups expressly addresses sustainable development. Increasingly, the Council’s work is
economic in nature, although until the development of the Arctic Economic Council, all of the
Council’s economic work had some environmental element. In some ways, the Council has a
broad yet narrow mandate, charged to focus on environment and sustainable development yet
open to other issues.
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1.4 – How Does the Council Operate?
The chair of the Council rotates every two years. The first country to chair was Canada
from 1996 until 1998, followed by the United States from 1998 until 2000, Finland from 2000
until 2002, Iceland from 2002 until 2004, Russia from 2004 until 2006, Norway from 2007 until
2009, Denmark from 2009 until 2011 and Sweden from 2011 until 2013. Canada was chair from
2013 until 2015, followed by the United States. The chair is responsible for organizing Council
meetings and providing themes for Council work, though the other Council states have a lot of
power to shape the agenda. The Council held 42 meetings from 1996 until 2013.63 It typically
holds three meetings annually, usually in the spring and fall. There are three types of meetings.
Senior Arctic Officials Meetings (also known as SAO meetings) usually occur twice a year.
States send delegations of typically six to twelve officials, while permanent participants usually
send two to six people. The head of the state delegations is referred to as the “Senior Arctic
Official.” Ministerial Meetings (also known as MM meetings or ACMM meetings) occur every
other year in the spring. At these meetings, ministers of foreign affairs or other high-ranking
officials review the Council’s previous two-year term and initiate a new research program. States
articulate the results by signing a declaration that sets the Council’s agenda for the next two
years. Ministerial Meetings close a country’s turn as chair and pass the chair to another country.
Deputy Ministers Meetings (DMM) occur in the years that there is not a Ministerial Meeting. In
these meetings, foreign affairs deputies from each Council state review progress, as well as
permanent participant representatives. The first DMM was held in 2010. Canada has opted not to
hold a DMM, indicating that they may not become permanent fixtures on the Council calendar.
Working groups meet roughly two times a year, in between other Council meetings.
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The substantive work of the Council occurs through projects. To accomplish goals, states
sponsor projects, sometimes co-sponsored by permanent participants or observers. To sponsor a
project, the sponsor must conceive of the project, design its contents, fund agreed-upon costs and
execute the agenda. Projects might include a scientific assessment or a technical project such as a
search and rescue practice exercise or a plan to clean up a contaminant. States and sponsors
typically bring these projects to a Council working group for consideration. Other states,
observers or permanent participants can join the leadership of a project by co-sponsoring. The
working group adopts the project under the leadership of the sponsors, unless another state
vetoes the project. The working group then presents the project at a SAO meeting, at which point
states have another opportunity to veto the project. States then approve the project at the
Ministerial Meeting. At this point, working groups have likely carried out substantial work on
the project, though a veto is still possible. After approval at the Ministerial Meeting, the working
group completes the project between meetings and gives updates at its own meetings. As noted,
the Council may establish a task force to complete a project at Ministerial Meetings or may defer
the matter to an expert group.
The Council operates by consensus. This measure, in essence, gives each state a veto
over any Council project. In Council meetings, states offer their support for projects, but need
not comment. Thus, sometimes a state may oppose a project but not speak on it or exercise its
veto. Therefore, we do not know definitely if states that do not directly voice support for a
project indeed favour a course of action. Alternatively, once a state vetoes a project, discussion
stops. Thus, it is difficult to know if countries that do not speak in this situation truly support a
project or would have vetoed it had another state not vetoed it first. Each state has a de-facto veto
in the Council as the institution operates according to consensus.
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The Council has a robust agenda, sponsoring dozens of projects. It undertook an average
of 57 projects at a time from 1998 until 2004. This number tripled between 2004 and 2013, as
currently the Council has more than 150 projects ongoing at any one time. About 90 per cent of
Council projects proceed without negotiation or real debate. States, observers and permanent
participants may provide statements of support for a project or technical suggestions, such as
collaboration with a particular research program or employment of a certain database. In about
ten per cent of cases, discussion turns into negotiations, with states vetoing projects in Council
meetings, negotiating compromises or attempting to alter the intent of a project. An example of a
project that proceeded without great political interference is the Survey of Living Conditions in
the Arctic, which was a straightforward survey of Arctic residents. Chapter 6 discusses this
project. An example of a project that provoked great debate, negotiation and compromise with
threats of vetoes is the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), with the controversial issue
being whether the final assessment would include a policy document. Chapters 2, 3 and 6 discuss
this project. Major projects include the ACIA (2004) and the Arctic Human Development Report
(2004). Other major projects include:
-

The Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (initiated 2006) (the CAFF)
Annual AMAP pollution assessments (2005-2013) (the AMAP)
Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (completed 2006-2008) (the AMAP)
Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment (published 2007) (the AMAP)
Arctic Human Health Initiative (initiated 2008) (the SDWG)
Agreement on Co-operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in
the Arctic (completed 2011) (Task Force)
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (published 2009) (the PAME)
Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (published 2013) (the CAFF)
Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response
in the Arctic (completed 2013) (Task Force)
Short-Lived Climate Forcers (initiated 2011) (Short-Lived Climate Forcers Task
Force)
Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost Assessment (published 2013) (the AMAP)
Arctic Resilience Report (interim report 2013)

The Council completes a variety of projects in seemingly disparate areas.
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Each Council meeting agenda contains about 15 items. In other words, states discuss
roughly 15 projects per meeting. In some cases, updates are brief and do not include discussion.
In other cases, discussions can drag on for most of a meeting. States do not comment on every
agenda item. For example, from 2004 until 2013, based on a sample of 10 meetings, states
provided an average of 3.3 comments on 2.6 agenda items.64 Permanent participants commented
on only one agenda item. About 15 observers attended each meeting, but only about five
provided comments and those five only commented approximately once.
A good case study to understand the process of a Council project is the assembly of the
Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (ABA), a report synthesizing the state of, and threat to,
biodiversity in the Arctic region. It is a project that was not overly contentious as it was a
scientific assembly of data about biodiversity in a particular region, but had some small issues in
its research design. State officials jointly authored the project between 2007 and 2013. The goal
of the project was to “synthesize and assess the status and trends of biological diversity in the
Arctic.”65 As with all Council projects, a state sponsored the assessment. Finland initially
sponsored it in 2006, creating the work plan and providing initial funding. The United States,
Denmark, Canada and Sweden contributed hundreds of thousands of dollars to the project and
joined as co-sponsors in subsequent years. States organized the project between 2004 and 2007.
The idea for the ABA originated from the CAFF in meetings between 2004 and 2006, during
Russia’s term as chair, as a means to fulfill obligations under a previously approved project, the
Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program.66 It also emerged from a goal of states in the
CAFF to initiate a project that would support the work studying the consequences of climate
64
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change commenced under the ACIA.67 Finnish representatives in the CAFF initially conceived
of the project as a reasonably apolitical environmental scientific assessment responding to these
two priorities. The CAFF and Finland announced the idea for the project at the Ministerial
Meeting in Salekhard, Russia, in October 2006. Finnish officials then commenced on the project
work plan.68 There was brief discussion of the project at the April 2007 SAO meeting in Tromsø,
Norway, initiated by sponsor Finland.69 During this discussion, officials from the AAC and the
GCI urged approval of the project work plan, while officials from the RAIPON stated optimism
about the project.70 There were technical suggestions, as well. ICC officials suggested that the
CAFF coordinate the ABA work plan with International Polar Year projects (an international
Arctic science program), while Finnish officials stated that the CAFF must ensure that the ABA
does not overlap with other projects before approval of the work plan.71
The CAFF presented the work plan and states gave formal approval of the project at the
November 2007 SAO meeting in Narvik, Norway.72 The CAFF was instructed to deliver the
report in four phases, namely: 1) a summary to be delivered in 2010; 2) a scientific report in
2012; 3) a summary for policy-makers in 2013; and finally 4) policy recommendations later in
2013.73 This schedule meant that work occurred during Norway, Denmark and Sweden’s terms
as chair. At the November 2007 meeting, the United States delegation offered to co-sponsor the
project, which the Finnish delegation accepted, eager to obtain funding for it.74 United States
officials wanted to co-sponsor the project because it was scientific in nature and so presented a
67
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good opportunity to fulfill Council obligations. There were no problems getting further
consensus on the project. The permanent participants did not protest against the project and the
CAFF stated specifically that the project would include traditional indigenous knowledge.75
Delegations from Denmark, Canada and Russia all directly stated support for the project.76 The
delegations from Norway, Iceland and Sweden did not state support or exercise a veto at this
meeting. It was unclear whether these countries supported the project, though it was the type of
scientific assessment they would likely support. The lack of explicit support could have indicated
disapproval but an unwillingness to exercise a veto; however, such a situation was not the case.
Norway’s delegation expressed support for the project at the November 2008 SAO meeting in
Kautokeino, Norway.77 Delegations from Iceland and Sweden stated support for the project in
October 2010 in Torshavn, Denmark, and contributed data to the project before that point.78
The project proceeded smoothly and no contentious negotiations resulted. A steering
committee of eight people directed the project, comprising representatives from Sweden, Iceland,
the AAC, Canada, Finland, Denmark, Russia and the U.S.79 Sixteen people worked on the
steering committee at various points, including representatives from the GCI and the United
Nations Environment Program.80 There were 35 authors, drawn from every Council country, as
well as non-Arctic countries.81 The project included contributions from more than 240 authors.82
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Updates on progress were given at nine Council meetings between 2008 and 2012.83 Council
state and permanent participants gave statements of support and offered kudos for the progress
made at these meetings, such as providing technical comments on drafts, making financial as
well as personnel contributions and suggesting how the CAFF might disseminate the report. For
example, at the November 2009 SAO meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark, representatives from
the RAIPON suggested that some of the information regarding reindeer herding was
inaccurate.84 The CAFF delegates said that they would contact the World Reindeer Herders
Association, an international reindeer herding organization, to verify the data.85 In these
meetings, more sponsors emerged as progress proceeded smoothly and the project looked to be
of a high quality. The Danish delegation announced Denmark would join the ABA as a cosponsor at the April 2008 SAO meeting in Svolver, Norway.86 Canada and Sweden joined as a
co-sponsor in October 2010 in Torshavn, Denmark, after making financial contributions to the
project.87 Funding ultimately came from every Arctic country, except Iceland and Russia, and
additional funds came from the Nordic Council of Ministers, to which Iceland contributes.88
The report revealed that 21,000 species are found in the Arctic and that climate change
threatens the biodiversity of the region.89 Finland’s policy-makers conceived of the project as a
scientific assessment within the existing mandate of the Council that would not create formal
policy for states. The report included 17 policy recommendations, most of which are reasonably
83
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unspecific, offering directions for further work and research. For example, the report
recommends that states “actively support international efforts addressing climate change, both
reducing stressors and implementing adaptation measures, as an urgent matter,” to “require the
incorporation of biodiversity objectives and provisions into all Arctic Council work and
encourage the same for ongoing and future international standards, agreements, plans, operations
and/or other tools specific to development in the Arctic” and to “reduce the threat of invasive
alien/non-native species to the Arctic by developing and implementing common measures for
early detection and reporting, identifying and blocking pathways of introduction, and sharing
best practices and techniques for monitoring, eradication and control.”90 Each of these
recommendations is relatively vague. The report does not indicate how states should “support”
international climate change policy. The incorporation of “biodiversity measures” into all
Council projects is not binding on states or other Council groups. It says states should develop
“measures” to “reduce the threat of invasive” species, but does not initiate this process or
indicate what these measures should include.
This case illustrates a typical four-stage process in the development of a Council project.
First, a state conceives a project in a working group and presents it to other Council states for
approval. Second, the sponsor organizes and designs the project. Third, a working group
completes the project between meetings by directing a steering committee or a group of
researchers. During this stage, the working group or sponsoring nation updates other Council
countries about the progress between meetings. Other countries can give comments or cosponsor the project as it unfolds, pending vetoes and objections. Fourth, once state delegations
approve of a project at a ministerial meeting, the project is complete.
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1.5 – How is the Arctic Council Evolving?
This section examines the five ways in which the Council is evolving. First, the Council’s
mandate is growing to include economic issues. The 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
highlighted that climate change will make the Arctic more accessible to potential resource
extraction and shipping. It found that, “The average extent of sea-ice cover in summer has
declined by 15-20 per cent over the past 30 years.”91 The Arctic has more than 90 billion barrels
of oil in reserve as well as trillions of cubic metres of natural gas.92 As a result, after 2004 Arctic
states increasingly emphasized emergency preparedness and search and rescue projects, which
this dissertation will show are partly economic issues.93 The government of Canada has stated
that its priorities are to encourage “responsible Arctic resource development,” “safe Arctic
shipping” and “sustainable communities.”94 As noted, the Council is establishing the Arctic
Economic Council, its first overtly economic project without a strong environmental element.95
Second, the policy-making role of the Council is growing. “Policy-making role” refers to
action undertaken to facilitate the creation of formal agreements or policy. When states created
the Council, there was the hope or expectation among some commentators that the Council
would be a strong body that would create policy, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. It became clear
that this would not be the case soon after the Council began operations. The United States and
Russia, in particular, opposed a policy role for the Council. The Council became a research
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institution and a policy-recommendation body but it did not facilitate the creation of policy.
Take, for example, the ACIA. It is a research assessment that collected information about climate
change. It contains a set of policy recommendations, but it does not impose any obligations on
states.96 States could have created an agreement on climate change in the Council, but did not. In
fact, state policy-makers never seriously considered this option. However, in 2009, states began
work on the creation of an agreement on Arctic search and rescue, followed by an agreement on
response to oil spills in 2011. Earlier, states did not create formal policy in the Council on
principle. Today, states are more willing to use the Council as a policy-making forum.
Third, the institutional power of the Council is evolving in that states created a permanent
Council secretariat in 2011. The Council did not have a strong bureaucratic structure to organize
and implement action for most of its history. The Council secretariat rotated between member
countries every two years prior to April 2007, when Norway, Sweden and Denmark announced a
temporary secretariat over six years that the three countries would host together in Tromsø,
Norway. The Council announced that Norway would host a permanent secretariat when this
temporary arrangement ended in 2013. (All of the working groups had permanent secretariats.
The permanent participants had the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat, formed, funded, at a cost of
more than one million dollars a year, and hosted by Denmark since 1994.)97 This development of
a permanent secretariat could give the Council a greater ability to initiate programs and organize
action between Council countries. The bureaucratic robustness of the Council is increasing and
thus the institutional capacity of the Council is growing.
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Fourth, an increasing number of observers wish to join the Council. The European Union,
in particular, is seeking to become a permanent observer, creating controversy about what
countries and organizations should be part of the Council and what they should be able to do.98
This interest in the Council is challenging ideas about which actors can participate in Arctic
politics, as well as the power of states and indigenous peoples in the region.
Fifth, it is less clear if the role of permanent participants is evolving. There was optimism
among many onlookers that permanent participants would be equal in influence with states when
states founded the Council in 1996 with help from these groups.99 However, the permanent
participants have faced numerous obstacles to their full participation, such as states being
unwilling to treat them as equals and consider their contributions, and a lack of funds and
resources to contribute to Council projects and meetings, as well as a new flood of observers and
interest in the Council that demands even greater resources that these groups mostly do not
have.100 The permanent participants are only able to contribute to about 20 per cent of Council
projects.101 Each of the major evolutionary changes are discussed in its own chapter.
1.6 – How Do Others Theorize the Arctic Council?
How do other authors understand the Arctic Council? The Council represents an instance
of international co-operation and many theories attempt to understand why states co-operate.
Three such theories are functionalism, neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism.
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Functionalists argue that states are rational and seek to solve problems.102 States will cooperate to solve problems automatically, without prompt, especially to address issues that spill
over from other instances of co-operation.103 They will begin to co-operate on areas of low
politics, which are issue areas where vital state interest and survival is not at stake.104
Functionalist scholar David Mitrany writes that part of the explanation for international co-operation
is the “general wish for a collective security system . . . after the shock of the two World wars.” 105
According to Mitrany, co-operation in areas less vital than collective security builds trust between

states, which leads to further co-operation in more political issue areas.106 For example, in the
words of noted functionalist scholar Ernst B. Haas, “The [European] Community began life with
the collective commitment to change the basic rules of industrial development by widening the
market for producers.”107 The theory first emerged in the 1950s to explain the emergence of the
European Union. Haas writes, “Converging practical goals provided the leaven out of which the
bread of European unity was baked.”108 Functionalist Karl W. Deutsch adds that it is possible to
“abolish finally national conflict by speeding up economic growth and intercommunication
everywhere.” 109 According to functionalists, international institutions will evolve automatically

when new problems emerge.
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Neoliberal institutionalists agree that states are rational, but argue states seek to make
absolute gains as opposed to solve problems.110 According to neoliberal institutionalists, states
could co-operate without attempting to resolve a pressing issue. They argue that when state goals
change, so do international institutions, although change can be tempered by three elements: 1)
path dependency, 2) norms and 3) the form of negotiation.111
Neorealists argue that rational states seek to maintain independence in international
relations above all other goals. Thus, relative gains, rather than absolute gains, motivate and
constrain states when they co-operate.112 In other words, states co-operate when they stand to
gain more than a rival. Neorealists do not rule out the possibility that an absolute gain could
motivate a state. In the words of neorealist Kenneth Waltz, “Structurally we can describe and
understand the pressures states are subject to.”113 He goes on, “We cannot predict how they will
react to the pressures without knowledge of their internal dispositions.”114 However, realists such
as Joseph Grieco predict “the likely prevalence of the relative gains problem for cooperation.”115
Neorealists assume relative gains considerations will motivate states in most cases, especially in
instances where vital interests are at stake.116 The theory emerged in the 1970s to explain pattern of
international relations during the Cold War in a scientifically rigorous manner. Neorealists affirm
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that to ensure survival, states must maintain a balance of power, where states “establish a formal
alliance and seek to preserve their own independence by checking the power of the opposing
side.”117 Great powers should be most influential in this process.118 Thus, international
institutions will evolve in response to changes in the international balance of power and to help
states make relative gains. Co-operation will be very difficult in such situations, but may be more
possible when the balance of power is not at stake. Each of these three theories is explored in
greater depth in subsequent chapters. Suffice it to say at this point that they clearly disagree
about how and why states co-operate.
There is a great deal of empirical literature on the Arctic Council that seeks to understand
the role of the institution in international governance. Some scholars see the institution as a nonpolicy-making research forum with an environmental mandate. This group of authors includes
political scientist Oran Young,119 diplomat Evan T. Bloom120 and political consultant Terry
Fenge.121 Other scholars see the Council as a soft-law body that helps create international norms
within its environmental mandate. This group of authors includes international lawyer Timo
Koivurova,122 and political scientists Andrea Charron,123 Rob Huebert,124 Leena Heinamaki,125
Alison Ronsen,126 Olav Schram Stokke127 and Monica Tennberg.128 Still, other authors write
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outside of this debate. Political scientist Klaus Dodds conceives of the Council as an “actornetwork,”129 while historian John English examines the history of the Council and attributes its
growth to broad international interests and domestic political concerns.130 The works of authors
who write about particular areas of the Council are addressed in the individual chapters relevant
to their work.
In terms of the normative literature, many authors argue that the Council should address a
wider range of issues and take stronger policy action. They include political scientist Michael
Byers,131 lawyer Oded Cedar132 political scientist Franklyn Griffiths,133 historian Whitney
Lackenbauer,134 the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program,135 legal scholar David
Vanderzwaag136 and consultant Brooks B. Yeager.137 Their works see the Council as a major
institution to improve Arctic governance. For example, the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security
Program released a report in 2012 that advocated the Council become a stronger, more robust
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international body. It encouraged Canada to push for a “new funding mechanism” so the Arctic
Council can undertake more projects.138 An example might be a stable budget. It also proposed,
“Any candidate for Arctic Council observer status must publicly declare its respect for the
sovereignty of Arctic states and the rights of Arctic indigenous peoples.”139 This measure would
increase the influence of indigenous peoples in the organization, as it would recognize their
inalienable governance rights. The organization also encouraged Canada to “work to continue
the evolution of the Arctic Council from a decision-shaping body into a negotiating forum for
new binding agreements.”140
1.7 – How is the Thesis Structured?
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 examines the reasons for the evolution and
growth of the Council’s mandate. Functionalism would expect the mandate to expand
automatically when doing so is in states’ technical interests, while neorealists would credit
regional balance of power concerns. Neoliberal institutionalists would expect that state interest,
as well as the form of negotiation, explain mandate growth. Chapter 2 argues that the mandate of
the Council is growing because climate change is creating economic opportunities states want to
exploit. Thus, neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the growth of the
Council’s mandate, although institutional competence as predicted by functionalism also is
important.
Chapter 3 explores the evolution of the Council’s policy-making role. Functionalism
would expect the Council’s policy-making role to expand automatically in response to issue
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spillover, whereas neorealists would expect the policy-making role to evolve as the result of
regional balance concerns and the desires of great powers. Neoliberal institutionalist scholars
would expect the policy-making role of the Council to expand when doing so offers potential,
absolute gains for states. Chapter 3 argues that the policy-making role of the Council is growing
because formal policy helps states make economic gains in the Arctic region. Neoliberal
institutionalism explains the reasons states have opted to create policy in the Council, but
neorealism explains the types of policy created in the Council.
Chapter 4 discusses the reasons for the establishment of a permanent secretariat for the
Arctic Council and the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity. Functionalism would
expect states to have established the secretariat to ensure efficiency and trust between Council
countries, whereas neorealism would expect the evolution in terms of power concerns.
Neoliberal institutionalism would argue that the evolution took place to enhance state absolute
gains and economic interest. Chapter 4 argues that the institutional capacity of the Council is
expanding because it helps states make absolute gains, as per the expectations of neoliberal
institutionalism. However, states have deliberately designed the secretariat to ensure the Council
will not challenge state autonomy in the Arctic, in line with predictions of neorealism.
Chapter 5 examines the evolving role of the observers and explains the reasons for their
increased interest in the Council. Functionalism would expect observers to have influence if their
participation contributes to the work of the Council, whereas neorealism predicts that regional
position concerns explains their participation and influence. Neoliberal institutionalism predicts
that observers can be influential in the Council, especially if they can provide compelling
information and ideas to states. The chapter argues that economics partly explain the
participation of observers. States seek to become observers in the Council to gain influence over
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the economic development of the region and environment protection. Arctic members accept
new observers when their participation promises to improve the economic prospects of the Arctic
region and provide economic opportunities. Thus, neoliberal institutionalism, with its emphasis
on the importance of absolute gains in international relations, provides the best explanation for
why observers seek to join the Council.
Chapter 6 addresses the role, evolution and influence of permanent participants in the
Arctic Council. Functionalism would predict that the permanent participants could be full and
influential members of the Council, in contrast to neorealist theorists who would expect them to
be powerless actors. Neoliberal institutionalism would predict that the permanent participants
could be influential depending on the effectiveness of their agency, or their ability to persuade
states of the merit of their views. Chapter 6 argues that neoliberal institutionalism provides the
best explanation for the influence of permanent participants. Permanent participants are less
influential than states in the Council, but can have influence based on their agency, or their
ability to lobby and ally with states to achieve desirable outcomes.
Chapter 7 summarizes the major conclusions of each chapter, and the contributions of
this thesis to literature on the Arctic Council as well as international relations theory. It then
proposes some directions for further research. It concludes that the economic potential of the
Arctic region explains the growth of the Council, tempered by the interests of great powers, and
that this evolution is relatively unaffected by the needs of Arctic residents. If the economic
potential of the Arctic region were not as strong as it is currently, we would not see the same
evolution of the Council. This conclusion is no doubt distressing for commentators and scholars
concerned about the environmental future of the Arctic. The Council is evolving from an
environmental institution dedicated to studying and preventing environmental damage to a forum
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promoting the economic future of the Arctic, possibly at the expense of the environment. This
thesis concludes that neoliberal institutionalism is correct in emphasizing state action motivated
by absolute gains, but underestimates the importance of great power gains in determining
outcomes.
Chapters in this thesis are summarized as follows:
Table 1.1: Summary of Chapters
Chapter 1
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6
Chapter 7

Introduction
Explaining the Expanding Mandate of the Council
Explaining the Policy-Making Role of the Council
Explaining the Evolving Institutional Capacity of the Arctic Council
Explaining the Role of Observers in the Arctic Council
The Evolution of the Arctic Council Permanent Participant’s Status,
Rights and Influence
Conclusion

1.8 – What Are the Contributions of the Thesis?
As a whole, the thesis enhances our understanding of the Arctic Council and its
evolution. Each chapter contributes a case study to the empirical literature on the Council and
tests the ability of three theories to explain institutional evolution. Chapter 2 provides the first
comprehensive understanding of the ongoing, contemporary political debates around the
Council’s mandate. As noted, earlier work attempted to understand the Council’s role in regional
governance, concluding that it is either a research institution141 or a soft-law institution.142 Many
authors debate whether the Council’s mandate should expand.143 This chapter concludes that the
Council is increasingly an economic institution and mandate expansion outside of this area is not
likely.
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Chapter 3 addresses the debate in literature about the role of the Arctic Council in two
ways. First, some writers do not see the Council as a policy-making body, but rather as a
research body,144 while others identify the Council as a “soft-law” body, or an international
institution that helps create norms.145 This thesis examines whether either of these
characterizations is accurate and ultimately argues for a new understanding of the Council as a
policy-facilitating forum. Second, as noted, a large body of literature argues that the Council’s
policy-making role should expand, in that it should make more policy, more often.146 This thesis
helps understand the realities of the Council’s current expansion and finds that the Council’s
policy-making role is already growing due to the economic potential of the Arctic region. Policymaking outside of issue areas with a strong economic dimension is unlikely.
Chapter 4 explains a change in the Council that current literature did not expect; namely,
the growth in its institutional capacity. Instead, many authors expected the Council to remain a
weak institution, with some informal capacity stemming from soft-law or norms;147 however,
institutional growth is ongoing. This thesis argues that the expansion of institutional capacity is
occurring because state policy-makers have deemed it is necessary to help the Council carry out
its expanded mandate. It lends support to calls for the Council to undertake more work.148 A
greater bureaucratic capability will be necessary to allow such work to take place. Chapter 4
argues that the current bureaucratic arm of the Council will not allow it to become the strong
governance body, desired by many scholars.
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Chapter 5 examines a controversy in the literature. Many authors see the observers as
relatively non-consequential actors in the Council that contribute relatively little of substance to
it.149 In contrast, Timo Koivurova argues that the observers’ presence in the Council is changing
norms about what actors have the right to participate in Arctic governance.150 For Koivurova, the
observers make the Council a more international body, in which a variety of actors come
together to address environmental issues of global consequence. This thesis examines which of
these two perspectives is most accurate in the contemporary Arctic Council by thoroughly
examining the history of observers in the institution. It concludes that the observers are relatively
minor contributors, but that their interest in the Council demonstrates state enthusiasm for the
region’s economic future and environmental importance.
Chapter 6 addresses a debate in literature on the Council permanent participants. Earlier
literature debated whether the permanent participants would have “full participation” in the
Council,151 while later literature saw the permanent participants as minor yet important
contributors to a fundamentally state-centric institution,152 whose presence grants the Council a
certain amount of legitimacy.153 The chapter evaluates the merits of these arguments and
concludes that the permanent participants are more influential now than ever before, but they still
have significantly less influence than do states.
This thesis contributes to international relations theory by testing the assumptions of
functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 test predictions
about the influence of international institutions, while Chapter 5 assesses assumptions about the
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composition of international institutions. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 also examine predictions as to
whether international institutions can influence international politics. Chapter 5 tests whether
non-member states are important in this process. Chapter 6 tests assumptions about the
composition of international institutions vis-à-vis the permanent participants. It evaluates the
assumptions that these theories make about non-state actors in international institutions, as
permanent participants are non-state actors with membership in the Council. These theories
assume that they are outsiders, lobbying states. Chapter 6 assesses their power as insiders that are
seemingly able to compete with states for influence. As such, the thesis provides insights into the
validity and reliability of international relations theories. It suggests the relevance of neoliberal
institutionalism, if adjusted to include aspects of neorealism and functionalism.
Overall, the thesis tests the following broad theoretical questions of relevance to
international relations:
Functionalism


Are states allowing the Council to evolve automatically in response to issue spillover and
clear issues demanding a policy response? Do non-state actors participate fully in the
Council?

Neorealism


Are states allowing the Council to evolve to maintain a regional balance and
accommodate great power interest? Are non-state actors powerless in the Council?

Neoliberal institutionalism


Are states allowing the Council to evolve to fulfill absolute gains? Do non-state actors
have influence in the Council based on their agency?

By answering these questions in regards to the various ways in which the Arctic Council is
evolving, it contributes both an empirical case study and theoretical insights.
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1.9 – What Methodology is Employed?
This thesis as a whole presents a case study of international co-operation. Each instance
of evolution represents its own case study. The use of a single case study to understand
circumstances of international co-operation is advantageous because a narrow study makes it
easier to thoroughly and systematically understand complex dynamics, the operation of a
phenomenon or a causal mechanism.154 A single case study is limiting because conventional
methodological wisdom says that it is not possible to generalize from a single case.155
Nonetheless, each case study adds to the body of knowledge from which generalizations can be
drawn. Single cases also can reveal scientific facts, hypotheses and theoretical propositions to be
confirmed through further case work or studies with a large number of cases.156 Some scholars,
such as economic geographer Bent Flyvbjerg, argue that the type of in-depth understanding
gleaned from single case studies is particularly suited to innovative learning.157 The single case
study also can be of value because one can communicate a level of complexity and contradiction
that multiple case study research makes more difficult.158 Simple and eloquent theory is still
possible while understanding the complexity of events.159
This thesis employs historical process tracing, which is “the systematic examination of
diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in the light of research questions and hypotheses
posed by the investigator.”160 It “inherently analyzes trajectories of change and causation” and
“gives close attention to sequences of independent, dependent and intervening variables.”161
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Historical process tracing involves mapping and thoroughly understanding the stages and steps in
an event, which in this case is the evolution of the Arctic Council. This process unveils causal
mechanisms, or the cause of a phenomena or event.162 A major advantage of process tracing is
that understanding the process of an event can help overcome common problems in research,
such as “reciprocal causation, spuriousness and selection bias.”163 Reciprocal causation refers to
situations in which multiple factors impact one another, making causation difficult to deduce.
Spuriousness refers to situations in which a relationship between two variables is a coincidence,
yet mistakenly understood as a causal relationship. Selection bias occurs when an inappropriate
variable or piece of data is chosen to study a relationship. Understanding the order of events and
process tracing helps untangle these complex relationships.
Using historical process tracing, the thesis examines Council meetings and studies the
significant events outside those meetings. It explains why these events took place and provides a
comprehensive history of the Arctic Council. It examines the discussions, agenda items, projects
and decisions undertaken by the Council and how these changed over time. It analyzes the key
bargaining coalitions and explains the reasons these coalitions emerged. Most of the events in
Council meetings are routine and straightforward. The historical process tracing focused on 1)
discussions that spurred great controversy, which reveal areas of potential evolution, and 2)
events related to debates about the five instances of evolution that this thesis examines.
The results of the historical process tracing form the dependent variables for the analysis.
The expectations of the major international relations theories form the independent variables for
the analysis. Chapter 2 examines the output of the Council and its discussions on projects. It
looks specifically for instances in which states argued for or discussed expanding the mandate of
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the Arctic Council. These instances form the dependent variables of the analysis. Chapter 3
examines the output of the Council and its discussions of formal policy. It looks specifically for
those instances in which there was controversy over the creation of policy. These instances form
the dependent variables of the analysis. Chapter 4 examines the negotiations to form the
Council’s secretariat. The stages in negotiation form the dependent variables. Chapter 5
examines the negotiations to add observers to the Council and their activity once they were in the
Council. These two sets of activities form the dependent variables, separate and yet interrelated.
Chapter 6 examines the total output and activity of permanent participants in the Arctic Council.
This activity is the dependent variable, expressed as a measure of their influence in the Council.
The independent variables in Chapters 2 through 6 are the expectations about institutional
growth drawn from international relations theory. Table 1.2 provides more details about these
variables and how they relate to each chapter in this analysis.
Table 1.2: Variables
Dependent Variable (Chapters 2-5)
Changes in Council mandate
Changes in policy-making
Establishment of secretariat
Interest in new observers

Dependent variable (Chapter 6)
Influence of permanent participants

Independent Variable (Chapters 2-5)
State interest
Automatic expansion
Issue spillover
Competency
Institutional capacity
Interest group pressure
Absolute gain
Economic potential
Form of negotiation
Path dependence
Norms
Relative gains
Great power interest
Balance of power
Independent variable (Chapter 6)
Provision of quality of information
No influence/incorrect appearance of
influence
Form of negotiation/agency of actors

Related Theory
Functionalism
Functionalism
Functionalism
Functionalism
Functionalism
Functionalism
Neoliberal institutionalism
Neoliberal institutionalism
Neoliberal institutionalism
Neoliberal institutionalism
Neoliberal institutionalism
Neorealism
Neorealism
Neorealism
Related Theory
Functionalism
Neorealism
Neoliberal institutionalism
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This thesis includes data collected from five sources. First, the history of the Council’s
activities and decisions is traced from 5,100 pages of the minutes of Council meetings and other
Council documents. These minutes provided an outline of the activities of the Council, as well as
its discussions and decisions. Second, to understand why decisions were made, 33 interviews
were conducted with policy-makers from all of the Arctic states and representatives of the
permanent participant organizations. These were elite interviews, designed to “reconstruct an
event or set of events.”164 In elite interviews, “the aim is not to draw a representative sample of a
larger population . . . but to draw a sample that includes the most important political players who
have participated in the political events being studied.”165 Interviewees were selected on the basis
of reputation and the number of Council meetings attended. The interviews were semi-structured.
They probed events, discussions and decisions, thus building on the knowledge derived from the
meeting minutes. The questions specifically asked for insights about internal discussion around
decisions. Twenty-one of the interviews took place in person, in Ottawa, Ontario, and
Washington, D.C., at a site of the interviewee’s choosing during spring and winter 2013. The rest
occurred via Skype or email in the summer of 2013. Follow-up interviews and correspondence
occurred in fall 2014. Seventeen interviewees wished to remain anonymous, largely because of
conditions imposed by their employer, such as the government of Canada, or fear of negative
consequences for revealing sometimes politically sensitive information about Council
proceedings. In such cases, quotes are attributed so as not to reveal the person’s identity (for
example, “a senior Canadian foreign affairs official and a former Council delegation member”).
Fourteen interviewees asked to see and potentially edit quotes before attribution and their wishes
were respected. Two interviewees allowed attribution without a review. The questions posed
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varied with the interviewee, depending on which meetings they attended. Examples are in
appendix one. Third, attending the October 2013 Council meeting in Whitehorse, Yukon,
facilitated gaining first-hand experience of the operation of the Council and the policy-making
process of meetings. Conversations were held with Council policy-makers and state delegation
members who provided insights into the history of the Council. Fourth, the WikiLeaks database
provided more than one dozen diplomatic cables relating to Council decisions that explained the
reasons behind state action. Fifth, policy-makers made more than a dozen pages of classified
documents related to the Council available to the researcher.
In conclusion, this thesis assesses of the evolution of the Arctic Council. It answers the
following question: what explains the Council’s evolution? It formed as a weak environmental
research forum but has grown into a broad policy-making institution of global governance.
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CHAPTER 2: EXPLAINING THE EXPANDING MANDATE OF THE COUNCIL
The mandate of the Arctic Council is undergoing great change and evolution. Although
the Council emerged to facilitate as well as promote co-operation on environmental protection
and sustainable development in the Arctic region, the mandate does not specifically limit its
work to these two areas. The only issue off-limits to the Council is military security. In the past,
the Council carried out mostly environmental work as it developed into a research institution that
produced scientific reports and technical projects about the Arctic. In recent years, the mandate
has functionally expanded in that it addresses more issues, namely economics and public safety,
such as business representation, search and rescue and oil spill response. The mandate could
expand further as states seek to exploit economic opportunity in the region.
This chapter answers the following question: why is the mandate of the Council
evolving? “Mandate” refers to the types of issues states instruct the Council to address. The
Council’s formal mandate has not changed. Rather, its informal mandate, or the types of issues it
addresses, has expanded. This chapter explains changes in the Council’s mandate using
neoliberal institutionalist theory, neorealist theory and functionalist theory. Functionalism would
predict that an institution’s mandate would expand automatically due to state interest, issue
spillover, institutional pressure or outsider lobbying. Neoliberal institutional theory would
predict the institution’s mandate would expand when states stand to gain something through cooperation, particularly when the gain is economic, and also that the form of negotiation impacts
outcomes. Neorealist theory would predict that the Council’s mandate would expand when
doing so enhances relative gains and regional balance. The chapter concludes that neoliberal
institutionalism, complimented with arguments from functionalism, provide the best explanation
for the Council’s evolution and that the economic potential of the Arctic explains the mandate’s
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growth. If the economic potential of the Arctic were not perceived to be increasing, the Council’s
mandate would not expand. The central argument of this chapter is that the Arctic Council’s
mandate is undergoing expansion and addressing more issues than ever before because the
increasing economic potential of the Arctic region provides an incentive for states to co-operate
and increase its work. In addition, the fact that the Council has demonstrated that it is competent
to take on a greater range of issues and that interest groups effectively lobbied for mandate
expansion contributed to growth. The first section details the theory employed in this chapter.
The second section traces the evolution of the Council’s mandate from 1996 until 2013 to
establish that the mandate has indeed undergone expansion. The third section explains the
mandate’s evolution by reconciling trends in the Council’s history with the hypotheses of
neoliberal institutionalism, neorealism and functionalism.
This chapter contributes to the academic literature in three important ways. First, no
existing work systematically examines and seeks to understand the current evolution of the
Arctic Council’s mandate. In the study of the Council, a first group of authors focus on why it
emerged, as seen in work by political scientist Oran Young,166 political scientist Olav Schram
Stokke,167 American diplomat Evan Bloom,168 consultant Terry Fenge,169 political scientist Rob
Huebert,170 historian John English171 and political scientist Timo Koivurova.172 These authors
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mostly view the institution as a research body that facilitates information sharing on
environmental issues, occasionally inspiring action.173 A second group of authors, led by Timo
Koivurova, disagree and view the Council as a norm-creation body that creates soft-law on
environmental issues.174 This chapter argues that a new conceptualization of the Council as an
economic facilitator is necessary.
Second, this research will help inform debates about the role of the Council. A large body
of work, especially the work of the Munk-Gordon Arctic Security Program, argues the Council’s
mandate should expand further,175 while some authors, especially work by Oran Young, argue it
should maintain its current structure.176 This work largely ignores the political context of the
Council. For example, political scientist Michael Byers advocates that the Council should create
an oil spill prevention treaty, but does not examine why the Council rejected such a treaty when
creating an oil spill response treaty.177 Other authors who advocate a greater role for the Council
are cited in Chapter 1. This paper argues that subsequent mandate expansion is unlikely into
policy areas without a strong economic imperative.
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Third, this chapter contributes to literature that tests the explanatory reliability and
validity of neoliberal institutionalism, neorealism and functionalism. Case studies, such as this
chapter, are necessary to prove the reliability and validity of theory. This chapter suggests the
continued validity of neoliberal institutionalism, with some modification drawn from neorealism
and functionalism.
2.1 – Theorizing the Evolution of the Arctic Council
A series of predictions are necessary to provide a context to explain the evolution of the
Council. Functionalism argues that institutions change without prompting and would make six
predictions about Council evolution. The first four hypotheses explain state preferences, or why
states want to evolve the Council. The fifth and sixth hypotheses predict outcomes of evolution.
H1: The Arctic Council’s mandate is expanding because all member states stand to make
absolute material gains through automatic expansion.
Functionalists hold that the mandate of an institution will expand naturally when all states stand
to gain something in a technical sense, such as a piece of information or capability that they
would not otherwise have.178 According to functionalists, institutions will evolve without state
prompting in a “self-sustaining” process.179 Neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism predict
that states would have to change institutions deliberately and would co-operate for different
reasons. According to functionalism, “Driving the alleged self-sustaining integration process was
. . . a mechanism called ‘spillover,’ . . . whereby the creation of a common policy in one sector
generates the ‘need’ to transfer policy-making in related sectors to the supranational level as
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well.”180 For example, states may desire to make gains by increasing trade with several countries
and so an international institution will create a new free trade agreement. Creating a new free
trade agreement means new trade routes might be necessary. Thus, the international institution
would develop new trade routes, even though such work might be outside its original mandate.
The development of these trade routes would be in the absolute interest of all member states.
States will only act together when structural changes create unified preferences.
H2: States are allowing the Arctic Council mandate to expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic
goal around a less political issue area.
Functionalists argue that the Council’s mandate will expand because states seek to fulfill
a mutual technocratic goal in a less political issue area, such as search and rescue or
environmental monitoring.181 A less political issue area is a non-ideological issue, where actors
generally agree on the overall goal. These are policy areas outside of vital state interest. The
other theories studied would agree with this hypothesis, though functionalists emphasize this
point. Other theories predict that states will be hesitant to co-operate in areas crucial to their
interest, such as military security, since non-compliance could threaten state survival. Noncompliance with a search and rescue agreement, for example, would present problems but would
not threaten state security. Evolution in response to less political issue areas is automatic.182 For
example, one functionalist interpretation of the formation of the European Union is that,
“rational-bureaucratic technocracy” was “a benevolent social driving force” behind the
organization.183 Co-operation on less political issues can build trust that leads to co-operation on
more political issues.
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H3: The mandate is expanding because institutional capacity allows it to evolve without
disruption.
Functionalists would predict that mandate expansion would occur when the organization
has a reasonable degree of autonomy from states.184 In the words of political scientists Bastiaan
van Apeldoorn, Henk Overbeek and Magnus Ryner, “There is also a political spillover, whereby
supranational institutions attain ever higher levels of policy-making autonomy, resulting in a
situation in which the supranational executive sets the political agenda and independently carries
the integration process forward.”185 As stated by functionalist David Mitrany, “Every functional
link helps to build up a common legal order.”186 The other two theories examined argue that

international institutions cannot become fully independent actors. The process toward gaining
independence proceeds in five stages. First, states create international institutions to accomplish
technocratic tasks. Second, international institutions automatically address new issues as
challenges arise. Third, states grant these institutions a certain degree of independence to ensure
they can complete their tasks efficiently.187 Independent institutions also help ensure cooperation because states will be more likely to work together when no one state can dominate.188
Fourth, states give up their own ability to dominate in order to ensure co-operation. Independent
institutions are more efficient because they can help mediate among states when new problems
emerge and generate new ideas.189 Fifth, independence allows international organizations to set
agendas and even demand co-operation or action. Institutions also can encourage co-operation in
subtle ways, such as by gathering information and facilitating the emergence of new issues.190
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H4: The mandate is expanding because an epistemic community is convincing states it should
expand.
Functionalists would predict that interest groups and epistemic communities of
individuals could help lobby states to increase the powers and responsibilities of the
organization, as individuals can influence state policy.191 Individuals, epistemic communities and
interest groups can bring information forward that impacts how states define their interests.
Epistemic communities are groups of experts who share a common perspective on an issue.
Interest groups can bring forward “interests, beliefs and expectations.”192 A difference between
functionalism and the other theories is that functionalists hold that individuals or groups can
influence states at the international level. For example, groups of individuals negatively impacted
by climate change would demand institutional action to address the issue in the Arctic Council.
Similarly, companies and individuals that can benefit from the economic opportunities of climate
change would advocate the Arctic Council expand its mandate into the economic realm.
H5: The mandate is expanding because the Arctic Council has proven itself competent.
Functionalists assert “organizations that are judged to be competent will gain additional
powers”; hence, the fact the Arctic Council’s mandate is expanding indicates that it has proven it
can execute its current mandate.193 Governments want to entrust tasks to entities that can
successfully complete those tasks. This idea contrasts with neoliberal institutionalists and
neorealists, who privilege state interest for institutional expansion. For functionalists, mandate
expansion is an evolutionary process as long as the institution is an effective one.194
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H6: The process of mandate expansion should occur automatically and proceed consistently.
Functionalists would predict the Council is evolving automatically. As noted, on the
international scene, new issues emerge that demand state response, which can create separate
issues.195 For example, climate change presents a challenge to states that the Council will
automatically address, given its mandate to work on the Arctic environment. The issue also
presents economic opportunities in the region as melting sea ice opens potential trade routes and
unlocks resources. The Council will automatically address economic issues because of its other
work on climate change, which leads to institutional mandate expansion into economic areas.
Functionalists would predict this process should proceed without interruption, in contrast to the
other theories studied that predict institutional expansion is a highly political process.
Neoliberal institutionalists would hold four hypotheses about the evolution of the Arctic
Council’s mandate, based on their emphasis on the material interests of states. The first three
hypotheses explain state preferences to evolve the Council, while the fourth explains outcomes.
H1: States are expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain
something through expansion.
Neoliberal institutionalists would argue that states expand the Arctic Council’s mandate “when
states can jointly benefit from co-operation.”196 States define their interests rationally, focusing
on material gains. As long as all states gain something through mandate expansion, or make an
absolute gain, they will be likely to co-operate.197 Functionalists expect states would co-operate
to make absolute gains while neorealists expect co-operation to result in relative gains, defined
later. For neoliberal institutionalists, the great powers of the Arctic (the United States and
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Russia) must gain something through co-operation. In addition, the likelihood of co-operation
will be high because all of the countries involved face the “shadow of the future.”198 In other
words, all of the states in the Arctic Council interact on a number of issues and are thus likely to
need to co-operate in the future. These states will strive to maintain good relations in the present.
In the case of the Arctic Council, the likelihood of co-operation will be high.
H2: The expansion of the Arctic Council is occurring because of an economic issue.
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that economic gains are a particularly potent motivation
for international co-operation and Council evolution.199 All theories would agree with this point,
though neoliberal institutionalists emphasize this type of co-operation to the greatest extent.
H3: States are allowing the Arctic Council to expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal,
tempered by path dependence and norms.
The Council’s mandate should expand to fulfill shared state goals and provide a technical
service. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that states use international institutions to “provide
information, reduce transaction costs, make commitments more credible, establish focal points
for coordination and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity.”200 Functionalists and
neorealists mostly agree with this hypothesis. However, neoliberal institutionalists would expect
that norms and path dependency impact institutional evolution.201 Norms refer to informal
expectations and patterns of behaviour that states follow. Path dependency means that once a
state invests resources in a project, it is unlikely to change course, even if it is clear the initial
course of action was an unwise one. States will expand the Council’s mandate when it provides
gains to states and no norms or path dependence holds evolution in check.
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H4: The form of negotiation (such as coalitions, information and the power of persuasion) has
an impact on the evolution of the Council’s mandate.
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that agency, or the form of negotiation (e.g. the type of
interaction between states) has an impact on the outcomes of negotiations.202 Thus, the Council’s
mandate is evolving in part due to the form of negotiation. States, non-governmental
organizations, interest groups and epistemic communities bring forward information that states
may find persuasive. Outcomes may not reflect the interests of great powers, as neorealist
scholars would predict. Functionalists would expect automatic evolution. Even small states can
exert and impact on negotiations based on the persuasiveness of the information they brings
forward, their ability to ally with like-minded states to form coalitions and the effective
employment of persuasive negotiation tactics.
Neorealists make three predictions that explain when an institution’s mandate would
expand, based on their emphasis on the importance of state security. The first two hypotheses
predict preferences while the third predicts outcomes.
H1: Relative gains will mediate the evolution of the Council’s mandate.
Neorealists would predict that relative gains, rather than absolute gains, would influence the
evolution of the Council’s mandate. Relative gains refer to the notion that in interactions in
which vital interests are a stake, states must gain more than rival states.203 Neoliberal
institutionalists hold that in any interaction, a state will co-operate if it gains something, termed
an absolute gain. Functionalists would emphasize absolute gains, as well. For neorealists, great
powers would not agree to any change in the Council’s mandate if it had an impact on state
security or its power relative to that of a rival. To quote neorealist scholar Robert Gilpin,
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“Realism assumes that national security is and always will be the principle concern of states.”204
Participation in the Council needs to enhance states’ ability to survive and self-help in the
international system.205 Thus, the mandate could not negatively impact state survival or security
in any way. Economic gains enhance state security, as a good economy is necessary to maintain
independence and self-help in the international system.206 The same is true of environmental
considerations, as a healthy environment is likely necessary to maintain independence. Other
sorts of considerations can be important to states, though security concerns will underpin any
state interaction or instance of institutional evolution. Neorealists would predict that the Council
would not exist at all if it negatively influenced state security, even with its work on
environmental protection.
H2: States are expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council to provide “balance” in the region.
Neorealists would argue that states are evolving the mandate of the Council so the
institution can maintain regional balance. A “balance” refers to a situation in which various
coalitions of states have equal capabilities and thus will find conflict contrary to their interest.
The Council could be an attempt to create balance against some external threat to the Arctic
region or a coalition of powers in a different region, such as China. Alternatively, small powers
could attempt to exert control over a great power within the Arctic.207 Neorealists argue that
three tenets define the international system: statism, survival and self-help.208 They assert that
states are the only important actors in the international system and fundamentally seek protection
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from external threats. Neorealists expect that states will expand or evolve the mandate of the
Arctic Council to create a balance against an external or internal challenge, potentially
environmental or economic, which neoliberal institutionalists and functionalists do not.
H3: The evolution of the Council’s mandate should reflect the preferences of great powers.
Neorealists argue that great powers would not enter into the Arctic Council or allow its
mandate to change unless it met the interests of these actors.209 Neoliberal institutionalists and
functionalists do not make this prediction. The great powers will always be the most important
actors in the international system. For instance, in the European Union, “the role of major
political players, namely Germany, France and the United Kingdom, is central.”210 Great powers
have greater economic and military power than smaller powers. These powers have less need to
co-operate than do other powers and can demand that any co-operation reflect its interests.211
We can review each theory by summarizing the question each theoretical lens attempts to
answer. In regards to functionalism, is the Council’s mandate evolving automatically in response
to issue spillover and clear issues demanding a policy response? The theory’s predictions would
be falsified if evolution were not automatic or consistent. In regards to neoliberal
institutionalism, are states allowing the Council’s mandate to evolve to fulfill absolute gains,
tempered by the form of negotiation? The theory’s predictions would be falsified if evolution
was in response to relative gains and the form of negotiation was not important. In regards to
neorealism, are states allowing the Council to evolve to maintain a regional balance and
accommodate great power interest? The theory’s predictions would be falsified if absolute gains
motivated states, or if great power preference did not prevail in outcomes. Table 2.1 summarizes

209

Powell, “Absolute and Relative Gains,” 230.
Gilpin, “A Realist Perspective on International Governance,” 238.
211
Dunne and Schmidt, “Realism,”143.
210

55
the key variables examined in the analysis. Variables highlighted are key unique variables that
prove or disprove the explanatory power of a theory.
Table 2.1: Dependent and Independent Variables
Dependent variable: expansion of the Arctic Council’s mandate into economic
and other areas

Necessary (n)
/ sufficient (s)

Common ind. variables

S
S

Less political issue area
Economic gains

Functionalism ind. variables Absolute gains (i.e. states gain something)
Issue spillover
Independent institution
Interest group or epistemic community lobbying
Institution has proven competence
Automatic response

N
N&S
N&S
N
N
N&S

Neoliberal ind. variables

N&S
N
N
N
N&S

Absolute gains (i.e. states gain something)
Shadow of the future
Lack of path dependence
Lack of contrary norms
Form of negotiation (i.e. information, coalitions)

Neorealist ind. variables

Relative gains (i.e. states gain more than rivals)
N&S
No security ramifications
N
“Balance” motivations
N&S
Great power preference reigns supreme
N&S
Necessary and sufficient conditions are highlighted because they are the key variables that will
prove or disprove the predictions of the various theories.
2.2 – Understanding the Evolution of the Council
This section shows that the Council’s mandate expanded between 1996 and 2013. The
Arctic Council’s mandate has proceeded to grow in four periods. During the first period, from
1991 until 1996, states co-operated on environmental issues in the Arctic Environmental
Protection Strategy (AEPS). States and governments debated the merits of transforming the
AEPS into a stronger institution that would address human security issues and perhaps military
security. In the second period, from 1996 until 2004, the Council emerged as an institution to
promote environmental protection and sustainable development. States and governments debated
the definition of “sustainable development” and the place of military security within this
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mandate. In the third period, from 2004 until 2007, Russia committed action to shift emphasis in
the Council’s work to emergency preparedness from environmental protection and sustainable
development. Environmental research was still a major part of the Council’s work as research
revealed the problem of climate change in the Arctic region. In the fourth period, from 2008 until
the present, the Council promoted economic growth, in addition to addressing environmental
issues and sustainable development issues. The Arctic Council has evolved from an institution
that promotes environmental conservation and sustainable development to an institution that also
promotes regional economic growth, in response to opportunities created by climate change.
2.2.1 – 1991-1996
From 1991 until 1996, states debated the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
(AEPS) and Council mandate. To establish that evolution in the Council’s mandate has taken
place, it is necessary to understand the institution’s intended mandate at its founding. This
subsection seeks to answer two questions. First, what was the intended mandate of the Council at
its founding for each actor? Second, what were the major debates about the Council’s mandate?
In terms of the first question, all of the Arctic states intended and agreed that the Council
mandate should have a strong environmental component because it was a successor to the AEPS,
an environmental body in which states researched the extent of Arctic pollution. The AEPS
emerged partly to encourage co-operation between the United States and the Soviet Union
following the Cold War, which led to the creation of the Council. As noted in Chapter 1, the
United States and its western allies competed for global dominance with the Soviet Union and its
eastern comrades from 1945 until 1991. The Arctic, lying between the two adversaries, would
have been a theatre of combat in any military conflict. The United States counted four other
Arctic countries as allies in its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) collective defence
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regime, namely Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Norway. Another Arctic country, Sweden, was
formally neutral but more closely allied with the West than the East. The government of the
other Arctic state, Finland, faced difficulty, as relations with its Russian neighbour were
historically problematic. Finland was a colony of Russia for 108 years leading up to the First
World War. The Soviet Union invaded Finland in 1939, which resulted in Finland losing a tenth
of its territory after the war. Finland’s governments sought to maintain good relations with its
neighbour throughout the Cold War by opting not to join NATO, while working to avoid being
drawn behind the Iron Curtain. In the 1980s, the administration of hawkish United States
President Ronald Reagan increased military spending and the Soviet economy under Premier
Mikhail Gorbachev weakened. The United States increased its annual military spending to
$456.5 billion in 1987 from $325.1 billion in 1980.212 The Soviet Union struggled to keep pace,
leading to economic problems and contributing to its fall. Nuclear war seemed more likely than
at any point since the 1960s as 1970s attempts to create détente faded.
Toward the later 1980s, the AEPS was created as hope increased that an Arctic
governance institution could emerge with a collaborative, peace-building mandate. The United
States Department of State issued an Arctic policy document in April 1983, the United States
Arctic Policy, which indicated it was interested in expanding Arctic co-operation, though it did
nothing to follow up on this statement.213 Relations between the Soviet Union and the United
States subsequently worsened after the Soviet Union shot down Korean Airlines Flight 007 on
September 1, 1983. In 1985, political scientist Oran Young authored an article in Foreign Policy
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magazine that called on states to proclaim the Arctic a “zone of peace.”214 On October 1, 1987,
in the wake of the negotiation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and a
general improvement in Soviet-United States relations, a conciliatory Gorbachev gave a speech
in Murmansk, Soviet Union, which echoed Young’s words by advocating making the Arctic a
“zone of peace.”215 The government of Finland was inspired by these words and contacted
foreign affairs departments in the Arctic states to convene a conference on this subject.216 There
seemed to be a possibility in the late 1980s that an Arctic institution with a peace-building
mandate could emerge, which incidentally led to the creation of the AEPS and Council.
These discussions lead to the AEPS and Council because there was also hope that an
Arctic institution with an environmental mandate could emerge. Finnish policy-makers were
particularly hopeful that collaboration on environmental protection could ease Cold War
tensions. States first became aware of Arctic contamination problems due to observations by
pilots flying over the Arctic in the 1970s.217 In the 1980s, Arctic states and indigenous groups
were concerned after it became clear “that sloppy Russian workmanship has led to an increase in
nuclear pollution in the environmentally sensitive Arctic Ocean.”218 The Soviet Union unsafely
stored nuclear waste in the Kola Peninsula that borders Finland. The Soviet Union did not have
regulations to govern the storage of the cancer causing industrial coolant polychlorinated
biphenyl (PCB) safely.219 In bilateral meetings, the government of Finland had difficultly
convincing the Soviet Union to take action on this issue.220 On both issues, states knew the
problem existed, but did not understand the extent of the problem. The environment emerged as
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an issue around which states could collaborate to ease Cold War tensions, which would set the
stage for the emphasis on environmental protection in the Arctic Council.
The Council’s intended mandate emphasizes environmental protection because the AEPS
emerged as an environmental organization. Relations between Cold War adversaries continued to
improve as the Soviet Union began to dissolve after 1989. Finland successfully convened a
conference on Arctic governance in Rovaniemi, Finland, in September 1989 after two years of
requests and letters sent to Arctic governments. It took so long to convene a conference because
many Western policy-makers did not believe the sincerity of Gorbachev’s proposal, since he had
not proposed to close the Soviet Union’s military installations in the Arctic, as noted in Chapter
1. International co-operation between East and West of this type was new and so state officials
had low expectations for this meeting. Before the meeting, policy-makers mutually decided to
work to take “co-operative measures to protect the Arctic environment.”221 After three further
meetings, (April 1990 in Yellowknife, Canada, January 1991 in Kiruna, Sweden and June 1991
in Rovaniemi, Finland) states created the AEPS. The AEPS was not an international institution,
per se, but rather a research strategy. The meetings were not contentious, amid a spirit of cooperation. In addition, the AEPS was a scientific strategy that did not have the sorts of impacts
on vital state interest that create contentious negotiations. States created four working groups,
staffed by government scientists and experts from each Arctic country, to meet and compile
research on Arctic environmental issues. The AEPS would hold bi-annual meetings of
environment department officials to share findings. The four working groups were the Arctic
Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), which compiled reports on the extent of
Arctic pollution; Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), which studied the health of
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plants and animals; Emergency Prevention, Preparedness, and Response (EPPR), which prepared
for potential emergency situations, such as an oil spill, and; the Protection of the Arctic Marine
Environment (PAME), which monitored the extent of Arctic marine pollution. The AEPS came
into being because it was not overly ambitious, but it compiled useful scientific information.
The AEPS led to the creation of the Council because within three years, state researchers
had done a great deal of work to establish the extent of Arctic pollution, which provided the
impetus to continue this work in the Arctic Council. The AEPS found more than 180,000 tonnes
of PCB fluids had been produced in the Russian Arctic during the Cold War, without safe
storage or disposal facilities.222 The process to create the Council began as state policy-makers
informally debated how to continue and formalize this work. The prospect of an Arctic
international institution was on the agenda, prompted by Gorbachev’s earlier proposal for an
Arctic zone of peace. Canada came to champion a weakened version of a 1991 proposal from the
Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) that called for the creation of a formal Arctic international
organization to promote the region as a zone of peace.223 The ICC’s President, Mary Simon, had
some influence in the 1990s Canadian Liberal government, as she had represented the Inuit
during the 1982 repatriation of the Canadian constitution and the negotiation of the Nunavut
Land Claims Agreement. As detailed by John English, she pressed Canada to establish the
Council during her various interactions with the government during the early 1990s and helped
organize a conference on the proposal in 1992.224 The process leading to the creation of the
Council began in 1995, during a meeting in Ottawa between United States President Bill Clinton
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and Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien.225 Chretien proposed the creation of the Arctic
Council. Clinton agreed to discuss the issue and so Canadian officials sent communications to
the other Arctic state foreign affairs departments, which also agreed to discuss creating a council.
Policy-makers in the Nordic countries in particular were enthusiastic about the prospect of an
Arctic council.226 Russian policy-makers were more reluctant, but agreed to discuss the idea.227
State delegations attempted to negotiate the creation of a formal Arctic international organization
outside of AEPS meetings and through teleconferencing during 1995, as well as a round of
negotiations in Ottawa during June, with the goal of seeing the AEPS transition from a strategy
to an international institution by the end of that year. As is evident in subsequent chapters,
contentious issues emerged in these early negotiations, which continue in the Council to this day.
This chapter limits its focus to contentions over the mandate.
The Nordic governments strongly intended that the Council’s mandate have a strong
environmental component. The major reason these states supported a Council is that their policymakers sought to force Russia to address environmental issues. Policy-makers in all of the Arctic
states had a desire to address pollution in the Russian Arctic, having received troubling
information about the unsafe storage of nuclear and other waste materials after the end of the
Cold War. 228 However, contaminants and persistent organic pollutants (POP) from Russia
affected the Nordic countries more than North America,229 particularly Finland and Norway,
given these countries’ proximity.230 One policy-maker summarized, “I felt the leading countries
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[in negotiations] were in Scandinavia.”231 The force of the scientific evidence about
environmental problems in Russia gave the Nordic countries, as well as Canada and the United
States, a powerful bargaining chip to push for an Arctic council.
Canada, the United States and the Nordic countries also intended that the Council have an
environmental mandate because many policy-makers had a concern that Russia did not want to
address environmental issues. Arctic environmental policy-makers believed that Russians had
the weakest environmental awareness of any Arctic country. Russian officials were “extremely
nonchalant,” with the misguided belief that “Russia is a gigantic country” too large to suffer
serious environmental damage.232 The Russian economy went through a depression following the
collapse of the Soviet Union as gross domestic product fell by more than fifty per cent during the
1990s.233 The Russian government closed half its Arctic environmental monitoring stations, amid
budget shortfalls.234 The top priority for Russian policy-makers became the country’s economic
recovery.
Policy-makers outside Russia intended a Council with an environmental mandate for fear
that many Russian officials opposed environmental action, as environmentalists were at the
forefront of the country’s democracy movement. International Russian experts believed, “A lot
of the constituency for democratic reform came from the environmental community” because
after the 1986 Chernobyl disaster it was clear “that the Russian regime was ignoring Russia’s
many environmental problems.”235 In 1996, as the Council was coming into being, the Russian
government “downgraded” its environmental department from a ministry to a less-powerful
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“state committee.”236 In 2008, the Russian government combined the committee with the
Ministry of Natural Resources to become the Ministry of Natural Resources and the
Environment.237 A United States expert on Russia and Arctic policy-maker summarized,
There was a growing pressure to tame this environmental beast that had politically been very
important when the Soviet Union disappeared. As time went on, they made too many enemies
within the power structures and largely industrial corporations . . . Since then, we’ve been
watching very closely how Russia tries to manage its environmental policy functions.238

Experts within the Arctic governments believed that “major oligarchs and industrial concerns” in
Russia did not favour “any kind of strong environmental regulatory body coming out of
Moscow.”239 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the transition to capitalism led to privatization
of natural resources and former state business that created a class of wealthy business people in
the country unprecedented in Russian history.240 Policy-makers outside Russia saw this class as
hostile to environmental regulation.241 Economic concern and the importance of Russia as a
regional player could have given it a strong bargaining chip to resist Arctic governance.
Canada intended to create a Council with an environmental mandate, but it also intended
that the Council find a way to formally consider the views of Northerners on Arctic governance
and include a “human dimension” in the work of the AEPS.242 Indigenous peoples’ organizations
also intended that an Arctic council include human security issues. Canada and the indigenous
peoples’ organizations, particularly the ICC, became allies in the 1995 Council negotiations. 243
Indigenous peoples’ organizations first put human security issues on the AEPS agenda, which
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led to a question as to the role of such issues in a new Arctic council. The three major indigenous
peoples’ organizations that existed in 1991 participated in the AEPS as observers, namely the
ICC, Saami Council and Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON).
These groups and their members believed that it was unacceptable that they shared the same
status as non-Arctic states in the AEPS even though they represented northern indigenous
peoples. The three indigenous peoples’ organizations successfully organized a private meeting
with the Arctic states to argue that they should have a special status in the AEPS. This meeting
occurred during the September 1993 AEPS ministerial overview meeting in Nuuk, Greenland.
The Arctic states agreed that these groups would have the right to attend every AEPS meeting.
Observers could only attend the meetings to which states invited them.244 At the September 1993
meeting, the permanent participants used the authority granted by the new status to pressure
states to address human security in the AEPS. In response, at the same AEPS meeting, states
created the Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization to address human security
under the rubric of sustainable development.245 This work by indigenous peoples’ organizations
put human issues onto the agenda for a new Arctic Council. As one Arctic policy-maker
summarized, “Once you started to set up a structure to address sustainable development . . . it
starts to take on a life of its own.”246 Canada championed this cause for two reasons. The first
factor was the domestic importance of the ICC. In 1994, as Canada began to consider the notion
of an Arctic Council anew, it appointed Mary Simon as its first circumpolar ambassador and
subsequently as its chief negotiator to create the new council. Second, much of the Nordic
interest in Arctic governance stemmed from European environmental problems. Adding
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sustainable development to the Council could help orient it toward projects of more interest to
North America. Canada held a bargaining chip in negotiations: the support of northern residents
in the three indigenous peoples’ organizations.
In terms of the second major question about the Council’s mandate, two debates emerged
as negotiations to create the Council began in 1995. The first debate concerned the role of human
security in the new institution. Two alignments developed, amid differing state intentions for the
creation of a new Council. In the first alignment, Russia and the United States did not support the
concept. The United States’ policy-makers were leery of the political consequences of an
emphasis on sustainable development. The AEPS Task Force on Sustainable Development and
Utilization undertook controversial work soon after its founding. In 1995, the ICC brought a
project to the task force called Collapse of the Seal Skin Market, which discussed the 1972
United States Marine Mammals Protection Act and its ban on the import of seal products, as well
as various economic hardships in Inuit communities.247 Earlier, in a 1985 report, the ICC had
slammed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, the major United States land claims act, as an
act of assimilation by the United States government against the Inuit.248 Further, Canada had
appointed the president of the ICC as its lead negotiator to create a Council. Policy-makers in the
United States government came to fear a potential Arctic council as a venue to air grievances
against the United States’ Arctic activities and challenge its national sovereignty.249 Russia did
not strongly support adding sustainable development to the Council’s mandate due to a lack of
understanding of the concept.250 During the September 1993 discussions of whether to create a
sustainable development task force in the AEPS, Russian policy-makers were unfamiliar with the
247

The report was published under the auspices of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy Task Force on
Sustainable Development and Utilization.
248
English, Ice and Water, 190.
249
Ray Arnaudo, former United States delegation member and Council chair, April 17, 2013.
250
Interview with former United States delegation member and State Department official, spring 2013.

66
meaning of the term and even had trouble translating it into Russian.251 In the second alignment,
as noted, Canada and the indigenous peoples’ organizations supported adding it to the Council
mandate, as did the Nordic states. As previously stated, Canada supported the concept in
deference to indigenous peoples’ preference and to ensure the work of the Council was not too
focused on European issues. The Nordic countries joined Canada’s alignment and supported
adding human security and sustainable development to the Council in 1995. The concept of
sustainable development in part arose due to the United Nations Commission on the
Environment and Development headed by a former Prime Minister of Norway, which resulted in
the October 1987 Brundtland Report.252 Subsequently, all of the Nordic delegations supported
work on sustainable development at the 1993 Rio Earth Summit.253 Sustainable development was
part of the mandate of another Arctic governance institution made up of the Nordic countries, the
Nordic Council of Ministers.254 Some policy-makers have explained the Nordic promotion of
sustainable development as “ideological imperialism.”255 Despite uniformly being “very
progressive on climate issues,”256 the Nordic countries have different interests, with different
histories, economic systems, resources, access to waterways, international obligations,257 and
interest in Arctic resource development.258 No doubt important was the fact that, as the ICC and
its leader Mary Simon was important in Canada, so too was the Saami Council important in the
Nordic states (save Iceland).
The second debate emerged over the role of security in the new mandate of the
organization. There were no major military security issues among the Arctic states in the 1990s,
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save for some relatively minor disagreements over the legal status of some maritime areas,
certainly not issues to spark an arms race or armed conflict.259 Nonetheless, security had been a
factor in the creation of the AEPS, stemming from calls to make the Arctic a “zone of peace” and
so a question naturally emerged as to whether it was appropriate to add security to the new
mandate. In 1995, Canada and the Nordic countries supported adding military security to the
mandate of the new organization, while Russia and the United States did not. Canada and the
Nordic countries supported a strong and flexible Council that could respond to a wide variety of
Arctic issues as they emerged. The United States and Russia feared the sovereignty ramifications
of including military security in the Council mandate and any placing of limits on its
sovereignty.260
Throughout the 1995 negotiations, which occurred mostly around AEPS meetings held in
Canada that year, these mandate debates hampered progress. Officials in Canada and the Nordic
countries wanted a Council and so were willing to compromise, despite environmental concern
and the force of indigenous activism. The United States’ refusal to compromise became the
biggest obstacle to creating a Council. To other state delegations, this opposition was surprising,
given that the new Council would adopt the “architecture of the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy,” which the United States supported.261 In addition, the United States government
supported international action on Russian environmental problems. However, United States
policy-makers were leery of a Council for three reasons, beyond questions of including
sustainable development in the mandate. First, during preparatory meetings for the 1995
negotiations, some policy-makers in the United States questioned whether a regional
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organization would be effective when other international environmental organizations, such as
the United Nations Environment Programme, already existed.262 Second, some United States
officials questioned whether a regional council was necessary because the solutions to
environmental issues required a transboundary approach, working in concert with the entire
world community.263 Third, the Arctic was not a priority area for the United States government
during the 1990s.264 In the absence of a formal policy on the region, the United States
government was “legalistic” in its approach to the Council, concerned with the legal obligations
and ramifications of an Arctic international institution.265 The United States’ size as a regional
actor and its staunch concerns over sovereignty gave it a powerful bargaining chip. Canada and
the Nordic countries wanted a Council. The United States was willing to walk away from
negotiations.
The Council’s mandate resulted from a compromise over a separate issue in the process
of negotiations. Canada had hoped to wrap up negotiations quickly and informally, but this goal
proved unrealistic. Canada and the United States organized three major rounds of negotiations in
Ottawa throughout 1996 (in April, June and August). As further detailed in Chapter 7, Canada
and the Nordic countries wanted the permanent participants to be full members of the Council,
which the United States and Russia opposed. This discussion dominated the April meetings. The
negotiation process that led to the creation of the Council’s mandate unfolded in three stages. In
June, Canada and the United States held one-on-one meetings at the larger negotiations. First, the
Canadian delegation proposed a compromise on the issue of indigenous representation that
influenced the Council’s mandate, namely to drop military security from the mandate in
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exchange for the United States agreeing to add indigenous peoples’ organizations as second-tier
“permanent participant” Council members equal to states in all areas except voting rights.266 In
addition, sustainable development would be part of the mandate. The United States delegation
agreed to this compromise, content that Canada acceded to its security concerns. Second, Canada
brought the proposal to a closed-door meeting with the three indigenous peoples’ organizations.
In past international negotiations, some indigenous officials feared that an emphasis on
“sustainable development” could create projects that would challenge traditional economies,267
though in this meeting delegations decided to take that risk to ensure the Council included a
“human” emphasis. Third, after indigenous approval, the Nordic officials agreed to the proposal,
seeing that without this compromise, the Arctic Council would not come into being. Russian
officials agreed to this compromise, as well, somewhat leery at the inclusion of indigenous
peoples’ organizations in the Council but enthusiastic over the prohibition on security issues. The
inclusion of indigenous peoples’ organizations in the Council as members assured that human
issues would be part of the new organization, as these groups would not allow the exclusion of
such issues. The compromise over their inclusion led to an agreement over the Council’s
mandate and temporarily settled discussions over the place of sustainable development and
military security.
The United States accepted Canada’s compromise for three reasons. First, delegates
agreed that the willingness of Canada and the Nordic countries to compromise on the
organization’s new mandate created a Council that suited the United States’ interest. It would not
address military security issues that could impact United States sovereignty. Second, the United
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States’ delegates saw that the Council could facilitate useful information sharing between the
Arctic countries. Inter-departmental meetings in the lead-up to the 1996 negotiations saw policymakers realize a benefit to international co-operation.268 In 1996, it was necessary to share
information such as health statistics through international institutions or costly research, a fact
that may be difficult to appreciate in the Internet age.269 Such comparative information is useful
in construction of policy. Today, that information is widely available online, but in 1996, it was
not.270 Third, the research conducted by AEPS had raised the profile of the Arctic region. There
was a concern among some policy-makers that in the absence of a response to Arctic pollution,
other United Nations bodies, such as its environmental program, could increase their attention on
the Arctic region.271 The creation of the Arctic Council was partly to prevent other institutions
from gaining a foothold in Arctic governance. Canada proposed a compromise that suited the
interest of the United States.
Why did Russia support the Council’s environmental and sustainable development
mandate, given that the environment was not a priority area for the Russian government in the
1990s? There were two major reasons. First, Russia faced international pressure to address
environmental pollution (as seen in Finland’s lobbying for the AEPS) and the Council was a way
to respond to that pressure. As the Council was a relatively weak organization, it would not
hamper Russian sovereignty. Second, throughout negotiations, policy-makers realized action on
the environment attracted needed international funding and investment in Russia,272 which it
partially re-directed to non-environmental projects. For example, at the September 1996
inaugural Arctic Council meeting, Russia announced a “regional program of action” on
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biodiversity, a project under the CAFF working group. The specifics of the project were vague.
The project got underway in November 1999, after securing funds from Norway ($45,000) and
the United Nations’ Global Environmental Facility funding agency, which would eventually total
millions of dollars. Russia updated the Council 11 times in the next 12 years about the project, a
particularly long time for an Arctic Council project, yet did not deliver specific, strong results.273
The United States, in particular, privately had evidence that elements in the Russian government
were re-directing some of the funds into other, non-environmental projects.274 Fears over
corruption and wasted resources in Russia prompted the United States to help form the ACAP
working group in 2006 to deal with contaminants.275 Russia held a similar bargaining chip to the
United States as a large regional player, willing to walk away from negotiations. The Council
mandate agreed upon suited Russian interests.
States created the Council with a mandate to facilitate co-operation on environmental
protection and sustainable development. With the issue of permanent participants settled, states
straightforwardly negotiated the structure of the Council in August and September 1996 (its
founding meeting).276 The Council was different from the AEPS because the former 1) was to be
a permanent institution; 2) was run by the foreign affairs ministries of the Arctic states while the
ministries of the environment had run the AEPS, and; 3) was to promote sustainable
development as well as environmental protection, through the creation of the new Sustainable
Development Working Group (SDWG).277 Some state officials and permanent participant
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delegates thought the Council was simply “the AEPS with a new name.”278 Other policy-makers
were optimistic and believed that sustainable development would be a “pillar” of the institution,
equal to the environment.279 One could argue that “sustainable development” suffered a setback
due to the creation of the Council, because the Task Force on Sustainable Development and
Utilization folded in favour of the new SDWG.280 The SDWG would start again at a beginning,
constructing a new mandate and developing new projects.281 The work of creating the Council
was not fully complete before its official launch in September 1996. At that meeting, the Council
set three goals for its first years of existence: 1) to draft rules of procedure, 2) to shut down the
AEPS and assume all of its work, and 3) to develop the terms of reference and mandate of the
Council’s sustainable development program, under the newly created SDWG.282
In review, this subsection sought to answer two major questions: 1) what was the
intended mandate of the Arctic Council, and; 2) what were the major issues and alignments
pertaining to the Council’s mandate? The Arctic Council’s mandate is to facilitate co-operation
on environmental issues and sustainable development. There were two major debates during
negotiations to create the Council. First, states debated the extent of human security and
sustainable development in the Council’s mandate. Second, states debated whether the Council’s
mandate should include military security issues. Canada and the Nordic countries wanted the
Council to address security issues and take strong action on sustainable development. The United
States and Russia were willing to walk away from the Council if need be, as both opposed these
notions. Why did the preferences of some prevail over those of others? Who exerted most
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influence? The United States and Russia emerged as the major winners, as these countries were
able to ensure that the Council was not an overly strong body, with a limited mandate focused on
the environment and the vague notion of sustainable development. The Council would not
address security issues, as per their request. The United States exerted the most influence,
because it was unwilling to compromise and, as a large regional player, was a leader in
negotiations. The Nordic countries also could claim victory. The major goal of these countries
was to create a Council focused on the environment, which was the outcome of negotiations.
However, the Council was weaker than these countries would have liked, as it did not address
military security issues. The Nordic countries exerted less influence than did the United States.
Canada exerted less influence because it gave priority to creating the Council and hence it was
willing to compromise, in contrast to the hard-line positions taken by the United States and
Russia. The Council did not have an overly strong human element and would not take up
security issues, as Canada envisioned. The Council ultimately emerged as a reasonably weak
environmental body.
Returning to the literature, authors who write about the Arctic Council correctly identify
the institution as an environmental research body after its founding, based on states’ decision to
carry on the work of the AEPS in the Council.283 Its mandate does not invest the institution with
specific powers beyond this role and it did not obviously emerge as a soft-law body. These
authors do not discuss efforts by Canada and the Nordic states to have the Council become more
than a research body and the political struggle surrounding the founding and the mandate of the
institution. Historian John English’s Ice and Water notes political division but questionably gives
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much credit for the founding of the Council to advocacy groups and the leadership of the
government of Canada, underestimating reasons for the creation of the Council favoured by
European countries and the United States, as this section demonstrates.284 English’s work posits
that Canada created an Arctic council due to lobbying by interest groups, but does not explain
why Canada found their ideas compelling and why other countries went along with Canada’s
ideas.285 English particularly credits the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Canadian Arctic
Resources Committee and the Gordon Foundation with promoting the idea of a council.286 This
section demonstrates that the Council came into being for a number of reasons, including a desire
to foster post-Cold War peace, a desire to address problems in the Russian environment and a
need to share information about the Arctic region. It also demonstrates that policy-makers
wanted to formalize the governance that was occurring in the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy. Furthermore, Canada was not the only country that showed leadership in the creation of
the Council. The Nordic states were supportive and influential. The Council emerged as an
environmental body through a political process of contentious negotiations relating to the interest
of all Arctic states.
2.2.2 – 1996-2004
The Council’s mandate appeared settled in 1996, but debates continued from 1996 to
2004. This section seeks to answer two questions. First, what evolution took place in the
Council’s mandate between 1996 and 2004? Second, how did the debate evolve and what
explains this evolution?
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In terms of the first question, little evolution took place after 1996 because states agreed
on the Council’s basic mandate following the negotiations to create the institution. In 1998, the
Arctic Council articulated its formal mandate in the Iqaluit Declaration. Delegations wrote this
mandate at Council meetings in Canada in May and August 1998. The policy-making process
was straightforward and did not see disagreements over the mandate, as states and permanent
participants had agreed in principle to the content in 1996. The declaration states that the Arctic
Council’s goal is to “provide a means for promoting co-operation, coordination and interaction
among the Arctic States” and emphasizes that this should be “with the involvement of the Arctic
indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular
issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”287 The mandate
does not preclude discussion of any issue except for the vacuous concept of “military security,”
indicating that it could discuss other types of security.288 In places, the declaration emphasizes
the advocacy and informational role of the Arctic Council. It says that a goal is to “disseminate
information, encourage education and promote interest in Arctic-related issues.”289 From this
wording, it is clear that states did not intend that the Council be a policy-making instrument. The
mandate is broad because it does not define the contentious concept of “sustainable
development,” but says the Council will focus on “areas of Arctic children and youth, health,
telemedicine, resource management, including fisheries, cultural and eco-tourism, technology
transfer to improve Arctic sanitation systems, and national sustainable development
strategies.”290 Its formal mandate is broad, though, as the next paragraph shows, the informal
mandate of the Council has become more focused and has changed considerably.
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Most of the Council’s concrete work in 1999 and 2000 was on environmental issues.
Action on sustainable development was not as strong as it is today because the Sustainable
Development Working Group (SDWG) was constructing its mandate. To give a few examples,
on the environmental front, in 1999 Norway promoted the development of a strategy and related
projects to clean up pollution in the Arctic.291 In 2000, work began on the Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment (ACIA), which is a major scientific report on climate change. At the May 2000
meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF) working group
announced several new projects,292 while the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response
(EPPR) working group293 and the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working
groups294 were busy executing a pre-set research agenda. The SDWG did not complete any
concrete projects as it dealt with institutional organizing. Not every project proceeded smoothly.
States worked on an emergency preparedness project to study the threat of oil spills in the Arctic,
but the commitment was weak. At the May 2000 Council meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the
minutes state, “Norway noted that they are the lead country for the project on a circumpolar map
of resources at risk from oil spills in the Arctic, stating that the deadline for countries to
contribute information was March 1 and that only Norway had responded to date.”295 This
project was unambitious, an example of information sharing. States did not respond quickly to
even this low-level Council project, a sign the commitment to such issues was weak.
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In regards to the second question pertaining to debates about the evolution of the
Council’s mandate, two issues emerged. The first concerned the exact meaning of “sustainable
development.”296 At two Council meetings in May and August 1998, Council states negotiated
the sustainable development mandate. In this era of the Council, Russian officials singled out the
necessity of economic development, while Europeans favoured environmental protection, with
North Americans falling somewhere in between.297 These preferences reflected the interests of
Arctic states during the negotiations to create the Council. Russia faced economic problems,
while Nordic governments feared environmental pollution from Russia. North America did not
face the same consequences of these issues. In the May and August negotiations, the Nordic
countries wanted a set of “shared priorities” for sustainable development, while the United States
and Russia favoured the creation of a set of technical projects.298 Russia was largely silent in this
debate, allowing the United States delegation to lead the push for a project-based approach.299
The Canadian delegation advocated for an emphasis on “capacity building,” or the notion that
the SDWG should give northerners the ability to be “authors of their own development.”300 Why
did states hold these positions? The United States and Russian preferred to create a weaker
working group, which reflects concerns about challenges posed by a sustainable development
program. Canada sought to strengthen the influence of the permanent participants in the Council.
Delegations did not wish to be acrimonious so early in the history of the Council and so, in these
negotiations, worked to accommodate each other’s concerns. The terms of reference states
created do not define “sustainable development,” but say the goal of the SDWG is to “foster
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sustainable development in the Arctic region, including economic and social development,
improved health conditions and cultural well-being.”301 It reflects the United States and Russia’s
desire for a project-oriented SDWG, calling on the group “to propose and adopt steps to be taken
by the Arctic States to advance sustainable development in the Arctic.”302 In October 2000, at the
Council Ministerial Meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the Council states articulated a set of priority
projects, in fulfilment of the wishes of the Nordic governments. These areas are capacity
building, health, education, children and youth, natural living resources and infrastructure
development.303 The inclusion of capacity building reflected Canada’s preferences.
The Canadian government wanted “capacity building” to be a theme for all sustainable
development work and undertook two projects to promote it. First, at the October 2000
Ministerial Meeting, Canadian policy-makers authored and presented a report outlining what
“capacity building” entails.304 Examples of projects to enhance sustainable development were to
create a summer camp, art projects, information materials, internships and other tangible
initiatives for northern residents.305 Second, Canada and Finland hosted a workshop on capacity
building in Helsinki, Finland, in November 2001.306 In June 2001, at a Council meeting in
Rovaniemi, Iceland’s delegation said it would make sustainable development a priority during its
term as chair.307 At the end of 2002, states urged “all subsidiary bodies of the Arctic Council to
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take capacity building into account in all their activities,” though this statement did not constitute
a formal requirement.”308 Some policy-makers felt that the SDWG became a venue for state
projects that did not fit elsewhere in the Council, in response to different state interests.309 Yet,
Canada initiated some projects that reflected its desire for a “capacity building” approach.
In total, the Council launched 57 projects from 1998 until 2004, or about 11 projects per
working group. About eighty percent of this work was environmental in nature. The Council held
19 meetings between 1996 and 2004. At meetings, states reviewed project proposals by working
groups and gave feedback. Working groups and government scientists completed projects
between meetings, such as reports, assessments and technical initiatives, such as workshops. The
Council completed three major projects from 1998 until 2004, namely: 1) Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment, completed in 2004 by the CAFF and the PAME; 2) the Arctic Contaminants Action
Program, completed by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), which was
a technical project that sought to clean up the results of the 180,000 tonnes of PCBs produced in
the Russian Arctic during the Cold War, and; 3) the Arctic Human Development Report,
completed by the SDWG, which compiled social statistics comparing the Arctic regions. By
2002, even Russia promoted sustainable development and argued, “The work carried out in the
SDWG was of utmost importance to the whole Council because of the human aspect.”310
As a brief aside, the resulting mandate for the SDWG is quite broad, especially compared
to the other working groups that have a clear set of activities. The notion of “sustainable
development” is open to multiple interpretations, while other working groups have a clearer set
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of priorities.311 The AMAPs activities focus on monitoring Arctic pollution. The AMAP is
arguably the most active working group. It has completed major projects on PCBs, radioactivity,
climate change, acidification, Arctic haze, mercury and others, many of which have policy
recommendations.312 The CAFF focuses on monitoring biodiversity in the Arctic, as seen in such
projects as the Arctic Biodiversity Assessment.313 In the past, it has completed work on an Arctic
species trend index, various assessments on Arctic seabirds and flora, among other projects.314 It
contributed to the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment along with the AMAP and the SDWG.315
The EPPR focuses on Arctic emergencies. It has produced numerous reports about risks and
trends in shipping, the potential for oil spills and search and rescue capabilities.316 It has
organized various “tabletop” exercises to plan for Arctic emergencies.317 The PAME focuses on
trends in Arctic shipping and marine pollution. It is responsible for the Arctic Marine Shipping
Assessment, a major initiative that the Council adopted in 2004.318 This project has spawned
numerous follow-up reports and subsequent work to assess the present and future of Arctic
shipping.319 The AMAP, CAFF, PAME and the EPPR have had a contained set of activities.
Meanwhile, even today, the SDWG’s activities fall into four broad categories. First, some
of its projects focus on social issues faced by Arctic residents, such as information on suicide
prevention and the status of women.320 Second, some of its projects concern traditional
northerner and aboriginal lifestyles, such as projects on compiling information about the threat to
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traditional knowledge from climate change and the preservation of traditional languages.321
Third, some focus on indigenous health, such as projects on the state of circumpolar health,
circumpolar nutrition, a survey of living conditions in the Arctic, a project on controlling
infectious disease and attempts to implement telemedicine programs.322 Fourth, some of its
projects are about general Arctic economic issues, such as a summit on Arctic energy, reports on
the state of the northern economy and reports on issues in traditional economies such as reindeer
herding.323 Each of these broad sets of activities could warrant a working group in itself. There is
more focus in the group today, as much of its activity focuses on understanding the threats and
opportunities from climate change on Northerners, though certainly there are projects outside of
this theme.324 According to policy-makers within the group, the general approach of the SDWG
has been to take on a variety of projects that could be of value to northern residents.325 The group
has tried to avoid discussions of the definition of sustainable development, as well as the group’s
mandate, and focused on achieving outcomes.326 The SDWG has had a broad set of activities that
reflect the fact that states have had a difficult time defining and understanding what constitutes
sustainable development.
The second debate over the Council’s mandate occurred at the November 1999 Arctic
Council meeting in Barrow, Alaska. It concerned the flexibility of the Council’s mandate. At this
meeting, the United States delegation included a representative from the United States military to
give a presentation on a joint project with Russia called the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation Group.327 The presentation was strictly for information and it would not result in
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Council action. When the agenda item came up, the Canadian delegation immediately vetoed
discussion of the matter, before other countries could comment, because the program concerned
military security.328 Why would Canada block the discussion of security issues when it, along
with the Nordic countries, had pressed the United States and Russia to discuss military issues in
the new Arctic Council? United States policy-makers did not intend to add military security to
the Council’s mandate, but the presentation could have set a precedent to do so in the future.
This precedent could have one day suited Canada’s interests. The Canadian delegation decided to
block the United States’ presentation in retribution for what it perceived as a disruptive use of the
rules of procedure by United States delegations. Canadian policy-makers perceived that United
States officials were strictly interpreting the mandate.329 For example, the United States had
insisted that the Council fully develop its rules of procedure before the institution undertook any
substantive work, against Canada’s preference to move forward with substantive work. As noted,
the United States was “legalistic” early in the Council.330 The delegation from Canada wanted to
signal that it too could strictly interpret the Council mandate and subvert the will of the United
States’ policy-makers. Canadian policy-makers determined that sending this message was more
important than a precedent to add security to the agenda. Canadian policy-makers believed the
Council had a significant mandate without considering traditional security.331 Security was not a
priority for countries in the Council as there were no pressing issues and it was a small,
inexperienced international body.332 Even though the presentation was strictly for information
purposes, Canadian policy-makers believed the Council should avoid discussions of security.
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In sum, this section explained the evolution of debates around the Council’s mandate
during the period from 2004 until 2007. The Council successfully completed its environmental
mandate, completing more than 40 research and technical projects dealing with the environment.
Two debates emerged over the Council’s mandate. First, states debated the content of the
Council’s sustainable development program, with the United States and Russia favouring a series
of technical projects, the Nordic countries favouring a set of shared priorities and Canada
pushing for a capacity-building approach. The result was a mandate that attempted to incorporate
every country’s viewpoint. The second was over the role of military security in the Council, with
Canada vetoing a discussion of military security to ensure the institution maintained a workable
mandate. These findings support the conclusions of authors, such as Oran Young, who classify
the Council as a research institution from 1996 until 2004.
2.2.3 – 2004-2007
From 2004 until 2007, the Council’s mandate shifted significantly as the Council began
to address emergency preparedness issues. This section seeks to answer two questions: 1) at what
point did changes in the mandate of the Council take place, and; 2) what explains these key
changes? The Council’s mandate shifted in 2004 after the release of the Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment, which made states aware of the new economic opportunities resulting from climate
change in the Arctic region. All of the Arctic states and even the permanent participants
supported this shift in the Council’s mandate, though Russia strongly proposed the new emphasis
on economic issues through its promotion of co-operation on emergency preparedness.
Nonetheless, the Council’s shift was not as profound as it may appear, as the majority of the
Council’s work continued to focus on environmental issues.
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In 2004, the Council released the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), which
changed the Council and its mandate. The report argued that climate change would present
profound challenges for the Arctic. The United States proposed the project at the 2000 Arctic
Council Ministerial Meeting, which won the enthusiastic backing of all of the Council
countries.333 The United States delegation proposed the project due to a general desire to know
more about climate change, especially given the interest in Alaska, as well as in fulfillment of its
perceived obligations to the international community and Council to be a leader on issues of
global consequence.334 Scientists and academics from all Council members wrote the text of the
report over the next four years, with annual updates to the Council on progress.335 The United
States provided core funding for the project and an American researcher, Robert Corell,
organized the research. Funding continued even as Republican George W. Bush succeeded the
Democrat Bill Clinton as president, although the former was not reputed to be a supporter of
work on climate change. The United States under the Bush Administration still wanted to obtain
information on climate change and to appear to fulfill international obligations to address it.336
Another reason the report moved forward is that there was also pressure to continue its funding
among Alaskan policy-makers, a state with a strong Republican character.337 It was a landmark
report that changed the Council.338
The ACIA made states and permanent participants aware of a variety of environmental
issues in the Arctic. It found that, “Annual average Arctic temperature has increased at almost
333
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twice the rate of the rest of the world over the past few decades” with “Arctic warming of about
4-7 degrees C over the next 100 years.”339 It also found that, “Permafrost has warmed by up to 2
degrees C in recent decades.”340 The report concluded, “Arctic precipitation has increased by
about eight per cent on average over the past century.” In addition, “The average extent of seaice cover in summer has declined by 15-20 per cent over the past 30 years.”341 Due to climate
change in the Arctic, “global and Arctic sea level has risen 10-20 centimetres in the past 100
years” while “about an additional half metre of sea-level rise (with a range of 10 to 90
centimetres) is projected to occur during this century.”342 It concluded that, “For Inuit, warming
is likely to disrupt or even destroy their hunting and food-sharing culture as reduced sea ice
causes the animals on which they rely to decline, become less accessible, and possibly become
extinct.”343 This report also made states aware of economic opportunities relating to climate
change. Ice melt would make Arctic shipping lanes more accessible to vessels. The Arctic region
contains more than 90 billion barrels of oil that will be more accessible due to climate change.344
Further, as Russia holds 80 per cent of Arctic resources, it stands to gain the most from climate
change in the Arctic.345 The ACIA made states aware of the region’s economic potential.
In response to the first question, regarding when the Council’s mandate shifted, it shifted
toward economic issues and emergency preparedness after the release of the ACIA report at the
November 2004 Ministerial Meeting. At this meeting, held in Reykjavik, Iceland, “Russia
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introduced the Arctic Rescue initiative, a mechanism for the coordination of international
activities on prevention and response as regards the consequences of emergencies in the
Arctic.”346 This initiative was a statement of support by Russia for the Council to shift to a
greater emphasis on emergency preparedness. The policy process unfolded in two stages. First,
Russian officials pushed the Council to take more action on emergency preparedness by stating
its importance at nine Council meetings between 2004 and 2009 (November 2004, April 2005,
October 2005, October 2006, April 2007, November 2007, April 2008, November 2008 and
November 2009). Russian officials sought to develop guidelines on the clean up of hazardous
materials as well as a search and rescue plan.347 Next, two projects came from this work. First, in
April 2005, the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group began to
author a report on Arctic shipping at its biannual meetings, which later resulted in the 2009
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, sponsored by the United States. Second, the government of
Russia organized an October 2008 “accident prevention” exercise in Valandei, with the
participation of the other Arctic states.348 Russia placed a greater emphasis on emergency
preparedness work after the ACIA made it clear that climate change created economic
opportunities in the Arctic. In response to the second question, as to reasons for the shift, none of
the Arctic delegations opposed this work in any other Council meeting, nor did any of the
permanent participants. As each state holds a veto on Council activities, each could have blocked
any project that did not meet with its approval. Delegations supported this work because
emergency infrastructures encourage economic development in the Arctic region. Information on
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shipping and preparation for search and rescue emergencies increases the potential for
investment in the region because companies have the knowledge that states are prepared when
emergencies arise. These measures reduce corporate liability and make them more confident to
invest in the Arctic region.
This new emphasis does not indicate that the Council turned away from environmental
work. The Council completed an average of 159 projects between 2004 and 2007, or 26.5
projects per working group. Each state sponsored an average of 15.25 projects, while permanent
participants sponsored an average of two projects each.349 Only two of these projects concerned
emergency preparedness as a primary focus, namely the aforementioned projects by Russia. The
Council undertook twelve major projects, all of which had a strong environmental character:
- The Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (initiated 2006) (Conservation of Arctic
Flora and Fauna working group, or the CAFF)
- Annual Arctic Monitoring and Assessment (AMAP) working group pollution assessments
(2005-2013) (the AMAP)
- Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (completed 2006-2008) (the AMAP)
- Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment (published 2007) (the AMAP)
- Arctic Human Health Initiative (initiated 2008) (the Sustainable Development Working Group)
- Agreement on Co-operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic
(initiated 2009) (Task Force)
- Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (published 2009) (the PAME)
- Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (published 2013) (the CAFF)
- Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic
(completed 2013) (Task Force)
- Short-Lived Climate Forcers (initiated 2011) (Short-Lived Climate Forcers Task Force)
- Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost Assessment (published 2013) (the AMAP)
- Arctic Resilience Report (interim report 2013)
Thus the Council still completed environmental work between 2004 and 2008.
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In summary, this section identified the point at which changes in the mandate of the
Council took place and the positions of various actors. Change took place after the publication of
the ACIA report. Russia sought to encourage work on emergency preparedness to encourage
economic development in the Arctic region, which all of the Arctic states supported. Academic
literature characterizing the Council as a research institution is no longer completely valid; the
Council is no longer merely an environmental organization. It is also an economic facilitator.
2.2.4 – 2007-2014
More recent Council work has focused on emergency preparedness and economic issues,
showing an evolution in the Council’s mandate. This section shows that the Council’s mandate is
now economic in nature as well as environmental, which all of the Arctic members support.
Between 2009 and 2011, the creation of an Arctic Search and Rescue agreement occupied much
of the Council’s time. From 2011 until 2013, the major project of the Council was a formal
agreement on oil spill response. The United States delegation surprised many observers when it
proposed the search and rescue treaty in November 2008 at the Council meeting in Kautokeino,
Norway, which Russia asked to co-sponsor to support its earlier emphasis on emergency
preparedness.350 The treaty aims to “strengthen aeronautical and maritime search and rescue cooperation and coordination in the Arctic.”351 State representatives easily negotiated the treaty at
only five meetings (Washington, December 2009, Moscow, February 2010, Oslo, June 2010,
Helsinki, October 2010 and Reykjavik, December 2010).352 At the May 2011 meeting in Kiruna,
Sweden, the delegations of the United States, Russia and Norway took many by surprise and
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sponsored a similar agreement on oil spill response.353 States again easily negotiated the treaty at
five meetings (Oslo, October 2011, St. Petersburg, December 2011, Girdwood, Alaska, March
2012, Helsinki, June 2012 and Reykjavik, October 2012).354 Chapter 3 elaborates on the
negotiation process that led to these treaties. The other states and the permanent participants
supported this work and contributed to the task forces that created the agreements.
There are three pertinent questions about these treaties. First, do they have substantial
economic elements? They provide safety and emergency response infrastructure in the Arctic.
This work has an economic element because it provides infrastructure that states and companies
need to operate in the Arctic region. These treaties will potentially result in increased investment
in the Arctic region. Second, why did the United States suggest these treaties and why did other
states support them? According to policy-makers familiar with the process, both treaties resulted
primarily from requests from the insurance and resource sectors for measures to increase
emergency response.355 Officials from the business community asked policy-makers for
measures to increase safety when operating in the Arctic region.356 Third, does the creation of
these treaties represent a sea change in the way that the Council operates? The Council still
completed environmental work from 2007 until the present, as these projects constituted only
two out of the Council’s average 159 ongoing projects. Yet, these treaties are very significant as
they represent the first clear work beyond the initial mandate of the Council. The institution
addresses more economic issues than in the past.
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After the development of these treaties, the government of Canada, in preparations to
become Council chair, emphasized the economic work of the Council, indicating a change in its
mandate. The government stated that it planned to use the Council to achieve economic
aspirations, which constituted the first time that a Council state had been so direct in stating this
intent. A Government of Canada report obtained by media sources said, “Canada will use its two
years as leader of the circumpolar world to promote development and defend its policies.”357
Media outlets reported, “A discussion paper circulated at meetings held across the North to
gather input suggests that Canada's top priority will be development.”358 The paper indicated an
interest that economic development should benefit the North and said, “The development of
natural resources in a sustainable manner, in which northerners participate and benefit, is central
to the economic future of the circumpolar region.” It also said, “Arctic Council initiatives could
be built around and support Canada's priorities to increase investment and development in the
northern resource sector.”359 Leona Aglukkaq, Canadian Minister Responsible for the Arctic
Council, held “meetings with private sector representatives across the North to help to plug a gap
in the Arctic Council’s work”360 The discussion of development provided by the government of
Canada does not stress the need for environmental protection. Policy-makers see economics as
increasingly important in the Council’s work.361 As one policy-maker summarized, “It seems
now the Council’s focus is on development” whereas “before, the focus was on environmental
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protection.362 In 2013, the government of Canada released a report that says its priorities in its
turn as chair are to establish “responsible Arctic resource development,” “safe Arctic shipping”
and “sustainable communities.”363
The Council issued a document called A Vision for the Arctic, which included what could
be an updated Council mandate. It said, “We have many accomplishments to celebrate since the
signing of the Ottawa Declaration in 1996, and it is timely for us to set out a vision for the future
of our region.”364 Its pillars are “a peaceful Arctic,” “the Arctic home,” “a prosperous Arctic,” “a
safe Arctic,” “a healthy Arctic environment,” “Arctic knowledge” and “a strong Arctic
Council.”365 Most of that is within the existing mandate of the Council. However, it also pointed
to a potential growth in the Council as a body to address conflict resolution and political issues.
It said, “The further development of the Arctic region as a zone of peace and stability is at the
heart of our efforts” and “We are confident that there is no problem that we cannot solve together
through our co-operative relationships on the basis of existing international law and good
will.”366 There is also a greater acknowledgement of the economic potential of the region. The
report says, “The economic potential of the Arctic is enormous and its sustainable development
is key to the region’s resilience and prosperity.”367 Again, the Council still undertakes
environmental work and most of its activities are environmental in nature. The Council still has
an average of 159 projects ongoing at a given time, roughly 80 per cent of which are
environmental in nature.
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The new emphasis on economics is due to requests from insurance and other companies
to Arctic governments for more Arctic infrastructure. Many fear that the difficulty of operating
in the Arctic will neutralize profits and discourage growth. In 2012, major insurance firm Lloyds
of London released a report that argued, “The Arctic is likely to attract substantial investment
over the coming decade, potentially reaching $100 [billion] or more,” however “given the high
risk/potentially high reward nature of Arctic investment, this figure could be significantly higher
or lower.”368 Emergency preparedness reduces the economic risk of operating in the Arctic.
An outcome of Canada’s emphasis on economic development369 is the establishment of a
new semi-autonomous institution, the Arctic Economic Council. States negotiated the structure
of the organization at Council meetings held in Canada during 2013 and 2014. Swedish officials
conceived of the body during its term as chair as a business council focused on corporate social
responsibility and the environment, but Canada shifted the emphasis based on its stated
priorities, a move all states supported.370 The 42-member Arctic Economic Council consists of
three business representatives appointed by each Council state and the permanent participants.371
The organization holds meetings separate from the Council but is part of the organization. The
Arctic Council reports that, “The overall aim of the AEC is to foster sustainable development,
including economic growth, environmental protection and social development in the Arctic
region.”372 The creation of the body is significant because it is the first outcome of the Arctic
Council that did not have some strong environmental component. The Arctic Council says that
the body will do environmental work, but it is first and foremost an “economic” body.
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In conclusion, the Council’s mandate is undergoing change. It has a broad mandate, but
in practice states intended that it take action on the environment and sustainable development.
The working groups have undertaken many environmental projects. States had difficulty defining
sustainable development and as a result, its projects are broad and often ad-hoc. The Council has
increased the number of projects that promote emergency preparedness as time has gone on. The
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment changed the direction and intensity of Council work, making
states aware of the economic opportunities in the region. The United States supported that report,
even though action on climate change appears contrary to its interest. Russia in particular wanted
the Council to take action to improve emergency preparedness in the region. Canada, the current
chair of the Council, has emphasized that it will use the Council to pursue and promote economic
opportunities in the Northern region. Earlier work by authors such as Oran Young, Olav Schram
Stokke and Evan Bloom viewed the Council as an environmental institution whose goal was to
research the Arctic so that states could subsequently take action to reduce and prevent pollution
in the region.373 John English agrees that the Council was intended as an environmental
institution but emphasizes that some states had broader goals for the institution to build the
region as a zone of peace; economic development and the similar goals were not among the
broad goals states had for the Council.374 The Council’s mandate is now environmental and
economic. Its initial mandate was to facilitate environmental protection and sustainable
development in the Arctic region. Its informal mandate at the current time is to facilitate cooperation on environmental research, to initiate projects to encourage human development in the
region and to improve the prospects for investment in Arctic resources.
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2.3 – Analysis of the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Mandate
Functionalism provides a somewhat compelling account of Council expansion.
H1: The mandate of the Arctic Council is expanding because all members stand to gain
something through automatic expansion.
Overall, the evidence does not support this hypothesis. All states gain something through
participation in the Council and its expansion into economic areas, though the gains are not
equally distributed. As noted, Russia benefits the most from economic gains in the Arctic region
as it controls 80 per cent of Arctic resources.375 However, all states gain information through
participation in the Council and its reports. States sought to gain information about Arctic
pollution, but moved to acquire information about climate change as the issue emerged,
constituting automatic expansion from issue spillover.
This hypothesis has limited explanatory value because expansion occurred selectively,
rather than automatically. The turn to economic work occurred after the 2004 Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment (ACIA) report. This work revealed economic opportunity stemming from
climate change, in the form of opportunities for increased Arctic resource exploitation and
shipping. Functionalism assumes states will respond rationally to problems. The hypothesis
would have support if Council states automatically took strong action to combat exogenous
climate change in the Arctic because the information about it in the ACIA is alarming. Yet,
Council action has focused on adaptation, rather than mitigation. All states moved to maximize
the benefits of climate change. Nordic countries have taken good action to combat climate
change, but the response of Canada, Russia and the United States has been inadequate.376 The
Council’s mandate is evolving due to political reasons and not solely due to issue spillover.
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H2: States are allowing the Arctic Council mandate to expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic
goal around a less political issue area.
There is support for the hypothesis because it appears to provide some explanation of
Council behaviour. The mandate expansion is around less political policy areas, namely search
and rescue co-operation. Oil spill response is more political, but it is less political than it could
have been because it is a response agreement and not a prevention agreement. Search and rescue
could become political, but the agreement that resulted is quite limited in scope, as discussed in
Chapter 4. The hypothesis is very similar to the predictions of neoliberal institutionalism, which
this paper discusses later.
H3: The mandate is expanding because institutional capacity allows it to evolve without
disruption.
This hypothesis does not appear valid because the Council does not have great power to
direct states. This hypothesis would have support if the Council had the bureaucratic ability to
make requests of Council states. However, this situation is not the case. The Council is only now
in the process of setting up a permanent secretariat and previously states firmly controlled the
working group secretariats. It is possible that the new permanent secretariat could make demands
of states and affect the operation of the Council. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, there is
every indication it will be a purely administrative secretariat. Many policy-makers argue that the
precise reason that it took so long to create a secretariat (and the reason why the secretariat is to
perform purely administrative work) is to stop it from making demands of states.377 The working
groups are as strong as they have ever been and their ability to shape the Council’s agenda is not
strong. The reports they create might put pressure on states, but they do not create action in
themselves and states often ignore their findings. Some policy-makers expressed the belief that
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some groups operate better than in the past,378 but otherwise the structure of the Council has
stayed the same. The Council’s mandate has expanded in tandem with the increased economic
interest in the Arctic region. It is difficult to argue that current mandate expansion is because of
the Council itself.
H4: The mandate is expanding because an epistemic community is convincing states it should
expand.
This hypothesis is not accurate. Epistemic communities, such as the Munk-Gordon Arctic
Security Program in Toronto, Canada, or the Rideau Institute in Ottawa, Canada, try to influence
the Council. This hypothesis does not have support because the Arctic Council only changed
once economic issues emerged. There is evidence that epistemic communities have had an effect
on the Council in the past. As noted, states partially added a “human dimension” to the Council
because of the demands of permanent participants, particularly in Canada. This lobbying partly
resulted in the Council’s sustainable development program. Yet, it is the Council’s weakest
working group, meaning that epistemic community demands did not result in strong action. In
addition, epistemic communities impacted the ACIA. Arctic Council policy-makers partly credit
the work of ACIA lead author Bob Corell for ensuring the project came to fruition.379 Alaska
Senator Ted Stevens worked in the United States Senate to ensure the project had crucial
funding.380 Yet, there are reasons that the Council states created the report aside from the
lobbying of individuals, such as the need for information about climate change. The hypothesis
does not have support because the Council has ignored lobbying by some groups that
demonstrate pressing problems in need of action, instead focusing on the lobbying efforts of
economic actors and the region’s economic potential.
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H5: The mandate is expanding because the Arctic Council has proven itself competent.
This hypothesis has support. Through various environmental impact assessments, the
Arctic Council has proven itself a competent international organization. The ACIA, for example,
is a very good report that has helped prove that climate change is occurring in the Arctic and
worldwide. Nonetheless, this hypothesis does not fully explain Council evolution. The Council
has been producing high quality reports for many years, yet evolution has only occurred once
economic objectives became clear. Neoliberal institutionalism and functionalism together can
provide a likely explanation for why states have expanded the workload of the Council rather
than create a new institution. It explains why states entrust reports to the Council rather than
creating the reports in other ways, or independent of the Council. In contrast, as demonstrated
later, neoliberal institutionalism would predict that path dependence would stunt Council
evolution. The fact that the Council is a competent body explains why path dependence did not
stall Council expansion. In accordance with functionalism, states partially expand the Council’s
mandate because it has proven that it can do what states want it to do. The Council had elements
in place that made expanding the Council more efficient than developing a new organization.
H6: The process of mandate expansion should occur automatically and proceed consistently.
This hypothesis does not have support because, as noted, the expansion of the Council’s
mandate occurred in response to selective state interests, rather than as an automatic process.
This hypothesis would have support if the Council’s mandate expanded when new issues
emerged without prompt. If the Council worked aggressively to combat climate change as
information became available, the hypothesis would have support. However, mandate expansion
did not begin until economic considerations became important. It is not clear how smoothly the
expansion of the Council’s mandate will progress. Thus far, it appears to be progressing
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consistently. Canada has said that it will continue to promote economic development in the
Council. The institution seeks to increase the role of business within the Council. Nonetheless, it
is too soon to tell if this trend will continue. The Council does not have any projects on its
agenda at the current time that will tangibly continue to increase the mandate of the Council. The
Council is not negotiating a treaty at present, for example. Yet, the Council could take up such
work in the future.
In conclusion, functionalism’s explanation for Council mandate expansion is not
compelling. It predicts that expansion should have occurred earlier than it did, but states did not
respond to pressing environmental issues presented in the ACIA report. Expansion did not occur
until economic considerations became important. Functionalism is correct in predicting that
expansion is occurring around a less-political issue area. However, functionalism is wrong in
predicting that the Council can compete for power with states. It is difficult to argue that the
Council is powerful beyond the control of states. It is not clear if the change that is occurring will
be consistent over time. It is somewhat correct in predicting that individuals can influence the
Council because individuals have had some influence over the Council’s agenda, though there
are many other considerations that explain state behaviour. However, individuals are not
responsible for the growth of the Council’s mandate. Most importantly, the growth of the
Council has not occurred automatically. States have been selective in expanding the mandate of
the Council, ignoring information about the need for climate change mitigation, instead focusing
on economic gains and the potential that climate change can benefit states in certain sectors.
They correctly predict evolution occurred once the Council proved itself competent, which
explains why states opted to use it to address economic issues rather than create a new
institution.
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Neoliberal institutionalism explains the growth of the mandate of the Arctic Council and
its hypotheses mostly have support.
H1: States are expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain
something through expansion.
This hypothesis has validity because all states stand to gain through co-operation in the Council
and expansion did not occur automatically. The Council emerged to address Arctic pollution and
promote co-operation between Russia and the West. According to neoliberal institutionalism,
this is a low-level goal because it does not concern military security or economics. All states
stood to gain, so states decided to form the Council. Under this scenario, the Council should not
have been very strong, and it was not. There are few states involved (eight) and they face the
“shadow of the future” (i.e. they will likely need to work together again), so there was an
incentive for co-operation. States excluded security because they did not stand to gain much by
adding it. It is clear that states were not able to accomplish much in terms of sustainable
development. However, states stood to gain something by adding sustainable development to the
mandate. The fact that states could not agree on a definition, and the working group’s agenda is
very broad, reflects the fact that Arctic states have different development needs. Historical
process tracing shows that most of the Council’s work has been on environmental monitoring,
which demands relatively low-level commitment. Environmental monitoring can create problems
for states if it highlights costly issues that demand resolution. The Council has provided funding
for research on climate change, calling for a change in the way states operate, for example. Yet,
environmental reports do not necessarily result in policy action. The ACIA has not inspired
strong state action on climate change. Rather, it has ignited interest in the economic potential of
the Arctic region. Emergency preparedness has become a focus on the Council at a time when it
can help states. States stand to gain through the Arctic Council and so continue to aid evolution.
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H2: The expansion of the Arctic Council is occurring because of an economic issue.
This hypothesis has support in that the mandate of the Council has expanded because it
increasingly emphasizes emergency preparedness and the North’s economic potential. States
have aspirations of economic growth in the Arctic. There is no shortage of reports extolling the
economic potential of the Arctic in the wake of climate change.381 The Arctic contains extensive
oil and gas deposits and Arctic shipping lanes promise to reduce travel distances substantially.
Canada has directly stated that it will use the Council to fulfill an economic agenda. Part of this
growth will benefit Northern Canada, but it also will benefit Canada as a whole. Whom the
development benefits most is not yet clear. Almost every Arctic Council policy-maker
interviewed believed that economics were an important explanatory variable in the Council’s
expansion. States have economic aspirations for the Arctic.
H3: States are allowing the Arctic Council to expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal,
tempered by norms and path dependence.
This hypothesis mostly has credence because states are using the Arctic Council to fulfill
a technocratic goal. All states stand to gain through the expansion of the Council. Search and
rescue, as well as oil spill prevention, are less political areas for co-operation. States are
collaborating on technical matters without risking state sovereignty. Neoliberal institutionalism
predicts that there are three reasons the Arctic Council would have been unable to evolve. First,
path dependency should have made new action harder to undertake in the Arctic Council. The
Council’s environmental orientation should have pushed states away from pursuing nonenvironmental issues in the Council. Counter to this, some institutional elements to deal with
search and rescue were in place through the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response
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(EPPR) working group, which may have provided a framework to break such path dependence.
Nonetheless, the fact that the Council has not evolved more is likely due to path dependence.
However, these factors may explain away a fundamental fact that neoliberal institutionalists do
not believe that international institutions will evolve in many circumstances. Second,
institutional norms should have made it harder to take new action. Once the Council begins to do
work to protect the environment, it could develop norms to continue such work. Still, there was
always some interest in carrying out action on emergency preparedness and development through
the EPPR and the Sustainable Development Working Group. Norms were not strong enough to
prevent work in these areas. Third, the Arctic Council countries have taken action in the face of
Arctic issues outside of the Arctic Council. Nonetheless, the countries all stood to gain
something from co-operation in the Council. Through environmental reports and monitoring, the
Council provides information and reduces costs for countries carrying out research. Through the
facilitation of international action and agreements, the Council makes commitments more
credible and predictable. States have a technocratic goal they want to achieve in the Council.
H4: The form of negotiation (such as coalitions, information and the power of persuasion) has
an impact on the evolution of the Council’s mandate.
The form of negotiation impacts the evolution of the Council’s mandate and thus this
hypothesis has predictive power. We can see that the Council emerged from negotiation. States
debated the Council’s mandate, with Canada and the Nordic countries failing to win United
States and Russian support for its initiatives. Coalitions were not as important in an institution in
which any country has a veto on any action. Yet, the major change in the mandate occurred due
to research conducted by the Council. Russia first proposed increasing the profile of emergency
preparedness issues in response to information about climate change, which won the support of
all of the Council countries. Information was important in the evolution of the Council.
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Neoliberal institutionalism mostly provides a good explanation of Council behaviour.
The Council’s mandate is expanding because it is in the interest of member states. All member
states gain something through participation in the Council, even if it is a low-level goal. It is
expanding to take on economic issues, which neoliberal institutionalists say are a particularly
potent motivator for state behaviour. The Council is evolving to perform technical functions,
helping states collaborate on emergency preparedness. The theory does not predict that
individuals can be important in the Council. However, it is clear that they might be important in
some way. Neoliberal institutionalism correctly predicts that the Council would not have the
power to compete with states. Still, the theory emphasizes that international institutions are
subject to path dependence. Information was important in the evolution of the Council, as was
the form of negotiation, as neoliberal institutionalism predicts. This dynamic does not account
for the fact that the Council’s mandate has shifted to include environmental issues, sustainable
development and economic issues.
Neorealism provides a poor explanation for Arctic Council mandate expansion.
H1: Relative gains will mediate the evolution of the Council’s mandate.
This hypothesis does not have support because it is clear that neither relative gains nor security
was important in state decision making about the Council. This hypothesis would have support if
states attempted to gain more than rivals through their work in the Council or if the Council’s
work improved state security. However, states co-operated in the Council to expand its mandate
even though gains were uneven. Russia stands to gain the most from the economic growth of the
Arctic region, yet its main regional rival the United States continues to collaborate to strengthen
the Council’s mandate. Further, security was not a pressing consideration of states at the onset of
the Arctic Council. There is little reason to believe that states now have security aspirations for
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the Council. The potential for conflict in the Arctic is virtually nonexistent.382 Survival is not at
issue. Further, several Council policy-makers argue that there is little chance that states have
security-minded motivation for participation in the Council. Council policy-makers do not
believe security was important in the founding of the Council.383 There were other organizations
that states could use to address Arctic traditional security as states formed the Council in 1996,384
such as NATO or the United Nations. One could argue that a strong economy supports state
security and self-help, in line with neorealist predictions. Neoliberal institutionalism better
explains the Council’s economic expansion, with its predictions about the importance of
absolute, economic gains. Relative gains were not important for states in the founding of the
Council.
H2: States are expanding the mandate of the Arctic Council to provide “balance” in the region.
This hypothesis does not have support because the states are not responding to a military
threat or regional re-balancing. They are collaborating on technical economic issues. In a way,
states wanted to form the Council to ensure regional balance against Russia, but such
considerations are no longer important. Despite some alarmist headlines and academic articles in
Canada, there are currently no military threats to any of the Arctic countries’ legal status in the
Arctic. In the unlikely event of a threat, NATO would protect member Arctic regions, because
Canada, the United States, Denmark, Iceland and Norway are part the alliance and it has
relations with the other Council countries. Even if one removes security considerations from
state motivations, the hypothesis has limited support. Aside from security, smaller states could be

382

For an example of any author who presents a case study on an area of Arctic security, the delineation of the outer
continental shelf, see, Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, “Meeting the Deadline: Canada’s Arctic Submission to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf,” Ocean Development and International Law 42, no. 4 (2011):
368-382.
383
Former United States delegation member involved in creating the Council, spring 2013.
384
Former United States delegation member involved in creating the Council, spring 2013.

104
using the Council to balance economic power in the region and prevent U.S. dominance. States
want to make gains through Council mandate expansion, rather than ensuring regional balance.
H3: The evolution of the Council’s mandate should reflect the preferences of great powers.
The hypothesis does not have support because all of the states support the direction of
evolution in the Council, representing a neoliberal institutionalist absolute gain. In addition,
sustainable development is part of the Council even though the United States resisted the
concept.385 The form of negotiation led them to accept the Council. One could point out that
Russia stands to gain the most from the expansion of the Council’s mandate into economic areas.
However, it seems likely that the Council’s mandate would have expanded even if this situation
were not the case. Overall, it is difficult to test the validity of the influence of the influence of
great powers based on this case. States all agreed to expand the mandate of the Council and the
preferences of great powers and other powers aligned.
In conclusion, neorealism does not provide a good explanation for Council behaviour.
States do not have major security concerns in the Arctic. These actors have economic concerns,
but neoliberal institutionalism better explains this interest. Neorealism would predict that the
United States would have to gain more than Russian does in Council mandate expansion for
expansion to move forward. It is difficult to argue this is the case because Russia has greater
Arctic territory, resources and shipping routes than does the United States. It is difficult to argue
that “balance” considerations motivate states in the Arctic. The states are not focused on
defending themselves against an internal or external threat. Smaller states might be trying to
balance economic power against the larger states. These states would include Russia and the
United States. Neoliberal institutionalism does a better job explaining this situation with its
emphasis on economic motivations for state behaviour.
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Table 2.2: Analysis
Hypothesis Number
Functionalism
Functionalist 1

Functionalist 2

Hypothesis

Accepted/Rejected

The mandate of the Council is expanding
because they all stand to gain something
through automatic expansion.
States are allowing the Arctic Council
mandate to expand to fulfill a mutual
technocratic goal around a less political
issue area.
The mandate is expanding because
institutional capacity allows it to evolve
without disruption.
The mandate is expanding because an
epistemic community is convincing states it
should expand.

Not supported – expansion
into environmental areas is
not automatic
Supported – expansion is in
less-political areas, such as
search and rescue

Not supported – no
evidence of strong
institutional capacity
Functionalist 4
Not supported – no
evidence of epistemic
community impact on
mandate
Functionalist 5
The mandate is expanding because the
Supported – ACIA
Arctic Council has proven itself competent, established competence
tempered by norms and path dependence.
Functionalist 6
The process of mandate expansion should
Not supported – expansion
occur automatically and proceed
into environmental areas is
consistently.
not automatic
Neoliberal Institutionalism
Neoliberal 1
States are expanding the mandate of the
Supported – all gain by
Arctic Council because they all stand to
expansion into economics
gain something through expansion.
Neoliberal 2
The expansion of the Arctic Council is
Supported – expansion
occurring because of an economic issue.
clearly economic
Neoliberal 3
States are allowing the Arctic Council to
Supported – expansion
expand to fulfill a mutual technocratic
clearly economic, technical
goal.
Neoliberal 4
The form of negotiation (such as
Supported – Council’s
coalitions, information and the power of
mandate evolved
persuasion) has an impact on the evolution throughout negotiations
of the Council’s mandate.
Neorealism
Neorealist 1
Relative gains will mediate the evolution of Not supported – absolute
the Council’s mandate.
gains key
Neorealist 2
States are expanding the mandate of the
Not supported – absolute
Arctic Council to balance power in the
gains sought, not balance
region.
Neorealist 3
The evolution of the Council’s mandate
Not supported – all states
should reflect the preferences of great
gain absolute gains
powers.
Functionalist 3

106
Table 2.3: Theoretical Explanations for the Evolution of the Council’s Mandate
Phenomena
Functionalism Neoliberal
Neorealism
Why?
Institutionalism
1991-1996/founding of the Council
Environmental
rationale for Council
formation
Military concerns in
Council formation

X

X

X

X

X

X

Scandinavian
interest in
environmental
Council
ICC influence over
Canada vis-a-vis
human security

X

X

X

X

X

United States
resistance to security
in Council
Russia resistance to
X
environmental work

X

X

X

United States
resistance to Council
(duplication/utility)

X

United States and
Russian resistance to
security versus
Canadian and
Nordic interest
United States and
Russian resistance to
human security
versus Canadian and
Nordic interest

X

Desire for
information sharing

X

X

X

X

X

All theories
emphasize
interests
All theories
emphasize
interests
All theories
emphasize
interest
Allow role for
epistemic
community
influence
United States
opposition
based on gains
Allow role for
epistemic
community
influence
Predicts great
power
reluctance to
co-operate
Predicts great
power
reluctance to
co-operate
Great power
concern;
questions over
gains and
avenue for
criticism
All states
stand to make
gains, relative,
mutual and
absolute
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Functionalism
Continued
Russia interest in
Council

Neoliberal
Institutionalism
Continued
X

Neorealism
Continued

X

X

X

X

Influence of
coalitions and
negotiations

1996-2004
Environmental focus

X

Disagreement over
sustainable
development
Disagreement over
security

X

All theories
emphasize
interests
Concerns
about
sovereignty
Influence of
coalitions and
negotiations

2004-2007
ACIA

Shift toward
emergency
preparedness
Continued
environmental work
2008-2013

X

X

X

Shift toward
economic work

Totals

X

X

Emergency
preparedness work
Continued
environmental work

X

10

All theories
emphasize
interests
Absolute gains

X

Absolute and
mutual gains

X

Absolute gains

X

Absolute and
mutual gains

X

Emphasis on
power of
economics

18

11
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It is necessary to review the major questions posed at the onset of this chapter. The
predictions of functionalism are not realized because the Council’s evolution is not automatic
and consistent. The predictions of neoliberalism are valid because absolute gains motivate states
to expand the Council’s mandate and the form of negotiation is important. The predictions of
neorealism are unsubstantiated because relative gains are not important in determining state
preferences and great power preference does not always prevail in Council decision-making.
Table 2.4 summarizes the results of the analysis.
Table 2.4: Dependent and Independent Variables Analysis
Dependent variable: expansion Necessary Fulfilled Why fulfilled
of the Arctic Council’s
(n) /
(Y/N)
mandate into economic and
sufficient
other areas
(s)
Common ind.
variables

Likely less
political issue
area

S

Y

No security in Council mandate (a
political issue); expansion into less
political emergency prep, economics

Economic
gains

S

Y

Emergency prep economic issue;
Arctic Economic Council

N

N

Russia gains the most from economic
growth

Issue spillover

N&S

N

Response to ACIA specific, not
automatic (i.e. economics, not climate
change); response took several years

Independent
institution

N&S

N

Council is a weak body; no evidence of
lobbying

Interest group
or epistemic
community
lobbying

N

N

Individuals partly responsible for
ACIA and SDWG, but less influence in
case of mandate

Institution has
proven

N

Y

Council has produced good reports;
states take new action in Council rather

Functionalism Absolute
ind. variables gains (i.e.
mostly equal)
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competence
Automatic
response

Neoliberal
ind. variables

Neorealist
ind. variables

than create a new institution
Response to ACIA specific, not
automatic (i.e. economics, not climate
change); response took several years

N&S

N

Absolute
gains (e.g.
states gain
something)

N&S

Y

All states gain through economic
expansion, though not all states gain
equally

Shadow of the
future

N

Y

All states are allies; though relations
with Russia are strained, future work
likely

Lack of path
dependence

N

Y

Council evolved despite history of
environmental work

Lack of
contrary
norms

N

Y

Council had roots in areas of expansion
(i.e. EPRR and SDWG)

Form of
negotiation
(e.g.
information,
coalitions)

N&S

Y

Compromise in negotiations led to
initial mandate of Council; information
responsible for expansion into
economic areas

Relative gains
(e.g. states
gain more
than rivals)

N&S

N

No evidence of concern for relative
gains; no importance of security issues

No security
ramifications

N

Y

Security not an important issue for
states

“Balance”
motivations

N&S

N

States attempting to make absolute,
economic gains

Great power
preference
reigns
supreme

N&S

N

All states supported Council;
sustainable development part of
Council despite United States and
Russian resistance; all states gain in
current expansion
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Conclusion
This chapter explained the evolution of the Arctic Council’s mandate to take on
economic and related public safety issues. Initially, states and permanent participants intended
that the Arctic Council promote environmental protection and sustainable development in the
Arctic region. Although it has done a lot of work on environmental protection, its work on
sustainable development has faced problems of focus. Only the Council’s informal mandate has
changed. Functionalists would explain this evolution with reference to a combination of
institutional capacity, technocratic interest, automatic spillover and institutional competence.
Neoliberal institutionalism would expect that economic issues, negotiation tactics and absolute
gains are responsible for mandate expansion. Neorealism would expect that regional balance
concerns are responsible for the expansion. Neoliberal institutionalists are the most correct in
that states are expanding the Council’s mandate to exploit the economic potential of the Arctic.
Functionalism also can contribute to our understanding the Council. Neoliberal
institutionalism would predict that the Council would not evolve due to norms. The Council
broke path dependence in that there were some elements and working groups whose broad
activities allowed it to move beyond environmental monitoring, namely the Emergency
Prevention, Preparedness and Response group. This fact is in line with the predictions of
neoliberal institutionalism. Nonetheless, the institution showed that it is competent through
excellent reports, which also contributed to its growth. This fact is in line with the predictions of
functionalism, which sees individuals within the council being able to shape the agenda of the
Council indirectly by pushing for action on climate change. Neoliberal institutionalism would
not make this prediction. The Council’s mandate has expanded mainly due to the economic
importance of the Arctic, but also due to its good work and the individuals within the Council.
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This chapter contributes to academic literature in that it is the first study to explain the
current expansion of the Arctic Council. Those who argue that the Council should expand for
normative or more altruistic reasons must pay heed to the power of economics. Many scholars
prescribe what the Council should do to address issues of profound importance in the Arctic
region. Scholars need to pay more attention to what the Council can do. That is, scholars need to
take into account the factors that motivate Council action when they provide their prescriptions
for Council action. As economic arguments are responsible for mandate expansion, scholars who
seek to influence the Council would be wise to make their arguments in these terms. Scientists
within the Council in the past have shaped the mandate of the Council, as seen in the case of
securing the funding of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment report. In the Arctic Council,
environmental and social problems in the Arctic motivate research but not necessarily action.
More elaboration about what changes are possible in the Arctic Council in this context is a
direction for more research.
Authors such as Oran Young, Evan Boom, Terry Fenge and Olav Schram Stokke may be
correct that the Arctic Council emerged due to an interest in scientific knowledge about the
Arctic, but that explanation does not explain the Council’s evolution. There is some evidence
that geopolitical concerns and concerns about human security also motivated states to form the
Arctic Council, but there is no doubt that concern about Arctic pollution from Russia mainly
inspired states to create the institution. These scholars did not anticipate the changes that are
taking place in the Council and that economics would inspire change in the Council. The
motivations and interests of states within the Arctic Council have shifted considerably since
scholars first examined the Council’s formation. As the Council is now dealing with important
economic issue areas, it may continue to expand.
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CHAPTER 3: EXPLAINING THE POLICY-MAKING ROLE OF THE COUNCIL
The policy-making role of the Arctic Council is expanding.386 In 1996, shortly after the
founding of the Council, commentators anticipated it would be an institution that governments
used to create formal policy.387 It quickly became clear that it would instead be a weak policyrecommendation body. The institution emerged as a forum to research environmental issues and
complete small-scale sustainable development projects. States and permanent participants
created scientific reports in the institution, often with policy recommendations, but they did not
create formal policies or treaties. The role of the Council changed in 2009, when it announced it
would create a formal agreement on Arctic search and rescue. This chapter explains the reasons
for the evolution of the Council’s policy-making role. The term “policy-making role” refers to
actions by the Council to facilitate the creation of formal international agreements. The Council’s
“policy-recommendation role” refers to research creating policy options, which states can decide
to adopt or ignore.
This chapter analyzes the policy-making role of the Council using functionalist theory,
neorealist theory and neoliberal institutionalist theory, proceeding in three sections. The first
section describes each theory’s expected reasons for the expanding policy-making role of the
Council. Functionalism would hypothesize that the Council’s policy-making role would expand
automatically in response to clear issues that states and the Council itself need to address.
Neorealism would expect the policy-making role should expand when doing so helps states
achieve relative gains and fulfills the preferences of great powers. Neoliberal institutionalism
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would hypothesize that the policy-making role would expand because it is in the absolute interest
of all member states, tempered by the form of negotiation. The second section undertakes
historical process tracing to demonstrate how the Council’s policy-making role has expanded
over time. The third section analyzes the results and concludes that neoliberal institutionalism,
with its emphasis on absolute gains, explains state preferences in the Council’s policy-making
role; however, neorealism, with its emphasis on great power influence, provides the best
explanation for outcomes in the Council. Economics provide the catalyst for the evolution of the
Council’s policy role, which all of the theories examined would expect. We would not see the
same expansion of the policy-making power of the Council if the Arctic’s economic potential
were not as strong as it is today. The central argument of this chapter is that the Council’s policymaking role is expanding primarily because the increasing potential to exploit the North’s
economic resources means that expansion is in the absolute interest of member states, most
importantly the United States and Russia. The North’s economic potential provides an incentive
for states to create policy that will improve the economic prospects of the region.
This chapter contributes to existing literature in three ways. First, existing literature does
not agree on the policy-making role of the Council. Several authors, such as diplomat Evan T.
Bloom,388 consultant Terry Fenge389 and political scientist Oran Young390 argue that the Council
developed as a research institution rather than a policy institution. These authors emphasize that
the Council creates good quality research that states use to create policy in other forums. For
these authors, the expansion of the Council’s policy-making role is an unexpected event. A
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second group of authors argue that the Council is a norm creating, “soft law” international
institution. This group includes such political scientists as Timo Koivurova,391 Peter Stenlund392
and Alison Ronson.393 A shortcoming of this literature is that the authors do not provide strong
examples to establish that the Council indeed creates soft-law. This paper evaluates both sides of
this debate and concludes that neither is currently accurate because the Council now creates
“hard-law,” or formal international policy. It contributes to literature that seeks to explain why
the Council operates as it does, as well as literature that seeks to understand the dynamics of
international institutional decision-making.
Second, this chapter contributes to literature that debates whether the Council’s policymaking role should expand further. Some authors, such as political scientist Oded Cedar,394 call
on the Council to increase its policy-making role to address pressing challenges in the Arctic
region. This group includes research institutes and think tanks.395 Their work ignores the political
context of current Council decision-making, as well as whether the type of policy role they
envision for the Council is possible in the near future. Existing work, for example, does not
examine whether the current instances of policy-making in the Council are temporary, successful
or wanted by all member states. This thesis shows that further policy-making expansion is
unlikely outside of economic issue areas.
Third, this thesis contributes a case study that demonstrates the explanatory validity and
reliability of neoliberal institutionalism when modified with predictions of neorealism.
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3.1 – Theorizing the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Policy-Making Role
Theory provides a frame for analysis to explain the reasons for the evolution of an
international institution. Functionalists would expect an institution would evolve automatically
and would thus propose six hypotheses to explain expansion of the Council’s policy-making
ability. The first hypothesis relates to state preferences and outcomes. The second through fifth
hypotheses relate to state preferences while the sixth relates to outcomes.
H1: Co-operation and policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving automatically in response
to external structural changes and issues that demand co-operation between states.
Functionalists would expect that changes in the policy-making role of the Arctic Council
are occurring automatically due to clear, external issues demanding a co-operative policy
response. Other theories argue institutional evolution is more political. Functionalists argue that
states respond to external challenges “automatically.”396 Political scientists Bastiaan van
Apeldoorn, Henk Overbeek and Magnus Ryner summarize that in functionalism, international
co-operation “propels itself forward.”397 Functionalist David Mitrany writes that there is
“promise in working arrangements as a way of building up an international community.”398
Formal agreements emerge to help states achieve their goals and do something that would not
otherwise be possible.399 For example, functionalists would expect climate change to elicit
automatic co-operation. It is a challenge external to any state and no one state is responsible. It
poses clear challenges that governments must address together and thus states will not hesitate to
respond. Thus, climate change co-operation will emerge automatically in the Council.
396

Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, Henk Overbeek and Magnus Ryner, “Theories of European Integration: A Critique,” in
A Ruined Fortress?: Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe, eds. Alan W. Cafruny and Magnus
Ryner (Oxford: Rowan and Littlefield, 2003), 21
397
Ibid.
398
David Mitrany, “The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional,” Journal of Common Market Studies 4, no. 2
(1965):137.
399
Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations,” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 3 (1998): 16-23 and Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner, “Theories of European
Integration,” 21.

116
H2: Co-operation and policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving because states all have the
same preferences that create evolution
According to functionalists, instances of international co-operation in the Council must
serve a clear function and be in the absolute interest of all states.400 Neorealists do not believe
gains must be absolute. International institutions, as summarized by political scientists Kenneth
W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “create social orderings appropriate to their pursuit of shared
goals: producing collective goods, collaborating in prisoner’s dilemma settings, solving
coordination problems, and the like.”401 States should have the same goal in any instance of
international co-operation and thus the evolution of the policy-making role of the Council is a
response to common goals.
H3: States are evolving the policy-making role of the Arctic Council to fulfill mutual
technocratic goals around a less-political issue area.
For functionalists, co-operation in the Council is likely to emerge around less-political
issues. These are issues usually associated with “low politics,” or issues that do not involve vital
state interest and impact state survival. Other theories would agree, but functionalists emphasize
this point. For example, military security would be a highly political issue area, but ecosystem
management would be a less political issue area. If all states face an environmental threat, the
solution to the problem should not be contentious. In the words of political scientist Mark Imber,
functionalists “advocated using the ‘low politics’ of functional, technical and economic cooperation as more suitable for promoting [international] integration.”402 Thus, the Council will
create formal policies and treaties to serve a technical purpose, such as the creation of a new
trade route or a mechanism to reduce pollution with transboundary consequences.
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H4: Evolution in the policy-making role of the Council is occurring automatically because of
“spillovers” that create opportunities for further co-operation.
Functionalists would predict that “spillover” would increase Council policy-making.
States may grant international institutions a degree of autonomy, after which institutions may end
up “leading the individual member states.”403 The other theories argue international institutions
will never “lead” states. States grant international institutions authority to complete tasks
efficiently.404 In some cases, “the creation of a common policy in one sector generates the ‘need’
to transfer policy-making in related sectors.”405 Functionalists call this process “spillover.”406 For
example, if states created an institution to negotiate an economic agreement, it might next
discuss the infrastructure necessary in response to new economic activity, which would expand
their policy-making role. Functionalists argue this process should proceed consistently.
According to functionalists, evolution in the Arctic Council would occur in response to issue
“spillover.”
H5: The Arctic Council is evolving because interest groups are pushing for new co-operation in
the Council.
Functionalists would predict that an epistemic community and/or an interest group is
likely convincing states that Council policy-making evolution is necessary and providing
information that makes evolution more likely. Functionalists argue that interest groups or
epistemic communities can convince states to undertake action by providing information or
making compelling arguments.407 In contrast, other theories, such as neorealism, do not believe
such groups can influence state foreign policy. Epistemic communities are groups of experts who
share a common perspective on an issue. Interest groups can bring forward “interests, beliefs and
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expectations.”408 For example, business groups may push for new roles and responsibilities for
the Arctic Council as climate change creates new opportunities for business in the Arctic. These
groups may provide information about the business activity that would result if the Council
undertook certain action, such as creating an agreement on search and rescue. They may bring
forward beliefs and values about the necessity of economic development ahead of all else. In
contrast, the epistemic community of climate scientists may convince states that action on
climate change is necessary by providing information about the harmful consequences of
inaction. They also may bring forward beliefs and values about the importance of protecting the
environment ahead of economic activity. However, states will not allow an international
institution to take on an issue that is outside of its interest or that is not within its desired range of
preferences, despite the lobbying of epistemic communities or interest groups.
H6: States are evolving the policy-making role of the Arctic Council because it has been proven
competent.
For functionalists, the Arctic Council will only evolve when it is clearly competent.409 In
the words of Imber, “Organizations that are judged to be competent will gain additional powers,
those that are not will be unlikely to enjoy task expansion.”410 In contrast, the other two theories
maintain that institutional expansion relates to state interests rather than institutional
performance. If a new issue emerges, states only will co-operate in existing international
institutions if it can execute state goals. If an institution does not have a record of success, states
may opt to create a new international institution. Thus, states will allow the evolution of the
Arctic Council when it shows that it is an international institution capable of doing more than it
currently does.
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Neorealists argue that concerns over relative position drive state ambitions and would
make three predictions to explain the growing policy-making role of the Arctic Council. The first
two hypotheses explain state preferences while the third explains outcomes.
H1: States have a greater concern for relative gains than absolute gains, present in the current
evolution of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role.
Neorealists argue that the evolution of the Council’s policy-making role should serve
state relative gains. As noted, functionalists assume that states will co-operate to achieve any
gain. Neoliberal institutionalists assume that states are “atomistic” in that in any transaction, their
motivation is to gain something, regardless of the gains of other states (i.e. absolute gains).411
Neorealists, in contrast, assume that states are “positional,” in that in transactions these actors
seek to maintain or improve their position relative to rival powers (i.e. relative gains).412 Rival
powers are states that can challenge the position of a given state and so states seek relative gains.
H2: Great powers would oppose a greater policy-making role for the Council in areas of vital
interest or zero-sum power distribution, such as security; small powers support a stronger
policy-making role for the Arctic Council to balance the region.
Neorealists argue great powers would need to gain more than rival powers to ensure
relative gains in Council evolution.413 Namely, the United States and Russia must gain more than
rival powers, such as China, in international co-operation. Russian and United States gains also
must be equal. Neorealists argue that self-help and survival are the most important goals in
international relations.414 Great powers would be unlikely to co-operate in areas of vital interest,
but may support co-operation in less important issue areas, such as environmental protection.
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Neorealists would argue that smaller states co-operate to “balance” against rival powers
in the Council.415 Through the Arctic Council, states might be attempting to strike a balance
against a rival outside the region. Small states in the Council might use the institution to balance
against the great powers in the region.416 For example, the Arctic states could use the Council to
respond to increased Arctic interest from a rival power such as China. Alternatively, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden might be attempting to balance the power of
Russia and the United States. A country such as Finland, for example, has few advantages in
bilateral relations with Russia, yet it is better able to achieve its objectives when it works in
concert with the other Scandinavian countries in the Council; hence, regional balance is an
important consideration. Neither functionalism nor neoliberal institutionalism emphasizes great
power relative gains or “balance” concerns as determining state co-operation, as do neorealists.
H3: The evolution of policy-making in the Council should reflect the preferences of the great
powers.
According to neorealist scholars, great powers would not enter into arrangements that are
contrary to their preferences and so the structure of the Council should reflect their interests. This
scenario is possible in functionalism and neoliberal institutionalism. Great powers have greater
economic and military power than smaller powers. Thus, these powers have less need to cooperate and can dictate the terms of collaboration.417 Smaller powers in the Arctic Council have
fewer alternatives to accomplish their policy goals. These states are less able to exploit their
economic power or coerce other states. In many cases, these actors require co-operation more so
than great powers. Thus, middle powers and small powers may co-operate through the Arctic
Council even when the form of co-operation does not match their foremost preferences.
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Neoliberal institutionalism would make five predictions about the reasons that an
international institution’s policy-making role would expand. The first three hypotheses predict
state preferences in Council evolution while the fourth and fifth predict outcomes.
H1: States co-operate in the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain something through
treaty making.
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that states must gain something by evolving the Arctic
Council’s policy-making role. They assert that a state creates a treaty when it is in its interest to
do so and it stands to gain something material.418 States will co-operate if they make any gain, in
contrast to neorealists who argue states will likely respond to relative gains.
H2: States are likely evolving the policy-making role of the Council because of an economic
issue.
Neoliberal institutionalists view economics as a potent motivator for state action and thus
the Council’s policy-making evolution. Other theories agree that economics motivate state
behaviour, but it is particularly important to neoliberal institutionalists.419 In the words of
political scientist David Baldwin, in neoliberal institutionalist theory, “states are assumed to be
trying to maximize their economic welfare in a world where military force is a possibility.” 420
H3: In international institutions such as the Arctic Council, norms and the “shadow of the
future” can create pressure for co-operation and make great powers more likely to accept
compromise on issues such as the expansion of the Council’s policy-making role.
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that states are likely to co-operate if all of the countries
are likely to have to co-operate in the future, which should be true in the Council. Scholars refer
to the fact that states will need to co-operate in the future as “the shadow of the future.”421
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Neoliberal institutionalists also argue that international norms can restrict state behaviour
(in contrast to functionalists and neorealists), which should have an impact on the Council.
Political scientists Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink define a norm as “a standard of
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.”422 In other words, a norm in international
relations is an informal rule or expected behaviour to which states adhere. In international
institutions such as the Arctic Council, norms about the institution’s operations may dictate state
action and can even overcome state interest, thus leading to compromise by great powers.
H4: The form of negotiation matters (such as coalitions, information and persuasion) and thus
Council policy-making evolution will not always reflect the interests of great powers.
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that the interaction between states and the content of
negotiations can explain outcomes of co-operation in the Council, in contrast to functionalists423
They also argue that non-governmental organizations, epistemic communities and small states
can bring forward information that impacts international co-operation. This fact explains why
outcomes may differ from the desired outcomes of great powers, in contrast to neorealists.
H5: The form of the Council’s policy-making role can reflect path dependence.
Neoliberal institutionalists would expect the Council to evolve in order to make the
region more predictable, though tempered by path dependence. They argue that treaties formalize
the sharing of information and codify how states interact.424 Treaties help ensure commitments
are legitimate. This situation can create path dependence. Functionalists and neorealists do not
believe this phenomenon will be a problem. Path dependence refers to the notion that norms and
established practices within international organizations can mean they are difficult to evolve.425
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Table 3.1 summarizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for policy-making role
evolution according to each theory. In regards to functionalism, is the Council’s policy-making
role evolving automatically in response to issue spillover and clear issues demanding a policy
response? The theory’s predictions would be falsified if evolution was not consistent or
automatic. In regards to neoliberal institutionalism, are states allowing the Council’s policymaking role to evolve to fulfill absolute gains, tempered by the form of negotiation? The theory’s
predictions would be falsified if evolution was not in response to absolute gains or the form of
negotiation was unimportant. In regards to neorealism, are states allowing the Council’s policymaking role to evolve to maintain a regional balance and accommodate great power interest? The
theory’s predictions would be falsified if gains other than relative gains motivated states, or if the
preferences of a great power did not prevail in outcomes.
Table 3.1: Dependent and Independent Variables
Dependent variable: expansion of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role

Necessary (n)
/ sufficient (s)

Common ind. variables

S
S

Likely less political issue area
Economic gains

Functionalism ind. variables Absolute gains (i.e. gains mostly equal)
Issue spillover
Independent institution
Interest group or epistemic community lobbying
Institution has proven competence
Automatic response

N
N&S
N&S
N
N
N&S

Neoliberal ind. variables

Absolute gains (i.e. states gain something)
Shadow of the future
Lack of path dependence
Lack of contrary norms
Form of negotiation (i.e. information, coalitions)

N&S
N
N
N
N&S

Neorealist ind. variables

Relative gains (i.e. states gain more than rivals)
No security ramifications
“Balance” motivations
Great power preference reigns supreme

N&S
N
N&S
N&S
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3.2 – Understanding the Evolution of the Council’s Policy-Making Role
This section provides an overview of four periods of Council policy-making. In the first
period, from 1991 until 1996, states debated the policy-making role of the Council, with the
United States and Russia strongly opposing defining the Council as a policy-making body, and
Canada and the Nordic states strongly supporting such a role. In the second period, from 1996 to
2003, the United States, Russia and even Canada blocked attempts to create formal policy in the
Council. In this period, policy-making in the Council did not occur because state interests did not
align in areas requiring a policy response. The third period, from 2004 until 2007, was a
transitional period. Russia increasingly supported using the Council to create policy because it
was in its economic interest to do so. In the fourth period, from 2007 until present, the Council
created formal policies on issues of circumpolar concern, namely emergency response.
3.2.1 – 1991-1996
To show that evolution has taken place, it is necessary to understand the intention of
states regarding the Council’s policy-making role. From 1991 until 1996, states debated the
policy-making role of the Arctic Council. There are four key questions. First, how did the
question of the Council’s policy-making role emerge? Second, what were key debates regarding
the Council’s policy-making role? Third, what were the positions of the various actors prior to
the creation of the Council regarding its policy-making role? Fourth, why did the preferences of
some actors prevail over others and who exerted the most influence? In regards to the first
question, the eight Arctic states envisioned that the Council would be an organization to research
important Arctic environmental issues. The key question that naturally emerged was whether the
Council would be the venue in which states would address these key issues. The Council
emerged as a successor to the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS).
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In regards to the first question, a question about the Council’s policy-making role
emerged because the AEPS had identified several issues demanding a policy response. The
strategy stemmed from a desire by policy-makers in Arctic states to co-operate in the wake of the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and to address severe environmental issues in the Russian
Arctic that demanded a response. Governments generally knew that there were large amounts of
the poisonous industrial coolant polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) unsafely stored in the Russian
Arctic. These states, including Russia, did not know the extent of the problem.426 It was
important to understand the issue because exposure to PCBs causes cancer. In addition, the
government of the former Soviet Union openly acknowledged that it had dumped radionuclides
in the Arctic, namely in the Kara and White Seas.427 The AEPS came together in 1991 in
Rovaniemi, Finland, after negotiations beginning in September 1989 at the government of
Finland’s suggestion. The program was to “protect the Arctic ecosystem including humans” as
well as to “review regularly the state of the Arctic environment.”428 The strategy established that
there were 180,000 tonnes of PCBs produced in the Russian Arctic during the Cold War.429 A
2000 report summarized, “Within the Russian Federation, there is no collection of PCB waste,
and no disposal facilities; PCB contaminated wastes are usually stored on site.”430 It also found,
“Storage may be in the open air or in storage rooms or warehouses,”431 in many cases near
populations of indigenous peoples. States began to consider the role of policy in the Arctic
Council because the AEPS identified Arctic environmental problems as potentially demanding a
policy response.
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After 1991, the question of an Arctic council’s policy-making role continued because
policy-makers became aware of the poor living conditions in some parts of the Arctic requiring a
policy response. Indicators showed the living standard of Russia’s Arctic residents was declining
after the fall of the Iron Curtain. During the 1990s, the life expectancy of Russia’s northern
indigenous peoples decreased by almost five years.432 The AEPS took on human development
projects, such as the creation in 1994 of the Task Force on Sustainable Development and
Utilization. It conducted studies of domestic policy and its impact on indigenous peoples.433
AEPS research about the declining human security situation in the Russian Arctic begged
questions about the policy role of an Arctic Council.
In terms of the second question, as to the key debates around the Council’s policymaking role, the main issue concerned whether the Council would be an institution in which
states created formal policy, which news commentary expected. In 1994, Toronto Star columnist
Gordon Barthos wrote, “An Arctic Council should be used to tackle a broader range of
international issues such as demilitarizing the North and creating a free-trade zone,” as well as
such issues as “boosting scientific exploration, mining, tourism, pollution control, and wildlife
protection.”434 Historian John English, in his history of the formation of the Arctic Council,
confirms that many commentators expected that the Council would be a policy-making body.435
The Walter and Duncan Gordon Foundation, for example, had called for policy creating a “zone
of peace” in the Arctic since 1984.436 Many commentators debated the Council’s policy role.
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In terms of the third question, regarding the positions of the various actors on the
Council’s policy-making role, two alignments emerged: Canada and the Nordic countries, with
delegations supporting a robust, policy-making Council; and the United States and Russia, whose
delegations stood opposed. Canada proposed the creation of the Arctic Council in 1995 as it
sought a more robust international institution to succeed the AEPS and faced demands from
indigenous peoples. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien proposed to United States President
Bill Clinton that states create a new Arctic institution during a meeting in Ottawa in February
1995, which the rest of the Arctic states accepted when contacted by Canadian officials.437 The
Canadian government intended the Council to be a policy-making body, which was not accepted
by United States and Russian officials. The process to create the Council proceeded in two major
stages. Discussions of the Council’s policy-making role were a relatively minor issue. First,
informal negotiations between states occurred throughout 1995 as well as in one formal
negotiation session during June.438 The goal of states was to transition the AEPS into an
institution informally and quickly by the end of 1995. However, state representatives could not
agree on the role of indigenous peoples’ organizations, discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis.439
Second, Canadian officials saw that informal negotiations would not be adequate and so
organized three rounds of negotiations between state department officials in 1996. These took
place in Ottawa in April, June and August.440 The issue of whether indigenous peoples’
organizations would be full Council members dominated the April and June meetings, with the
resolution that these groups become second-tier members, or “permanent participants,” without
voting power. June and August 1996 saw state delegations prepare the declaration founding the
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Council, signed in a September 1996 meeting in Ottawa. Delegations discussed the policymaking role of the Council during the June meeting.
In these negotiations, delegations from the first United States and Russia made two
arguments opposing a policy-making role. The United States led this alignment and so the
arguments reflected its preferences. First, the United States generally opposes international
organizations with a strong policy-making role for fears that it could compromise its
international autonomy.441 One Environmental Protection Agency official illustrated the fear that
the Council could affect sovereignty in an anecdote about the negotiations to create the Council:
We [the Environmental Protection Agency] had some inter-agency meetings that were bloody
because we had some Neanderthals from the then Bureau of Mines and various other elements.
They were almost shouting, ‘No way in hell are we going to let anybody else come in and tell us
whether or not we can go and mine in Alaska.’ There were parallel kinds of message coming
from certain other camps. At the end of the day, the State Department and the White House said,
‘There’s some good that can come out of this, so we are going to do it [and join the Council].’442

Second, the United States opposed the creation of policy in the Arctic Council to avoid
duplicating the efforts and roles of other international forums that create formal agreements, such
as the International Maritime Organization or United Nations.443 There were two other reasons
the United States and Russia opposed a strong policy-making role for the Council. The nature of
the United States’ policy-making system makes it difficult for the country to accept and
implement formal policy, which resulted in a reluctance to involve itself in institutions that could
create legal obligations.444 Furthermore, environmental issues were a fairly low priority for the
Russian government in the 1990s.445 Russian delegations have stated in Council meetings that
Russia feels unfairly singled out as a problematic polluter, when the other Arctic states have
441
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environmental issues as well.446 Russia and the United States opposed a policy-making role for
the Council out of concern for the obligations it would create, which the other Council states had
to accept.
The second alignment (the Nordic countries and Canada) sought a strong policy-making
role for the Council. In the June negotiations, these delegations argued that a policy-making
Council could be an effective means to address environmental and other Arctic issues. The
Nordic countries, namely Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, supported using the
Council to create formal policies as a way to force Russia to address its Arctic contaminant
problem.447 As noted, there was a significant contaminant problem in the Arctic impacting
human health. It is easier to create common policy positions in Nordic countries due to the
structure of their governments.448 In Finland, for example, Arctic stakeholders meet ahead of
Council meetings to develop common Finnish policy positions. (Such meetings do not always
happen in North American countries.) These stakeholders include government ministries,
experts, interest groups, the administration, regional governments, non-governmental
organizations and industry, as well as Saami representatives.449 Nordic countries in general
develop top-down strategies, followed by an action plan, implementation, follow-up and
monitoring.450 The United States, in contrast, does not always develop common multistakeholder policy positions, which makes accepting formal policy more difficult.451 Canada
supported policy-making as a means to develop the Council as a strong, robust international
body. Canada, in the early days of the Council, supported bottom-up decision-making and policy
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in the Council.452 Permanent participants also were part of this alignment, though these groups
were not a strong part of discussions and were preoccupied securing their participation in the
Council, discussed in Chapter 6. Government officials from the Nordic states and Canada
believed that good outcomes could come from the Arctic Council. What emerged from the June
1996 discussions was not a formal prohibition on policy, but an understanding that the Council
was an international forum, rather than an international institution with law-making capability.453
In regards to the fourth question, as to which states’ preferences prevailed, the first
alignment’s preferences prevailed as Russia and the United States created the expectation that
the Council would not be a venue to create formal policy. These two countries yielded more
powerful bargaining positions than the Nordic countries and Canada, namely their relative
importance and the fact that they were much less willing to compromise in the key June 1996
negotiations as to the Council’s policy-making role. The United States delegation, in particular,
demanded a Council that met its state interests and would not threaten the country’s international
autonomy. It became clear that the Arctic Council would not be a treaty-making body shortly
after the creation of the organization, but rather an institution that states would use to research
important policy options. As a 1996 news report noted,
The group will not, for example, be able to tell the United States whether to develop its most
northern Alaskan oil reserves, or counsel Russia about how aggressively to mine for minerals in
Siberia. But it may recommend methods for minimizing the effect of such projects and spreading
the work and benefits among native communities.454

The great regional powers emerged mostly victorious in negotiations.
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Still, the second alignment could also claim some success, as the United States and
Russian officials did not demand a general prohibition on the creation of policy. The second
alignment did not suggest any policies that the Council might create at the onset of the
institution. The United States and Russian official’s concerns were more about the future than
the present, which negated the need for a stronger prohibition. States understood after the June
1996 Council negotiations in Ottawa that the Council would not rush to create policy, but did not
include language in the Council’s founding documents precluding work on policy.455 The press
release announcing the Council, for example, says that the Council provided “a mechanism for
addressing the common concerns and challenges faced by their governments and the people of
the Arctic.”456 In the media, there was some confusion as to the ultimate policy-making role of
the Council. For example, a September 1996 Associated Press article created the impression that
the Council would create policy, identifying the Council as a body “to protect the fragile polar
environment while encouraging long-term development.”457 The language in the Council’s
founding documents leaves open the possibility that the Council could be a policy-making body
in the future. The Nordic countries and Canada accepted the policy-making powers of the
Council as prescribed by the United States and Russia, confident that the Council could be a
policy-making institution if circumstances dictated. Overall, the first alignment emerged
victorious, as there was an understanding that the Council, as an international forum, would not
create any policy in the short-term. The second alignment could claim some victory, as policymaking was available to the Council as a tool of governance. States relatively settled the question
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regarding the policy-making role of the Council as the Council began operations in 1996, even
though the question did not remain settled for long.
Returning to the literature, several authors explain that the Council was a research
institution upon its creation. This chapter confirms that analysis. The AEPS was an institution
that created good quality research about little understood environmental issues. In 1996, it
appeared that the Council would continue with this work, as predicted and described by Evan
Bloom, Terry Fenge and Oran Young. At the founding of the institution, the Council did not
appear poised to develop norms, or “a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors.”458 This
analysis suggests that authors such as Timo Koivurova, Peter Stenlund and Alison Ronson overemphasize the Council role as a soft law institution, based on the legal powers given at its onset.
The creation of research and reports does not necessarily result in soft-law. Soft law must see
research lead to a consistent change in state behaviour. In addition, those authors advocating that
the Council expand could deepen their research agenda by acknowledge that the Council was
designed deliberately as a limited research institution.
3.2.2 – 1996-2004
There are two key questions pertinent to the period of Council policy-making from 1996
until 2004. First, how did the debate over the policy-making role of the Council evolve from
1996 until 2004? Second, why did the preferences of some actors prevail over the preferences of
others?
In regards to the first question, the debate around the policy-making role settled to an
extent as it became clear that the United States and Russia would not allow the Council to be a
strong policy-making body. In creating the Arctic Council rules of procedure, the United States
458
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and Russia sought to ensure the Council had a weak policy-making role and that it could ensure
that such a role could not emerge without consent. The 1996 Ottawa Declaration set out three
goals for the Council to complete from 1996 until 1998: 1) to develop rules of procedure for the
Council; 2) to create terms of reference for the Sustainable Development Working Group
(SDWG), and; 3) to transition the work of the AEPS to the Arctic Council. There were five
Council meetings from 1997 until 1998, four of which Canada hosted in the spring and fall of
each year.459 The creation of the rules of procedure dominated the first four of these meetings,
from the spring of 1997 until August 1998.460 In these meetings, the United States sought to
ensure that the rules of procedure authorize the Council only to undertake projects having the
consent of all Council members, in essence giving each state a veto on all Council matters.461
The rest of the Council members sought to create a “short and simple” set of “procedural rules”
that would make the Council a flexible body and ensure the task of creating rules of procedure
did not take up too much time.462 The United States, which was again unwilling to compromise,
was successful, as the rules of procedure establish that each Council state has a veto on any
Council matter and that the institution operates according to consensus. This veto allows the
United States to ensure that no policy can occur in the Council without the consent of all states, a
high burden of agreement that could stifle policy. The Council’s policy-making role appeared
settled as the Council began undertaking substantive work in 1998.
Nonetheless, nothing in the rules of procedure precludes policy work in the Council,
reflecting the general understanding of the Council’s policy-making role achieved in 1996
459
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negotiations. States and permanent participants set the Council agenda,463 decide on delegation
sizes,464 schedule meetings and participate in meetings.465 All states and permanent participants
“may make proposals for co-operative activities.”466 States make all of these decisions by
consensus. Thus, every state has a veto on any Council matter. They decide what observers can
attend each meeting and what they can do in those meetings.467 States typically hold between two
and four annual meetings in which they receive updates on projects in progress, present
proposals for new projects and approve of projects presented by other countries. One state acts as
the chair country to facilitate communication for two-year rotating terms.468
Between 1996 and 2004, the Arctic Council emerged as a policy-recommendation body
because of the United States, Russia and to a lesser extent Canada. The Council held 18
institutional meetings from 1998 until 2004. Research defined the Council’s work during this
period. In a typical meeting, Arctic Council working groups of government scientists would
bring forward research proposals, which states would sponsor, approve and provide comment.
Permanent participants and occasionally observers also would sponsor projects and provide
comment. Most projects moved forward with little interference from state delegations. From
1998 until 2004, the Council initiated 57 projects, including three major projects (the Arctic
Climate Impact Assessment, the Arctic Human Development Report and the Arctic Contaminants
Action Program).469

463

Arctic Council, Rules of Procedure (Iqaluit, Nunavut: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 1998), Article 19.
Ibid., Article 13.
465
Ibid., Article 30.
466
Ibid., Article 26.
467
Ibid., Annex 2, Articles 1-4.
468
Ibid., Article 46.
469
Arctic Council, Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Arctic Council Ministers: Barrow, Alaska, United States of
America, October 12, 2000 (Barrow, Alaska: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 2000); Arctic Council, Report of
Senior Arctic Officials to Arctic Council Ministers (Inari, Finland: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 2002); Arctic
Council, Report of Senior Arctic Officials to Ministers at the Fourth Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting (Reykjavik,
Iceland: Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, 2004).
464

135
Research, rather than disagreements over policy, defines the Council’s first era of
existence. The Council undertook research projects on climate change, biodiversity, oil-spill
preparedness and human security, among others.470 Specific examples of research projects
include the Arctic Sea Birds project,471 sponsored by Norway and Canada (2000), the Russian
Regional Program of Action on the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment, sponsored by
Russia (2000) and the Shoreline Clean-up Assessment Technique Manual Project472 sponsored
by Canada (2004). Technical projects include a 2000 project by Canada in the SDWG entitled
“Children and Youth in the Arctic” that sought to facilitate “data collection and analysis of
health indicators” for children living in the circumpolar Arctic.473 It also sought to support
internships, “a summer camp for young people, a learning materials exchange, and an art
competition for young people.”474 A 2002 project by Norway in the Emergency Prevention
Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working group sought to produce “a series of GIS-based
circumpolar maps showing the areas of highest risk of an oil spill and those areas with sensitive
natural resources or subsistence communities,”475 a useful tool for Arctic shippers.476 At the
onset of the Council, the Arctic Council was a collegial “science club,” in which it was possible
to create non-binding research around environmental issues of concern to all Council states.477
This research, while valuable, does not represent significantly ambitious work for an
international institution, as universities or research institutions could have completed this work.
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The debate over the Council’s policy-making role re-ignited in 1999 when a Council
member proposed the creation of a formal policy in the Council. At the November 1999 Arctic
Council meeting in Washington, D.C., states discussed research on Arctic contaminants, among
15 agenda items, including reports from the working groups and briefs on relevant environmental
work occurring outside of the Council. The Swedish and Norwegian delegations, armed with
scientific evidence about the severity of the problem of PCB contamination, proposed the
creation of formal, coordinated state reduction targets for Arctic contaminants in the Arctic
Contaminant Action Plan (ACAP).478 The meeting minutes say, “Norway reported that delegates
should be prepared to negotiate final text for the strategy component of the [Arctic Contaminants
Action] plan at the next meeting.”479 The Norwegian delegation intended that all states commit
to the action plan and that Arctic states put forward a common policy on contaminants in other
“international fora.”480 After this suggestion, delegations from Sweden, Finland, Iceland and
Denmark expressed support for the plan.481 Sweden, for example, announced it would contribute
two specific projects to clean up PCBs in the Russian Arctic.482 However, the Canadian
delegation then stated it was vetoing the proposal to use the Council to create international
obligations, citing sovereignty concerns, before Norway or Sweden could discuss what either
envisioned.483 The meeting minutes report, “As far as using the ACAP as a coordinated approach
in international fora, Canada stated that the Council must continue to rely on individual states to
take action” and “Canada could not support an imposition on national sovereignty.”484
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In this case, Canada exercised a veto to block the first-ever suggestion of formal policy
creation in the Arctic Council. The United States and Russian delegations did not state outright
rejection of a coordinated Arctic Contaminants Action Program in 1999, but did not express
support either.485 Permanent participants supported creating a policy, but did not convince
Canada to reverse its veto. Following the Canadian veto, the Inuit Circumpolar Council said that
a policy response to contaminants would constitute “a concerted effort to look after needs of
indigenous people in the Arctic.”486 The Nordic countries supported policy on contaminants
because contaminants from Russia posed environmental and health risks for these countries, as
previously noted. A formal agreement would keep Russia accountable in the face of resistance to
environmental action. The United States and Russia did not state support or opposition to the
proposal, but given either’s earlier resistance to policy-making in the Council, support seems
unlikely. Russia had little interest in such environmental issues.487 Canada did not support formal
policy due to disagreements over the necessity of such measures.488 The debate over the policymaking role of the Council shifted as the Nordic countries attempted to convince the Council to
create formal policy, which Canada rejected, citing concerns over sovereignty.
In the aftermath of this shift, the debate over the Council’s policy-making role further
ignited as the United States took action to ensure that formal policy would not be forthcoming in
the Council. In 1993, at the AEPS meeting in Nuuk, Greenland, the Council’s future EPPR
working group, at the request of Canada, began to review the “adequacy and effectiveness” of
emergency preparedness “arrangements” in the Arctic.489 At the October 2000 Arctic Council
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Ministerial Meeting, the project announced it had “concluded that agreements in force are
currently adequate.”490 Formal treaties or policies could have resulted had the EPPR concluded
that existing agreements were not adequate. A decade later, the Council created an agreement on
oil spill prevention. Does this indicate that the agreements in place in 2000 were not adequate
and the EPPR report was incorrect, or that the environmental and economic conditions in the
Arctic changed over the course of 10 years? According to policy-makers involved, Russia and
the United States, then chair of the EPPR working group, pressured the EPPR to ensure the
report concluded current policies were adequate for fear its report could affect existing nuclear
pollution regulations.491 Other Council actors were not active in this debate but would have
likely allowed formal policy, though United States and Russian interests reigned supreme.
Further work demonstrates that in this period, the Council sometimes acted like an
advocacy group. At the November 2001 Council meeting in Espoo, Finland, the Arctic states and
permanent participants discussed strategies for its members to ratify the 1998 Long Range
Transboundary Air Pollution Protocols on Persistent Organic Pollutants and Heavy Metals, an
international convention to limit the use of contaminants. Canada was the only Arctic Council
member to ratify the protocols and so states discussed the prospects of other Council countries
ratifying.492 The Inuit Circumpolar Council urged states to ratify the protocols, and Sweden,
Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Finland expressed intent to ratify.493 The delegation from Canada
suggested releasing a statement urging “early ratification,” which the United States and Russia
allowed.494 The Council acted like an advocacy group rather than a policy-making organization.
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In response to the second question, as to why the preferences of some actors prevailed
over the preferences of others, the Nordic countries could not initiate policy because there was
no consensus on Council action. At the 2000 Council meeting in Barrow, Alaska, during a
discussion of contaminants, Denmark renewed calls for a formal policy on contaminants,
following up on the 1999 discussion, as its delegation asked, “Why is it so difficult for some
countries to make a commitment?”495 Denmark asserted, “Contaminants can only be reduced
through international co-operation.”496 In 2002, Finland circulated a draft of the upcoming Inari
Declaration to Arctic states and permanent participants that had the Council declare itself the
“mouthpiece” of the Arctic region.497 However, the delegations from Canada and Iceland said
that they “are not in favour of using the word ‘mouthpiece’ in the declaration,” vetoing the
idea.498 It is not clear where the other Council states stood on this issue. It is not clear what affect
the declaration that the Council is “mouthpiece” of the Arctic region would have, but certainly, it
would invest the organization with greater importance. The Council did not create policy because
the United States and Russia, and to a lesser extent Canada, did not support the creation of
formal policy in the Council on the issues favoured by the Nordics and permanent participants.
Decision-making by consensus gave these countries a tool to prevent the adoption of policy.
As Oran Young and others have asserted, the Council was a research institution from
1996 until 2004. In addition, the Council did not necessarily create soft-law and fulfill the
potential role identified by such scholars as Timo Koivurova, although its research often
contained policy recommendations.
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3.2.3 – 2004-2007
From 2004 until 2007, momentum built toward using the Arctic Council as a policymaking body as Russia began emphasizing the importance of taking action on Arctic search and
rescue. This section seeks to answer the following question: at what point did changes in the
policy-making role of the Council take place and what explains this evolution? Changes began to
take place in 2004 as Russia stated its support for formal policy on search and rescue, which all
Council members generally supported. However, the United States stood alone blocking formal
policy on climate change, to the disappointment of all Council states and permanent participants.
The policy-making role of the Council changed in 2004, when Russia shifted its position
toward that of the Nordic/Canadian alignment and away from the United States’ opposition to
policy-making. The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) had made clear that climate
change would increase the Northern Sea Route shipping season, a lane 40 per cent shorter than
the Suez Canal when travelling from China to Europe.499 The Russian delegation stated, at the
November 2004 Council meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland, at which states released the ACIA
report, that emergency response and Arctic search and rescue would be a priority for the Russian
government and proposed to “establish a network of international base points, stationing
equipment and resources for monitoring and rescuing through an agreement among the Arctic
states.”500 Russia supported taking action on search and rescue in the Arctic because a formal
agreement would strengthen its economic position in the Arctic. Many reports indicate that the
economic future of the Arctic is strong because it is a region with billions of barrels of oil and an
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abundance of natural gas.501 As noted earlier, Russia controls roughly 80 per cent of the Arctic’s
resources.502 Insurance companies have cautioned against Arctic investment due to lack of safety
infrastructure.503 Strong work on search and rescue reassures potential investors that resources
are available in case of emergency, which is part of the reason that Russia proposed policy to
increase economic potential.
Despite the Russian invitation to begin developing policy on emergency preparedness,
work did not begin immediately. Russia did not come forward with a clear treaty on emergency
preparedness. From 2004 until 2013, the Council had on average 159 projects ongoing at a given
time. The Council completed four major projects from 2004 until 2007, namely: 1) the
Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program;504 2) Annual Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Programme pollution assessments;505 3) the Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks project,506
and; 4) the Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment.507 Russia emphasized its commitment to search and
rescue at nine Council meetings over the next five years (November 2004, April 2005, October
2005, October 2006, April 2007, November 2007, April 2008, November 2008 and November
2009). The major focus during the Russian chair was on the clean up of hazardous materials in
the Arctic as well as the development of an Arctic search and rescue plan.508 As noted, there
were two significant outcomes of Russia’s emphasis on emergency preparedness and its search
and rescue plan. First, the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response working group
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began to create a scientific assessment on the extent of Arctic shipping. Work began on the
Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (sponsored by the United States) in April 2005, with updates
on progress at every Council meeting until 2011. Second, the government of Russia organized an
“accident prevention” exercise in Valandei, Russia, during October 2008, in which circumpolar
states came together to share strategies to avoid accidents in the Arctic.509 The Arctic Oil and
Gas Assessment also helped support Russia’s emergency preparedness initiative, though it was
more economic in scope. The Russia search and rescue initiative inspired the subsequent
agreement on search and rescue, discussed later.
Nonetheless, Russian openness to an international agreement did not signal great change
in the Council. There was a second event in which the debate over the Council’s policy-making
role came to the forefront as the United States signalled that it did not support the creation of
formal policy through controversy over the ACIA. States decided to create the ACIA at the 2000
Ministerial Meeting as an assessment of climate change in the Arctic in the wake of information
about a potential threat from global warming to the environment and livelihoods around the
world. Government scientists, led by the researchers from the United States, completed the
assessment over four years. At the November 2001 Council meeting in Espoo, Finland, Iceland
proposed the creation of a policy document to accompany the ACIA, which all states approved at
this meeting.510 Scientists updated the Council about its progress creating a policy document in
April 2003, at the Council meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland. The scientists reported, “The policy
document will be at least 30 pages, containing three major chapters.”511 The plan was to deliver
the first draft on June 15, 2003, followed by a second on October 31, 2003 and a third on
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February 9, 2004.512 At every point, states would provide comments, technical in nature. The
final draft would be finished on April 4, 2004.513 There would be a special Council meeting from
August 5-7, 2003 in Svalbard, hosted by Norway.514 The purpose would be to “create a link
between the scientific work of ACIA and the policy document.”515 It appeared that the Council
would create a robust policy document on climate change, which could have inspired some
policy action.
However, the ACIA policy document was not strong. The United States proposed a
policy document of only one page at the August 2003 meeting.516 After states did not accept this
proposal, the United States exercised its veto and ended the prospect of an ACIA policy
document.517 The United States changed its earlier support for fear of the document’s impact on
the 2004 presidential election as the Republican Party under President George W. Bush sought to
avoid commitments to action on climate change.518 The Inuit Circumpolar Council was
instrumental in seeing that a policy document survived. As discussed further in Chapter 6, Sheila
Watt Cloutier of the Inuit Circumpolar Council went before United States Senate Commerce
Committee on March 3, 2004 to testify that the United States was blocking policy on climate
change.519 This testimony embarrassed the United States, and it allowed the report to move
forward in November 2004 at the next Council meeting.520 It considered vetoing the report at this
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meeting, but decided the optics of doing so would be too controversial.521 The United States did
allow a policy document, but only after external pressure.
The United States’ resistance to Council policy is reflected in the policy report that
emerged from the ACIA, which is modest and the result of compromise. While the ACIA is 140
pages, the policy document is only eight pages.522 The report came out on November 24, 2004,
after the United States election took place on November 2. The actual policy recommendations
are weak and contain no specific strategies.523 Nonetheless, the ACIA changed the way the
Council operates and increased awareness about the dangers of climate change in the Arctic
region.524 It showed that, “Annual average Arctic temperature has increased at almost twice the
rate of the rest of the world over the past few decades” with likely “additional Arctic warming of
about 4-7 degrees C over the next 100 years.”525 The United States could not block the creation
of an ACIA policy document, but blocked it from being a strong document.
We can conclude that from 2004 until 2007, the policy-making role of the Council began
to shift as Russia joined the Nordic/Canadian alignment, generally becoming open to policymaking in the Council, specifically to action on Arctic search and rescue. Oran Young’s
characterization of the Arctic Council as a research institution accurately describes its role from
2004 until 2007, although a policy-making role was evolving. The Council undertook some work
beyond research, such as the ACIA policy document or the Russian search and rescue
collaboration exercise. However, we cannot point to any norms created by these projects, in
contrast to the predictions made by Timo Koivurova and others.
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3.2.4 – 2008-2013
The Council became a policy-making body, as well as a research institution, from 2008
until 2013, evolving its approach to governance. The key question is thus: what change in the
Council’s policy-making role took place and what explains this evolution? The major change
that took place was that the Council became a body that states use to negotiate formal policy,
through the creation of the Arctic search and rescue agreement, as well as the agreement on oil
spill response. All states supported the move to create formal policy in the Council, although the
support of the United States and Russia was the major factor leading to the creation of formal
policy.
The major change in the Council’s policy-making role took place in 2008. At the
November 2008 Arctic Council meeting in Kautokeino, Norway, the United States delegation
proposed the creation of an Arctic Council agreement on search and rescue to coordinate the
response to emergency situations,526 to the surprise of many observers and former Council
policy-makers who did not think the Council would ever create policy. Russia said that it
supported the proposal and none of the other Arctic Council members stated opposition.527 The
United States and Russia served as co-chairs of the task force that created the agreement.528
Overall, the Council continued to devote much of its activities to research. As of 2013, each state
sponsors an average of 15.25 projects. Permanent participants sponsor an average of two
projects. Observers have sponsored seven projects. Negotiating legally binding agreements
comprised a small portion of the Council’s overall agenda, namely two projects.
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The search and rescue agreement’s goal is to “strengthen aeronautical and maritime
search and rescue co-operation and coordination in the Arctic.”529 States negotiated the
agreement in five meetings in Washington (December 2009), Moscow (February 2010), Oslo
(June 2010), Helsinki (October 2010) and Reykjavik (December 2010).530 The process to
negotiate the agreement was quite straightforward, with few disagreements among states.531 The
agreement does five things. First, it says that countries will abide by existing international law in
the Arctic.532 Second, it divides the Arctic into zones of responsibility for search and rescue
issues.533 Third, it provides a list of departments to contact in the event of a search and rescue
emergency.534 Fourth, it says that a state can ask for assistance and carry out joint search and
rescue missions if appropriate.535 Fifth, the agreement requires states to exchange information
about search and rescue. The search and rescue agreement is not ambitious in terms of the
obligations it imposes on states, but it sets the stage for good quality co-operation and the sharing
of useful information. It is significant that states chose to create an international agreement at all.
States could have accomplished everything in the agreement with an informal policy or action
plan. Policy-makers believe that the agreement is very useful, if not particularly exciting or
ambitious as an international legal instrument.536 The agreement sets up communication and
coordination that could have happened in the absence of an agreement through existing Council
meetings. However, it is possible that this coordination would not have occurred without the
agreement. International agreements are a new tool that the Council uses to accomplish goals.
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States supported a search and rescue agreement for two reasons. First, an agreement
emerged because it was in the interest of all state members. Co-operation was necessary due to
increasing shipping traffic in the Arctic, which had been established through research by Russia
in the Council.537 Three officials privy to details of negotiations reported that the agreement
came together quickly and that there were few disagreements or roadblocks in its creation.538
There was a disagreement about the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in
search and rescue, but this disagreement was minor and easily overcome.539 Finnish officials
wanted the agreement to acknowledge that the military is a key provider of search and rescue in
the Arctic. Russia rejected this acknowledgement, as it believed it might justify a NATO
presence in the Arctic, a position supported by Canada as well.540 As noted, Russia stands to gain
financially from increased economic activity in the Arctic.541 The rest of the Arctic Council
countries supported the agreement to “ensure that it was not going to have a negative impact” on
their own initiatives and interests.542 In other words, states supported an agreement on search and
rescue to ensure that whatever inevitable regime emerged met their interests. Second, states
supported an agreement on search and rescue because of pressure from industry. An official who
is familiar with emergency response in the Arctic said that the resource industry requested more
safety infrastructure in the Arctic.543 Such infrastructure is very costly and fundamental to
operations.544 The Search and Rescue agreement could be a way for states to respond to
pressures to do something about emergency response without undertaking large expenditures.
The search and rescue agreement won support because it enhanced the economic prospects of
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several Council countries and did not run contrary to any other state interest, though it had little
tangible impact on search and rescue capabilities.
The process to ratify the agreement began in 2011 and was complete in 2013. The United
States accepted the agreement through executive order, overcoming its historical opposition to
international treaties dealing with the Arctic because it meant the agreement would not need to
be ratified in the United States Senate, often a difficult prospect.545 A situation has not yet
emerged in which provisions of the agreement were enacted, though preparations are ongoing
within Arctic state authorities.546 On January 19, 2013, all the countries ratified the agreement
and thus it legally came into force.547 The permanent participants or observers did not contribute
significantly to the search and rescue agreement, though they generally supported it or at least
did not strongly oppose it. Due to a lack of funds, permanent participants have to concentrate
their scarce resources on areas vital to their interests, as discussed in Chapter 6. The agreement
represented a move into policy-making by the Arctic Council.
In 2011, at the Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Kiruna, Sweden, Council state
delegations announced they would work to negotiate an agreement on oil spill response through
the creation of a new task force. This agreement represents the Council’s second attempt to
negotiate a formal agreement. Much like the search and rescue agreement, it came into being
because state interests aligned to create it. Norway, Russia and the United States co-chaired the
task force and led the negotiation of the agreement.548 States negotiated the agreement at five
collegial and straightforward meetings, held in Oslo (October 2011), St. Petersburg (December
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2011), Girdwood, Alaska (March 2012), Helsinki (June 2012) and Reykjavik (October 2012).549
States signed the agreement during the 2013 Kiruna Ministerial Meeting550 and hailed it as a
“huge agreement.”551 Several critics, such as international lawyer Michael Byers, criticized the
agreement for failing to address oil spill prevention, focusing instead on only on the response to
oil spills.552 Permanent participants were more critical of this agreement. The Arctic Athabaskan
Council sent two letters to the government of Canada requesting that the agreement address
prevention as well as response, which were ultimately ignored.553 It is possible that states will
negotiate an Arctic treaty on oil-spill prevention in the future, though it remains uncertain.554
The result of this process is not ambitious, though it shows that the Council has rethought
its role in regional policy-making. The agreement excludes security by excluding military
vehicles.555 It accomplishes five similar objectives to the search and rescue agreement. First, it
establishes that states will follow existing international law when addressing oil spills in the
Arctic.556 Second, it establishes zones of responsibility for oil spill clean up. States are
responsible to clean up oil spills in their domestic waters.557 Third, the agreement on oil spill
response establishes a list of departments responsible for oil spill clean up.558 Fourth, the
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agreement establishes that states can carry out joint clean ups if appropriate.559 Fifth, it
establishes that states have to share information about oil spills and techniques to combat oil
spills.560 The oil spill agreement places legal obligations on state parties. Article 4 requires states
to clean up oil spills561 and Article 6 obliges states to inform other countries if there is an oil
spill.562 The agreement says that states cannot refuse a request for help cleaning up an oil spill.563
States opted to create an agreement on oil spill response for two reasons. First, co-operation to
address an oil spill is in state interest.564 Second, states initiated the agreement because the oil
industry asked for more resources to deal with spills.565 States created the agreement for similar
reasons to the search and rescue agreement.
To reiterate, what change in the Council’s policy-making role took place and what were
the positions of the various actors in the Council? All states are now open to the creation of
formal policy in the Arctic Council. The United States was alone resisting changes in the policymaking role in the Council, from 2004 until 2007. This shift is not a sea change. The Council
created two formal agreements. However, the rest of its average 159 projects were research
intensive, policy-recommendation work that did not involve formal policy.
3.2.5 – 2013: The Future of Policy-Making in the Council
Before concluding, it is necessary to review the policy-making role through three
questions. First, what is the policy-making role of the Arctic Council today? Second, what is the
likely trajectory of the policy-making role in the future? Third, why did the Arctic Council move
from being a body that conducts studies to one that both conducts studies and engages in some
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policy-making work? The answer to the first question is straightforward, whereas the second is
less clear. The Council is a research body that can facilitate the creation of formal agreements if
state officials so desire. In regards to the second question, the future of treaty making in the
Council is unclear. The 2012 Kiruna Declaration Council work plan contained much that may
lead to policy, such as an “arrangement on improved scientific research co-operation among the
eight Arctic States” although there is no guarantee that any law-making documents will
result.”566 The Council will take “action to prevent oil pollution,” though it is unclear if this
action will result in policy.567 The Council is completing a project on short-lived climate
forcers,568 and some policy-makers believe a treaty could be on the horizon.569 Nonetheless,
some policy-makers still resist the notion that the Council is a policy-making body.570 It is not
apparent whether the Council will continue to develop its policy role, or if it will slow the pace
of change. Nonetheless, the change toward a policy-making Council has already occurred.
In response to the third question, the policy-making role of the Council is growing
because formal policy is increasingly in the interest of all Council states. From 1991 until 1996,
states debated the role of the Arctic Council. Before the Council held its first meeting,
commentators expected the Council to be a policy-making body. This expectation was not
initially realized, as the Council emerged as a research and policy-recommendation forum. The
Nordic countries wanted the Council to create policy to address pollution in Russia, while the
United States and Russia wanted to maintain sovereignty. Canada supported policy-making, but
preferred bottom-up approaches. From 1996 until 2004, the United States, Russia and to a lesser
566

Arctic Council, The Kiruna Declaration; see also Government of Canada, Development for the People of the
North: The Arctic Council Program During Canada’s Chairmanship (2013-15) (Kiruna, Sweden: Arctic Council,
2013) and The Arctic Council, Vision for the Arctic (Kiruna, Sweden: Arctic Council, 2013).
567
Government of Canada, Development for the People of the North.
568
Ibid.
569
Interview with Canadian delegation member and environment official, winter 2013.
570
This comment emerged in interviews with a Canadian government foreign affairs official, winter 2013, and two
United States government foreign affairs officials, spring 2013.

152
extent Canada blocked the creation of formal policy. States supported creating policy that was
within their interest and opposed policy that was not within their interest.
From 2004 until 2007, momentum built toward using the Council as a policy-making
forum. Russia introduced emergency response, as well as search and rescue, as priority issues
and proposed the creation of a search and rescue agreement. Meanwhile, the United States
blocked the creation of a strong policy document to accompany the Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment (ACIA). From 2008 until 2013, the nature of policy-making in the Council changed
when the Council negotiated a formal search and rescue agreement, led by the United States and
Russia. This issue was of particular interest to the United States, Canada and Russia, although all
of the Council countries supported the agreement. This agreement also led to the negotiation of
an agreement on oil spill response, similarly supported by all of the Council states but led by the
United States, Russia and Norway. The agreements are not particularly ambitious, but they do
indicate that the Council has moved from being purely a research institution to being a policymaking body, as well. The treaties that exist support the economic development of the Arctic
region by giving industry assurances that safety protocols exist. The future of policy-making in
the Council is unclear.
How do these findings contrast with the characterizations found in Arctic Council
literature? A new understanding of the Council is necessary. Evan T. Bloom,571 Terry Fenge572
and Oran Young573 argue that the Council is a research institution that provides good quality
information to states. This characterization of the Council’s work is accurate. However, the
Council’s role evolved in 2009, when states mutually decided to create formal policy in the
Council through two international agreements. It is also clear that states had many disagreements
571

Bloom, “Establishment of the Arctic Council,” 712.
Fenge, “Canada and the Arctic Council,” 64.
573
Young, “Governing the Arctic,” 11-12.
572

153
about the policy-making role of the Council, exhibited in 1999 in the dispute about whether to
create a formal policy on pollutants in the Arctic Contaminants Action Program, or in 2004 in
the dispute over the ACIA policy document. States never permanently agreed on the policymaking role of the Council. It is possible that the Council could create soft-law in the Council, as
noted by Timo Koivurova,574 Peter Stenlund575 and Alison Ronson.576 Yet, it is difficult to
identify the creation of any specific soft law, or international norms, in the Council from 1996
until 2008. When the Council’s policy-making role evolved, it became the venue to create
international Arctic agreements. The Council is beginning a new phase in its international
governance. Contrary to the characterization by Oran Young and others, the Council has moved
beyond its role as a research institution to become a policy-making body in addition. Contrary to
the characterization by Timo Koivurova and others, the Council has become more than merely a
soft-law organization by creating formal agreements and standards of practice. Furthermore,
authors, such as Michael Byers, who argue that the Council should do more, could deepen their
research agenda by expanding on the Council’s policy-making process.577 States create formal
policy when it is in in their mutual interest and can gain economically, rather than in response to
environmental and other issues that demand action. The Council has not become an allencompassing body to address all issues demanding governance. The contentious debate over the
Council’s policy-making role is over. The Council can be a venue to create formal policy, though
whether this role will expand is unclear.
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3.3 - Explaining the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Policy-Making Role
Functionalism provides some limited insights that explain the evolution of policy-making
in the Arctic Council.
H1: Co-operation and policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving automatically in response
external structural changes and issues that demand co-operation between states.
This hypothesis has limited support. It would have support if the evolution occurred
automatically due to external structural changes. This situation was more or less the case for
search and rescue as well as response to oil spills. These issues presented significant issues for
Arctic states that states could best meet co-operatively. There were relatively few disagreements
in the creation of these treaties. However, this hypothesis does not have support for two reasons.
First, the response to these issues was not always automatic. States did not take action because
action was necessary, but rather once they received demands from industry for regulation,
promising economic benefit. One could interpret this as automatic expansion. However, the
United States and Russia blocked earlier attempts to address these issues by limiting the Analysis
of the Adequacy and Effectiveness of Existing Arrangements and Agreements report due to
concerns over its effect on nuclear security. Second, the Council has rejected opportunities for
policy work on other pressing co-operative issues. The United States, Russia and Canada earlier
rejected strong policy work on Arctic contaminants, another external policy issue demanding cooperation. The United States blocked a policy response to climate change, an exogenous issue
that demands co-operation. United States policy-makers were well aware of the devastating
consequences of climate change, as it had funded a major research report on climate change in
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). The evolution of the Council’s policy-making
role has not consistently proceeded automatically in response to external structural changes.

155
H2: Co-operation and policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving because states all have the
same preferences that create evolution.
This hypothesis does not have support, even though the policy-making role of the
Council changed when state preferences aligned. The Scandinavian countries supported a strong
policy-making role for the Council since at least 1999, as seen in its support for action on Arctic
contaminants. Canada has wavered in its support for policy-making. It supported potential action
on emergency preparedness in 2000, but earlier blocked action on contaminants. The United
States blocked policy-making in the Council until action on search and rescue in 2009. Russia
did not support policy-making until it introduced its initiative on emergency preparedness in
2004. The Nordic countries supported the emergency preparedness initiative enough to allow it
to proceed, though gained less than Russia and the United States. States do not have the same
preferences and so the hypothesis does not have support.
H3: States are evolving the policy-making role of the Arctic Council to fulfill shared technocratic
goals around a less political issue area.
This hypothesis has some support because Council policy-making has been in areas that
are technical in nature and less political, as discussed in Chapter 2. The Arctic Council states can
create greater certainty in the region by pooling resources on search and rescue and oil spills.
The treaties that states have created are largely technical in nature: they commit states to follow
international law, conduct joint operations if necessary, create zones of responsibility, exchange
information and coordinate contacts in case of emergency. One could argue that these are less
political (i.e., less contentious) issues based on the ease with which the treaties came together.
There were some minor disagreements in drafting the treaties, but for the most part the treaties
came together quickly. They help states improve their emergency preparedness and support
industry operating in the Arctic region.
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One could counter this argument and argue emergency preparedness is still a highly
contentious issue. The United States and Russia had earlier blocked action on emergency
preparedness because they feared it would have implications for their nuclear activities in the
Arctic region, demonstrating a political dimension. However, this point does not indicate that
emergency preparedness was a political issue in itself. The implications of action in this area
made it a political issue. The United States and Russia likely supported action on emergency
preparedness in 2009 in part because they were able to ensure that treaties did not impact state
security. The United States and Russia were in a better place to ensure that action would not have
unintended consequences. It is clear that overall, emergency preparedness is a less-political issue
area than such issues as national economic health and military security.
H4: Evolution in the policy-making role of the Council is occurring because of “spillovers” that
create opportunities for further co-operation.
The hypothesis has little support because emergency preparedness did not come to the
Council’s agenda due to issue spillover. The United States and Russia brought the initiative to
develop the treaties to the Council. It did not emerge due to earlier work that the Council
accomplished, but rather from demands from outside actors. One could argue that the treaties
spilled over from work completed by the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response
(EPPR) working group about emergency preparedness. However, emergency preparedness
emerged separate from the EPPR, in unique task forces. The United States and Russia chose to
create the agreements in task forces rather than entrusting the task to the EPPR, which may have
seemed like a natural venue to create an international agreement on emergency response based
on its mandate to take action in this area. They did not want to cloud the role of EPPR by
entrusting it with policy-making. Policy-making did not evolve in the Council due to spillover.
Rather, it came to the Council due to the will of the United States and Russia.
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H5: The Arctic Council is evolving because interest groups are pushing for new co-operation in
the Council.
This hypothesis has some support because industry had effectively pushed for new forms
of co-operation in the Arctic Council. Industry is similar to an interest group and so fits under
functionalist theory. Industry convinced states that agreements on emergency response were
necessary. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, epistemic communities pushed the United States to
support the ACIA. This same epistemic community was not able to convince Council countries
to create a strong, supporting policy document. Nonetheless, the Council opted to create the
emergency preparedness treaties due to the demands of industries, namely the tourism, shipping
and resource industries in the Arctic, demonstrating the potential affect those interest groups and
epistemic communities can have on international institutions.
H6: States are evolving the policy-making role of the Arctic Council because it has been proven
competent.
This hypothesis has some support, but is not fully valid. While the Council has
demonstrated competence, it does not fully explain the evolution of the Council’s decisionmaking role. The Council has proven itself competent in that it has produced quality reports. The
Council created the 2004 ACIA, which demonstrated the abilities of the Council. Yet, states did
not create policy in the Council for some time after the report. The United States stifled the
attempts by the Council to create policy in the ACIA. Part of United States opposition was for
political reasons, connected to the United States’ presidential election. The policy document
ultimately did not make useful, substantive policy recommendations. The United States resisted a
policy-making role for the Council even after the latter proved it is a competent body. It is
significant that the Council’s policy-making role evolved after proving itself competent. It shows
that competence is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for international institution evolution.
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Neorealism provides insights that explain the evolution of policy-making in the Council.
H1: States have a greater concern for relative gains than absolute gains, present in the current
evolution of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role.
This hypothesis has limited support because states in the Arctic Council seem more interested in
absolute gains than relative gains. Concern for relative gains can make co-operation more
difficult. It is possible that the United States and Russia rejected action on Arctic contaminants
and emergency preparedness because they stood to gain less than other countries. It is also
possible that relative gains motivate concerns about climate change action. Yet, the United States
supported action on emergency preparedness despite the fact that Russia likely stood to gain
more from increased Arctic economic activity than did the United States. Russia has the greatest
potential to increase Arctic shipping of any Arctic Council country.578 Russia also has the most
developed Arctic offshore oil industry.579 The United States supported these treaties because it
stood to gain something in doing so, even if it was not as much as Russia. Absolute gains, rather
than relative gains, motivate states in the evolution of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role.
H2: Great powers would oppose a greater policy-making role for the Council in areas of vital
interest or zero-sum power distribution, such as security; small powers support a stronger
policy-making role for the Arctic Council to balance the region.
This hypothesis has support because the great powers have opposed policy-making in
areas that affect zero-sum power distribution, namely security. They rejected action on
emergency preparedness when it was possible that such action would impact security interests.
They supported treaties on emergency preparedness after ensuring that the treaties would not
affect their security interests. It is clear that great powers oppose a greater policy-making role for
the Council in areas of zero-sum power distribution.
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Smaller states support policy-making as a way to ‘balance’ against larger-countries. The
Nordic countries supported strong action against contaminants due to their proximity to Russia.
Contamination is greatest in Russia and the Nordic countries faced environmental affects
because of that contamination.580 Canada and the United States had less interest in this issue. The
Council was a means to leverage power against Russia and the United States, though ultimately
this leverage did not prove successful. The United States is the second-largest emitter of carbon
dioxide in the world and it is the most prominent country that is not a party to the Kyoto
Protocol, an international emissions reduction agreement. The Nordic countries have been more
aggressive and the ACIA policy document could have provided them with an advantage. Smaller
countries use the Arctic Council as a means to “balance” against the United States.
H3: The evolution of policy-making in the Council should reflect the preferences of the great
powers.
This hypothesis has support because the form of evolution of the Council’s policymaking role reflects the preferences of the United States and Russia. Nordic countries have
pushed for a policy-making role for the Council. Finland advocated making the Council the
“mouthpiece” of the Arctic region. Denmark in the past has expressed exasperation that the
Council does not take stronger action. The Council has created treaties that are in the interest of
the United States and Russia. Certainly, European states have supported the agreements that the
Council has created. Norway in particular supported the oil-spill agreement and co-chaired the
task force that created the agreement with Russia and the United States. Still, all of Europe and
Canada’s attempts to create policy in the Council without the support of Russia and the United
States have failed. The form of the evolution of the Arctic Council’s policy-making role has
reflected the interests of the great powers, namely the United States and Russia.
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Neoliberal institutionalism provides insights that explain the evolution of policy-making
in the Council.
H1: States co-operate in the Arctic Council because they all stand to gain something through
treaty making.
This hypothesis has support because the Council’s policy-making role grew due to issues in
which all states stand to make an absolute gain. All states stood to gain from the creation of
treaties on emergency preparedness. Some states stand to gain more than do other states. Russia
stands to gain a great deal by expanding the economic base of the Arctic region, as it possesses
the largest share of Arctic resources. The emergency preparedness increases safety in the Arctic
for all countries. In contrast, the treaty on contaminants faltered because the issues that it dealt
with were not as significant an issue for the United States and Canada as they were for European
countries. Action on emergency preparedness in 2000 faltered because the United States and
Russia saw that it might lose something, namely autonomy over its Arctic nuclear activities.
Action on climate change failed because the United States, as a large international polluter, stood
to lose economically in the short term. States supported policy-making in the Council when it
was in their interest.
H2: States are likely evolving the policy-making role of the Council because of an economic
issue.
This hypothesis has significant support because the issues that inspired states to create
formal policy in the Arctic are largely economic issues. Many reports indicate that there are
economic opportunities to expand Arctic emergency and transportation resources. However,
industry indicates that safety issues may prevent them from investing in the Arctic. 581 Emergency
preparedness is an economic issue because the creation of agreements increases the potential for
economic activity.
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It is important that states agreed to create an agreement to address oil spill response, but
not oil spill prevention. Work on oil spill prevention implies that regulations in the Arctic will
increase. Oil spill prevention necessitates a well-regulated energy industry. Increasing
regulations could discourage industry from investing heavily in the Arctic. Even the threat of
new regulations could stifle economic activity in the short term. Oil spill response, on the other
hand, reassures companies that government has a plan to make sure that the cost of oil spills,
including public relations and liability, is relatively low. States sought to create an agreement
after the high cost and public relations difficulty resulting from the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil
spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
H3: In international institutions such as the Arctic Council, norms and the “shadow of the
future” can create pressure for co-operation and make great powers more likely to accept
compromise on issues such as the expansion of the Council’s policy-making role.
This hypothesis has limited support because great power influence has determined the
course of Arctic policy-making, rather than the “shadow of the future.” It is true that the Arctic
states likely will need to interact in the future and so it is in their interest to maintain good
relations in the present. That may explain why the Nordic countries supported the search and
rescue agreement even though it was not in their immediate interest. However, it does not
explain why Canada rejected action on Arctic contaminants. Addressing Arctic contaminants
from Russia was a major concern of the Nordic countries. It made it the major theme of its
activity of the early years of the Council. The Council has done a lot to address Arctic
contaminants. If Canada truly had a concern for the shadow of the future, it would have
supported action that the Nordics wanted. The same also is true of the United States’ rejection of
action on climate change. States have an interest in the “shadow of the future” in the Arctic
region but it does not appear to influence the evolution of the Arctic Council.
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H4: The form of negotiation matters (such as coalitions, information and persuasion) and thus
Council policy-making evolution will not always reflect the interests of great powers.
This hypothesis does not have support because we have not seen that coalitions can
overcome the opposition of great powers in the Arctic Council. We have seen coalitions emerge
in that the Nordic countries frequently work together. They acted together to push the creation of
policy on Arctic contaminants. Canada has not acted in coalitions and it tried to push action on
emergency preparedness in isolation, to no avail. The permanent participants tried to create a
strong policy document in the ACIA, but did not succeed. Their victory was that a policy
document exists at all. The treaties that exist came into being because they are in the interest of
the great powers. The great powers led the Council in the creation of these emergency response
treaties. Coalitions were not able to overcome the wishes of the great powers in the Council.
H5: The form of the Council’s policy-making role can reflect path dependence.
This hypothesis has little support because path dependence has not stifled the Council’s
evolution. The Council has historically not been a policy-making body, conducting great
amounts of research and making policy recommendations. Path dependence is not responsible
for this situation, as demonstrated by great powers stifling attempts to create policy in the
Council. Absolute gains for all Council members led to the evolution of the Council’s policymaking role, which indicates a lack of path dependence. The Council is not creating formal
policy at the current time; however it is possible that the Council will create new treaties in the
future. The Council has several projects that could result in policy. The creation of formal policy
has established that the Council can be an institution to create policy.
However, path dependence is a useful concept because it explains why states opted to
expand the Council rather than create a new institution to create policy. The Council has
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emerged as the pre-eminent forum for Arctic governance. States opted to allow the evolution of
the Council rather than create a new institution to develop international Arctic agreements.
In summary, both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism provide insights that explain
the evolution of the policy-making role of the Arctic Council. Functionalism provides limited
insight as it correctly predicts that evolution will occur when states’ policy-making preferences
align. It is correct that the Council’s policy-making role will evolve around less-political,
technical issues. Functionalists are correct in saying that policy-making evolution will occur
when the Council establishes its competence; however, this element is a necessary but not
sufficient condition. They are partially correct that interest groups can influence the Council.
They can influence in some cases, but their influence is not consistent. Functionalists are
incorrect in arguing that policy-making in the Arctic Council is evolving automatically in
response to external structural changes and issues that demand co-operation between states. They
also are incorrect that evolution in the policy-making role of the Council is occurring because of
“spillovers.” Neorealism provides some insights into the evolution of the Council’s policymaking role. Proponents are incorrect that states’ primary concern is relative gains, but correct in
the assertion great powers can dictate the form of Council evolution. Neoliberal institutionalism
is correct in predicting that states’ primary concern is absolute gains and economics are a
particularly potent motivator for state activity. These theorists are incorrect that the “shadow of
the future” and negotiation tactics can overcome the opposition of great powers to evolution. The
evolution of the Council’s decision-making occurred due to four factors: it was in the interest of
all member states, it had the support of great powers, at that point the Arctic Council had proven
to be competent, and economic gains were at stake.
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The question is thus, what factor is most important? A competent international institution
will only expand if there is a reason for it to do so. Thus, state interest is important. Institutions
evolve when it is in state interest. However, why exactly is expansion in state interest?
Economics emerge as the most important factor in the evolution of the Arctic Council. Economic
gains made institutional expansion the interest of all member states, especially the great powers.
Permanent participants have had a small role in the evolution of the Council’s policy-making
role. Smaller powers cannot overcome the opposition of great powers, but great powers must
have the support of small powers. No theory explains the affect of domestic politics on state
decision making in the Arctic Council. Policy-makers believe that the structure of government
decision-making between the United States and Europe was an important factor. If neorealism
emphasized absolute gains rather than relative gains, it would be the most useful theory.
Table 3.2: Analysis
Hypothesis Number

Hypothesis

Accepted/Rejected

Co-operation and policy-making in the
Arctic Council is evolving automatically in
response to external structural changes
and issues that demand co-operation
between states.
Co-operation and policy-making in the
Arctic Council is evolving because states
all have the same preferences that create
evolution.
States are evolving the policy-making role
of the Arctic Council to fulfill mutual
technocratic goals around a less political
issue area.
Evolution in the policy-making role of the
Council is occurring because of
“spillovers” that create opportunities for
further co-operation.

Not supported – cooperation was not
automatic, but rather the
result of great power
interest and preferences
Not supported – Russia
gained more than Canada
and the United States

Functionalism
Functionalist 1

Functionalist 2

Functionalist 3

Functionalist 4

Supported – areas of cooperation are less political
but are not apolitical
Not supported – United
States and Russia supported
policy-making role
expansion, not spillover
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Functionalist 5

Functionalist 6

The Arctic Council is evolving because
interest groups are pushing for new cooperation in the Council.
States are evolving the policy-making role
of the Arctic Council because it has proven
itself competent.

Partially Supported –
industry party responsible
for evolution
Supported – Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment has
proven competence

States have a greater concern for relative
gains than absolute gains, present in the
current evolution of the Arctic Council’s
policy-making role.
Great powers would oppose a greater
policy-making role for the Council in areas
of vital interest or zero-sum power
distribution, such as security; small
powers support a stronger policy-making
role for the Arctic Council to balance
power in the region.
The evolution of policy-making in the
Council should reflect the preferences of
the great powers.

Not Supported – states seek
to make absolute gains;
Russia gains more than
United States
Supported – Russia and
United States avoid policy
affecting security; other
states seek to use Council to
compel Russia to take
environmental action,
among other areas
Supported – policy-making
occurs when desired by
Russia and United States

Neorealism
Neorealist 1

Neorealist 2

Neorealist 3

Neoliberal Institutionalism
Neoliberal 1

Neoliberal 2

Neoliberal 3

Neoliberal 4

Neoliberal 5

States co-operate in the Arctic Council
because they all stand to gain something
through treaty making.
States are evolving the policy-making role
of the Council because of an economic
issue.
In international institutions such as the
Arctic Council, norms and the “shadow of
the future” can create pressure for cooperation and make great powers more
likely to accept compromise on issues such
as the expansion of the Council’s policymaking role.
The form of agency matters in
international negotiation (such as
coalitions, information and persuasion)
and thus co-operation will not always
reflect the interests of great powers
The form of the Council’s policy-making
role can reflect path dependence.

Supported – states seek to
make absolute gain, or gain
something
Supported – policy-making
supports economic
development
Not Supported – states did
not always support policymaking or attempt to
compromise despite the
shadow of the future; norms
did not appear to have
impact on Council
Not Supported – coalitions
did not shift preferences of
United States and Russia;
persuasion did not seem to
be important
Not supported – great
power preference key
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Table 3.3: Theoretical Explanations for the Evolution of the Council’s Policy-Making Role
Event
Functionalism
Neoliberal
Neorealism
Why?
1991-1996
United States
X
Concern over
and Russian
sovereignty relates to
resistance to
relative gains and selfpolicy-making
help
Nordic/Canadian
X
X
Wanted to make
interest in
absolute gain and
policy-making
balance
1996-2004
Nordic interest
X
X
X
Could gain through
in contaminants
treaty
issue
Canadian
X
X
Less likely to gain and
resistance to
so resisted work
contaminates
policy
U.S. and
X
Concern over
Russian
sovereignty relates to
resistance to
relative gains and selfEPPR review
help
Advocacy work
Advocacy work not
of Council
anticipated
2004-2007
Russian embrace X
X
X
Stood to make gain
of search and
rescue
collaboration
United States
X
X
Concern over
resistance to
sovereignty relates to
ACIA policy
relative gains and selfdocument
help
2008-2013
Negotiation of
X
All states make
search and
absolute gain
rescue treaty
Negotiation of
X
All states make
oil spill treaty
absolute gain
Totals
2
7
7
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Table 3.4 demonstrates the necessary and sufficient conditions for each theory. In regards
to functionalism, is the Council’s policy-making role evolving automatically in response to issue
spillover and clear issues demanding a policy response? The Council’s policy-making role is not
automatic and thus the theory’s predictions are falsified. In regards to neoliberal institutionalism,
are states allowing the Council’s policy-making role to evolve to fulfill absolute gains, tempered
by the form of negotiation? The policy-making role evolution related to absolute gains but not
the form of negotiation. In regards to neorealism, are states allowing the Council’s policymaking role to evolve to maintain a regional balance and accommodate great power interest? The
policy-making role evolution was not in response to relative gains but balance concerns and great
power preference were important.
Table 3.4: Dependent and Independent Variables Analysis
Dependent variable: expansion Necessary Fulfilled Why fulfilled
of the Arctic Council’s policy- (n) /
(Y/N)
making role
sufficient
(s)
Common ind.
variables

Likely less
political issue
area
Economic
gains

S

Y

S

Y

Functionalism Absolute
ind. variables gains (i.e.
gains mostly
equal)
Issue spillover

N

Y

N&S

N

N&S

N

N

Y

Independent
institution
Interest group
or epistemic
community
lobbying

Area of policy-making are less
political, though not apolitical, namely
search and rescue
Area of policy-making support
economic growth by providing
infrastructure
Gains are absolute, although Russia
gains more than other states in policymaking areas due to economic
potential
United States and Russia brought
forward policy-making, not spillover of
issues
Arctic Council is not an independence
institution
Industry lobbied states to increase
emergency infrastructure in the Arctic,
despite the fact that states ignored
epistemic community demanding
action on climate change
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Neoliberal
ind. variables

Neorealist
ind. variables

Arctic Council’s ACIA showed that it
is a competent institution that can take
action on important issues
Policy-making has not been automatic;
took several years after ACIA and
emergency preparedness growth in
Council

Institution has
proven
competence
Automatic
response

N

Y

N&S

N

Absolute
gains (i.e.
states gain
something)
Shadow of the
future
Lack of path
dependence
Lack of
contrary
norms
Form of
negotiation
(i.e.
information,
coalitions)

N&S

Y

States all gain something through
policy-making in the Council, though
some gain more than others

N

N

N

Y

N

Y

N&S

N

Canada ignored calls for contaminants
treaty despite shadow of the future
Little evidence of path dependence in
the Council
Little evidence that norms stall
development of Council’s policymaking role
Coalitions and lobbying by states could
not overcome opposition by United
States and Russia; policy needs to be in
interest of United States and Russia

Relative gains
(i.e. states
gain more
than rivals)
No security
ramifications
“Balance”
motivations
Great power
preference
reigns
supreme

N&S

N

States all gain something through
policy-making in the Council, though
some gain more than others

N

Y

N&S

Y

N&S

Y

Policy specifically constructed to have
no impact on security
Small states wanted to control Russia
through policy
Coalitions and lobbying by states could
not overcome opposition by United
States and Russia; policy needs to be in
interest of United States and Russia
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Conclusion
This chapter explored why the policy-making role of the Arctic Council is undergoing
expansion. Functionalist theory would expect the Council’s policy-making role to expand due to
state interest, technical need, institutional competence, interest group influence and issue
spillover. Neoliberal institutionalism would credit state interest, the importance of economic
goals and adequate bargaining strategies. Neorealism would expect evolution would occur due to
the interest of great powers and the desire by small powers to balance power. Neoliberal
institutionalism and neorealism provide insights into Council evolution. The Council’s policymaking role evolved when states stood to make absolute gains (as per the predictions of
neoliberal institutionalism) and in line with the interests of great powers (as per the predictions
of neorealism). This chapter argues that the Council’s policy-making role is expanding because
the increasing potential to exploit the North’s economic resources provides an incentive to create
policy that will improve the economic prospects of the region.
This chapter has two implications for research. First, it contributes a case study that tests
the validity of dominant theories. It re-enforces the importance of absolute gains as well as great
power rivalry in the current context. The explanatory validity of neorealism with an assumption
of the importance of absolute gains (rather than relative gains) is a direction of further research.
Second, this work emphasizes the importance of economics in state decision-making. The Arctic
Council’s policy-making role evolved when state economic interests aligned.
Scholars such as Oran Young, Evan Boom, Terry Fenge and Olav Schram Stokke do not
explicitly examine the importance of economics as a driver of state behaviour. Groups and
individuals who seek to influence state decision-making, particularly on the environment, would
be wise to present their arguments in economic terms.
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This chapter contributes to academic literature because it proposes a new understanding
of the Council. The Council is now a research institution that states can use to create policy. It
creates policy to support economic growth in areas that must benefit all states but specifically the
United States and Russia. Overall, a new conception of the Council’s policy-making role must
emphasize the highly political nature of decision-making in the Council.

171
CHAPTER 4: EXPLAINING THE EVOLVING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF THE
ARCTIC COUNCIL
The institutional capacity of the Arctic Council is expanding. Institutional capacity refers
to “the ability [of institutions] to perform functions, solve problems and set and achieve
objectives.”582 In 1996, the institution had weak institutional capacity, since it lacked a
permanent secretariat to perform functions or a stable budget to achieve objectives. Its ability to
carry out functions or achieve objectives depended on state willingness to support the Council,
and this support ebbed and flowed as government priorities shifted. An institution has strong
institutional capacity if its bureaucracy is able to provide direction and carry out projects without
state approval. It has weak institutional capacity if it cannot take any action without state
approval, or if the institution were merely an extension of a group of states. The institutional
capacity of the Council is changing. In 2011, the Council announced that it would establish a
permanent secretariat in Tromsø, Norway. In 2014, it established a “project support instrument,”
similar in many ways to a stable budget.
This chapter answers the following question: why is the institutional capacity of the
Arctic Council expanding? It proceeds in three sections. The first section describes the
theoretical expectations of three major international relations theories vis-à-vis institutional
capacity. Functionalism would predict that institutional capacity is expanding automatically to
help the Council carry out its expanded mandate and operate more efficiently. Neorealism would
expect that the institutional capacity is expanding to create a balance in the region, but that great
power interest ensures expansion in no way challenges the authority of states or their ability to
control the Council. In essence, neorealists predict that, although it may appear that the
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institutional capacity of the Council is expanding, bureaucratic growth does not indicate capacity
expansion. Neoliberal institutionalism would expect that states are expanding the institutional
capacity of the Council to help achieve absolute gains, tempered by norms, path dependence and
the negotiation tactics of states. The second section undertakes historical process tracing to
demonstrate how the debate over the institutional capacity of the Council has changed over time.
Initially, Nordic policy-makers argued that the Council was an institution worthy of a stable
budget and strong bureaucracy. Officials from Canada, Russia and the United States did not
share this view. The debate shifted as the Nordic governments argued for the necessity of a
targeted Council trust fund and demonstrated the utility of a permanent secretariat in the face of
the Council’s growing workload. The third section analyzes the results and concludes that
neoliberal institutionalism, with its emphasis on absolute gains and negotiation tactics, explains
the reasons for the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity. However, neorealism also
provides insights, with its emphasis on great power interest and the importance of maintaining
regional balance. The central argument is that the Arctic Council’s institutional capacity is
growing because it is in the interest of all of the states in the Council, as it helps the institution
carry out its expanded mandate; however, states have increased institutional capacity in such a
way as to ensure the institution will not become too powerful. In addition, the expansion of the
Council’s institutional capacity may not have occurred had it not been for tactful negotiation
tactics by the Nordic governments, which demonstrated that a secretariat would enhance the
Council.
This chapter contributes to existing literature in three ways. First, it tests competing
expectations for the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity. Most research examining
the Council characterizes it as an institution with a weak bureaucratic structure, as exemplified
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by the writings of political scientists Oran Young,583 Rob Huebert,584 Timo Koivurova585 and
Olav Schram Stokke,586 as well as American diplomat Evan Bloom587 and consultant Terry
Fenge.588 International law researcher Belen Sanchez Ramos argues that the Council’s
institutional capacity is expanding “to face the rapidly changing circumstances in the Arctic that
have increased the challenges and opportunities in both volume and complexity,” echoing
reasons for the establishment of the permanent secretariat given by the Council itself.589 The
author does not cite any particular examples of the “volume and complexity” to which the
secretariat responds, nor type of challenges the new secretariat might address. She does not
analyze the negotiations that led to creation of the secretariat. This chapter argues that Ramos’
explanation is inadequate to explain the current evolution of the Council. Instead a more
nuanced explanation of institutional capacity growth in the Council is necessary, namely that
institutional capacity is expanding to help it fulfill its growing mandate. However, the
negotiation process has also shaped evolution.
Second, this research will help inform debates about the role of the Council. A large body
of work advocates that the Council should do more than it currently does. The implementation of
the recommendations of these authors will require a larger Council bureaucracy than currently
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exists.590 For example, some work advocates that the Council create more formal policies and
treaties, which require bureaucracy for enforcement and implementation.591 Some work assumes
the Council is powerful enough to take action independent of states, such as new regulations to
protect the environment or the creation of a new agreement.592 This work largely ignores the
political situation in the Council today and the type of action it is capable of taking. This chapter
argues that the type of Council reforms authors advocate are not possible given the current
institutional power of the Council. Ramos does not address this question. She evaluates the
changes in the institutional capacity of the Council that have taken place and concludes that
currently it is not possible to explain whether the changes are adequate to respond to the shifts
taking place in the Arctic region.593 She argues, “The creation of an international organization is
the best way to improve the global governance of the Arctic.”594 A critical evaluation of Council
capacity is necessary.
Third, this chapter provides a case study that tests the explanatory reliability and validity
of contrasting functionalism, neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism. It contributes to the
body of cases that prove or disprove the predictions of various theories. It ultimately shows the
explanatory power of neoliberal institutionalism, tempered with elements of neorealism such as
the goal of states to protect sovereignty.
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4.1 – Theorizing the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Institutional Capacity
Functionalists would make three predictions about the growth of the Council’s
institutional capacity, based on their explanation that institutions evolve automatically so that
states can make absolute gains. The first two hypotheses anticipate state preferences in Council
expansion while the third anticipates the outcomes of institutional evolution.
H1: States are allowing the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to expand because they
all stand to gain something through expansion.
Functionalists would predict that the institutional capacity of the Council is automatically
expanding so states can make an absolute gain. Functionalists argue that international cooperation “is a self-sustaining process that propels itself forward.”595 States respond to issues that
demand action automatically, without the need for political posturing and negotiation. 596
Sometimes, “the creation of a common policy in one sector generates the ‘need’ to transfer
policy making in related sectors.”597 Demands from interest groups or epistemic communities
also could create a need for evolution.598 Thus, increasing the institutional capacity of the
Council would occur in response to new responsibilities of the institution in order to help states
carry out necessary action. States would mutually benefit from the expansion of the Council’s
institutional capacity. Neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism reject that institutional
evolution occurs automatically. For example, the expanded mandate of the Council into
economic areas makes its job more complex and increases its total number of projects.
Functionalists would thus explain that the increased institutional capacity could be a means to
respond to this complexity.
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H2: The institutional capacity is expanding automatically to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal
around a less political issue area.
Functionalists argue that states would evolve the institutional capacity of the Council to
fulfill state interest and accomplish goals, most likely around less political issue areas in which
states can collaborate without concerns of vital state interest and survival.599 States create
international institutions “to reduce transaction costs in the narrow sense and, more broadly, to
create information, ideas, norms and expectations.”600 International institutions also help states
“to carry out and encourage specific activities,” “to legitimate . . . particular ideas and practices”
and “enhance their capacities and power.” Centralization and independence, such as the creation
of a secretariat, can “enhance efficiency” and the legitimacy of international institutions.601
Creating independent organizations allows states to trust one another because the institution
ensures accountability and that no individual state can dominate the agenda. Neoliberal
institutionalists and neorealist theorists would agree that states evolve international institutions in
response to less political issues but would reject that states desire to make international
institutions independent. States could allow the institutional capacity of the Council to expand to
ensure that it can complete new tasks that emerge as its mandate and policy-making role expand.
H3: The institutional capacity is expanding because the Arctic Council has proven itself
competent.
States are more likely to expand the institutional capacity of the Council once it has
proven that it is competent. According to political scientist Mark Imber, “Organizations that are
judged to be competent will gain additional powers, those that are not will be unlikely to enjoy

599

Mark Imber, “Functionalism,” in Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance, eds.
David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Polity, 2002): 294.
600
Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations,” Journal
of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 3 (1998): 8.
601
Ibid., 9.

177
task expansion.”602 States create independent international institutions to ensure efficiency and
trust between states.603 However, creating independent international institutions allows them to
take actions independent of states, such as gathering new information, creating new policy,
initiating international negotiations and more.604 International institutions with strong
institutional capacity can become independent actors that can challenge states for international
power. Thus, the Council may propel its own evolution forward, assuming it is competent, owing
to the independence that states have given the institution. Neorealists and neoliberal
institutionalists would not argue that institutional competence is important. Neoliberal
institutionalists would argue that path dependence means that international institutions are
relatively unlikely to evolve, though some evolution is possible. Functionalists would predict that
competence is a pre-condition for Council evolution.
Neorealists would make three predictions about the evolution of the Arctic Council,
based on their explanation that international institutions evolve in response to relative gains. The
first two hypotheses explain state preferences while the third anticipates outcomes.
H1: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council because it does not
impact on state autonomy.
Neorealists would argue that states would not expand the institutional capacity of the Council
unless it did not largely influence the autonomy of states. Neorealists explain, “The central
concerns of the state are its national interests, as defined principally in terms of military security
and political independence.”605 They seek survival in an international system, which is anarchic
and without a higher authority than individual states to enforce laws. Thus, states seek to
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maintain autonomy in any interaction and improve their position relative to other actors.606
Autonomous states need not rely on other states for security and survival, which enhances its
security. Thus, states would not expand the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to create
an institution that can compete with states for power or take action independent of states, in
contrast to the predictions of functionalists. Neoliberal institutionalists would agree with this
hypothesis, though they emphasize security less than neorealists. Thus, despite the growth of the
institutional capacity of the Council, the institution would remain a weak international body.
H2: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to balance power in the
region.
Neorealists argue that small and middle powers co-operate in international institutions to
“balance” against larger great powers. States operate under the premise that “collaboration
produces ‘balanced’ or ‘equitable’ achievements.”607 Small powers may band together and form
an alliance to compete with a great power. Alternatively, small powers may band with great
powers to create balance against a rival great power. International institutions are a manifestation
of this balancing process. States sacrifice a small amount of autonomy but gain something
relative to a rival. The six Arctic states other than the United States and Russia will seek to
expand the institutional capacity of the Council to create balance against the United States and
Russia. States also could be attempting to balance against a rival state outside of the Arctic
region, such as China. Functionalists and neoliberal institutionalists, in contrast, do not hold that
a major concern for states is the maintenance of a global balance. Enhancing the institutional
capacity of the Arctic Council creates a stronger institution that small and middle powers can use
to exert influence and maintain security, as well as autonomy, against great powers.
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H3: The evolution of the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council must reflect the preferences
of great powers.
Neorealists believe that in any interaction, such as the expansion of Council institutional
capacity, great powers must benefit more than rival powers.608 Great powers are strong enough to
act independently from other states and thus have less need for co-operation than small or middle
powers. Great powers in the Arctic, namely the United States and Russia, will thus have great
power to achieve their goals in negotiation. These states will seek a weak institution that cannot
challenge the international autonomy of states. International institutions also could be another
means for great powers to exert power and influence on the world stage, as they are likely to
dominate such institutions owing to their size and importance. Small and middle powers are
more likely to favour a strong Council that can control great powers, even though such an
institution could place some small restrictions on their autonomy, as well. Neoliberal
institutionalists, in contrast, argue that there are means for smaller powers to overcome the
preference of great powers, while functionalists predict automatic evolution. Neorealists
anticipate that the Council will reflect the will of great powers.
Neoliberal institutionalists would make three predictions about the Council’s institutional
capacity, based on their explanation that institutions evolve in response to absolute gains. The
first hypothesis explains preferences, while the third explains outcomes.
H1: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council because they all stand
to gain something through expansion.
Neoliberal institutionalists would argue that states are increasing the institutional capacity of the
Arctic Council “when states can jointly benefit from co-operation.”609 They would expect that
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states want the Arctic Council to be able to take on more tasks and thus states must increase the
institution’s capacity. These gains are likely, though not necessarily, economic.610 This
prediction is similar to predictions made by functionalists, though neoliberal institutionalists
would expect that evolution of the Council would emerge due to a desire for material gains,
whereas functionalists would expect that evolution occurs to deal with pressing issues. Both
theories agree that states will co-operate as long as they gain something in absolute terms. In
contrast, neorealists argue that gains should help states increase their abilities relative to a rival,
which can make co-operation difficult. For neoliberal institutionalists, states expand the
institutional capacity of the Council to make an absolute gain.
H2: The form of negotiation (such as coalitions, information and persuasion) affects the
development of Council institutional capacity.
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that the “context within which interaction takes place,”
or the strategies and tactics actors employ in negotiations (such as those to create greater Council
capacity), influence outcomes.611 For example, the type of information that states bring forward
can sway negotiations. States can also form effective alliances or coalitions that influence
negotiations. States can develop very persuasive tactics that influence negotiations. Thus, small
or middle powers can influence negotiations and outcomes can reflect their preferences. This
prediction stands in contrast to neorealists who predict that outcomes will reflect great power
preference. It also stands in contrast to functionalism that predicts that outcomes will be rational
and reflect the best possible decision. Thus, it is possible that the development of the institutional
capacity of the Council will reflect the interest and gains of small or middle powers that were
able to negotiate with states successfully.
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H3: Path dependence and norms will temper and challenge the evolution of the Council’s
institutional capacity.
Neoliberal institutionalists predict that the evolution of the institutional capacity of the
Council will be shaped by path dependence or norms. Norms are “a standard of appropriate
behaviour for actors with a given identity.”612 Path dependence refers to the idea that once actors
establish standard practices, it can be difficult to move toward new ideas.613 Neoliberal
institutionalists would thus predict that the institutional capacity of the Council would be
unlikely to shift greatly because norms and path dependence make evolution difficult. Norms
may develop that favour informal co-operation without strong institutional capacity. In essence,
states have established practices for how the Council should operate. This idea is not to argue
that institutions cannot evolve. The presence of evolution indicates that norms or path
dependence do not exist in a given case. Functionalists and neorealists do not foresee that path
dependence or norms should be significant problems. Neoliberal institutionalists could argue that
despite gains in institutional capacity, the overall capacity of the Council should remain weak.
Table 4.1 summarizes the necessary and sufficient conditions for the growth of the
Council’s institutional capacity according to each theory. In regards to functionalism, is the
Council’s institutional capacity evolving automatically in response to issue spillover and clear
problems demanding a policy response? These predictions would be falsified if evolution was
not consistent or automatic. In regards to neoliberal institutionalism, are states allowing the
Council’s institutional capacity to evolve to fulfill absolute gains, tempered by the form of
negotiation? These predictions would be falsified if evolution was not in response to absolute
gains or the form of negotiation was unimportant. In regards to neorealism, are states allowing
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the Council’s institutional capacity to evolve to maintain a regional balance and accommodate
great power interest? These predictions would be falsified if gains other than relative gains
motivated states, or if the preferences of a great power did not prevail in outcomes.
Table 4.1: Dependent and Independent Variables
Dependent variable: expansion of the Arctic Council’s institutional capacity

Necessary (n)
/ sufficient (s)

Common ind. variables

S
S

Likely less political issue area
Economic gains

Functionalism ind. variables Absolute gains (i.e. gains mostly equal)
Issue spillover
Independent institution
Interest group or epistemic community lobbying
Institution has proven competence
Automatic response

N
N&S
N&S
N
N
N&S

Neoliberal ind. variables

Absolute gains (i.e. states gain something)
Shadow of the future
Lack of path dependence
Lack of contrary norms
Form of negotiation (i.e. information, coalitions)

N&S
N
N
N
N&S

Neorealist ind. variables

Relative gains (i.e. states gain more than rivals)
No security ramifications
“Balance” motivations

N&S
N
N&S

4.2 – The Evolution of the Council’s Institutional Capacity
There have been three eras in the debate over the institutional capacity of the Arctic
Council. From 1991 until 1998, states created the Council and debated whether the institution
should have a secretariat and stable budget. From 1998 until 2007, states continued to debate the
merits of a permanent secretariat and stable budget, though the discussion began to shift. From
2007 until the present, states actively supported increasing the institutional capacity of the
Council, largely due to actions by the Nordic countries. In general, Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway and Sweden have urged the Council to develop strong institutional capacity, which
Canada, Russia and the United States resisted.
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4.2.1 – 1991-1998
From 1991 until 1998, states debated whether the Council should have a stable budget
and a permanent secretariat. This section addresses four key questions. First, how did the
question of the Council’s institutional capacity emerge? Second, what were the major debates
regarding the Council’s institutional capacity? Third, what were the positions of the various
actors prior to the creation of the Council regarding its institutional capacity? Fourth, why did the
preferences of some actors prevail over others and who exerted the most influence?
First, the question of the Council’s institutional capacity emerged because of the informal
nature of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). When creating any new
institution, questions of its powers quickly arise. To review, momentum for creating the Arctic
Council started in the 1980s as states became interested in improving relations with the Soviet
Union and addressing pollution in the Russian Arctic. States knew there was extensive pollution
in the Soviet Arctic, but the extent of that pollution was relatively unknown.614 Finland organized
negotiations to create the AEPS, which came into being in 1991. The AEPS was a strategy rather
than an institution or an organization and it did not have a permanent secretariat. Rather, states
set priorities at annual meetings and four working groups, staffed by government scientists and
researchers, completed the work between meetings. It was a strategy for information synthesis
and sharing. Through the work of the AEPS, by 1995, states and indigenous peoples’
organizations learned that there was extensive pollution due to unsafe storage of polychlorinated
biphenyls in the Russian Arctic, some 180,000 tonnes produced during the Cold War.615 As
noted in previous chapters, there was increasing pressure to expand the work of the AEPS to
address human issues, particularly from Canada seeking to expand the Strategy’s work to include
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work more relevant to North America, as well as the indigenous peoples’ organizations that
sought a greater role in Arctic governance. In particular, the well-being of Russian indigenous
peoples declined during the 1990s and indigenous peoples’ organizations wanted action.616 As
noted, the seven Arctic states other than Russia wanted to ensure that Russia would be
accountable amid reports of corruption following the collapse of the Soviet Union. States
naturally had to address whether the Council would have bureaucratic powers similar to the
AEPS, or whether the creation of an institution, as opposed to a “strategy,” warranted new
bureaucratic arrangements.
In regards to the second question, the main debate over the Council’s policy-making role
concerned whether the new institution would have a stable budget and permanent secretariat. To
briefly review, the government of Canada proposed the creation of the Arctic Council in a
meeting with the United States administration in February 1995, adopting a proposal for an
international Arctic organization promoted by think tanks, academics and indigenous peoples’
organizations for a decade.617 After informal negotiations throughout 1995, as well as a formal
meeting in June, policy-makers from the other Arctic states agreed that an institution would be
beneficial and formal negotiations took place in 1996. At the third major round of negotiations in
June 1996, states finalized a proposal championed by Canada and the Nordic states that the
Arctic Council would have a broader mandate than the AEPS by including sustainable
development, after compromise by the United States and Russia.618 The question of the
bureaucratic mechanism necessary for this institution emerged as the new body would have a
larger, more complex job than the AEPS.
616

Arctic Council, Arctic Human Development Report (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2004), 158.
According to the report, life expectancy among Russian indigenous peoples declined 4.8 years from 1990 until 1995.
This decline occurred because of high alcohol consumption, poor economic performance and high levels of stress.
617
John English, Ice and Water: Politics, Peoples and the Arctic Council (Toronto, Ontario: Allen Lane, 2013), 202.
618
Ibid., 228.

185
As to the third question, two alignments emerged during the negotiations in June, each
with different positions about the necessary institutional capacity of the Council. Canada, the
United States and Russia opposed creating a Council with a stable budget and secretariat. In
contrast, the Nordic states argued that the institution should have a permanent secretariat and
stable budget. The permanent participants were amenable to a permanent secretariat and budget,
although their main concern was securing their own participation in the Council. Canadian
policy-makers opposed a permanent secretariat and budget on the grounds that these measures
would make the Council Europe-centric. By virtue of their numbers, the Nordic countries would
provide most of the budget for the Council and secretariat, which, according to Canadian
officials, would ensure the Council focused on European projects.619 The alternative would be
for Canada or the United States to provide the bulk of the Council’s budget, which would create
an unsustainable financial burden. Meanwhile, United States and Russian policy-makers opposed
a permanent secretariat and budget because they sought a weak organization that would rely on
voluntary contributions from states. United States and Russian policy-makers feared that a strong
Council would challenge autonomy to act in the Arctic region.620 In the summer 1996
negotiations, United States policy-makers led the charge against the secretariat and stable budget
by arguing that a strong Council would inappropriately act as a “regional voice.”621 Additionally,
United States policy-makers were leery that, as a great power, the United States would be called
on to provide most of the Council funding.622 Policy-makers were aware that a permanent
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secretariat with a stable budget could challenge state autonomy.623 As one Canadian policymaker stated, “Permanent secretariats become their own gods.”624 Canada likely would have
compromised on this issue if the Nordic countries presented a proposal to address Canada’s
concerns, which was not true of the United States and Russia. These two countries would not
tolerate strong bureaucratic elements. Two alignments emerged in negotiations, with Canada, the
United States and Russia united in opposition to a permanent secretariat and budget for different
though complimentary reasons.
The Nordic countries wanted a permanent secretariat and budget for two reasons. First,
they argued that a permanent secretariat and stable budget would make the Council a more
legitimate institution. The Nordic countries are used to organizations with strong bureaucratic
elements.625 Some policy-makers believe the Nordic preference for strong bureaucracies is
cultural.626 In the later 2000s, Norway and Iceland supported a secretariat as both wanted to host
the organization to increase their legitimacy as an Arctic power.627 Second, policy-makers were
keenly aware that there was a strategic interest in a strong Council bureaucracy for the Nordic
countries. Such institutions could help keep Russia accountable addressing environmental issues,
as there was a fear that corruption in Russia would thwart efforts to protect the environment.628
The secretariat could serve as a body to monitor the implementation of policy and funds in
Russia, which would thus ensure that Russia lived up to its international obligations. The Nordic
states favoured the creation of a strong Arctic Council institution and so favoured the creation of
a strong Council bureaucracy.
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As to the fourth question, the preferences of Canada, Russia and the United States
prevailed over the preferences of the Nordic states because the governments of the United States
and Russia would not compromise. United States and Russian policy-makers would simply not
accept a Council with a strong bureaucracy and budget. The Nordic governments were more
willing to compromise to ensure the creation of a Council, which was seen as a key tool to
ensure co-operation with Russia. During the beginnings of the Council, the understanding
emerged that host countries would provide secretariat services and organize meetings.629 In
summary, the question of the appropriate institutional capacity of the Council emerged naturally
as state delegations discussed whether to create a new institution. A major question was whether
the Council should have a permanent secretariat and stable budget, or whether the Council
should adopt the more flexible approach seen in the AEPS. The Nordic countries favoured a
strong Council and thus a strong institutional capacity, while Canada, Russia and the United
States saw that a Europe-centric institution could threaten state autonomy. Ultimately, the
position of Canada, Russia and the United States prevailed, as Russia and the United States were
unwilling to compromise. The Nordic countries did not provide compelling evidence that a
secretariat was necessary.
4.2.2 – 1998-2007
From 1998 until 2007, the Nordic countries unsuccessfully pressed for a secretariat and
states debated the merits of establishing systemized financial support for the Council. This
section answers three key questions. First, what were key debates regarding the Council’s
institutional capacity? Second, what were the positions of the various actors? Third, why did the
preferences of some actors prevail over others and who exerted the most influence?
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In regards to the first question, the first major debate in this era was whether the Council
should have a permanent secretariat. The Council rules of procedure, finalized in 1998
negotiations, established that “an Arctic state may volunteer to provide secretariat functions” for
any working group.630 In addition, the permanent participants would have a permanent
secretariat, as the secretariat created in 1993 by Denmark to aid indigenous participation in the
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy would continue.631 The “host country” or chair of each
Council term was to provide “secretariat functions.”632 Denmark provided the bulk of Indigenous
Peoples Secretariat (IPS) funding, about $110,000 a year,633 with additional support from Canada
and Norway.634 The United States Department of Oceans Affairs provided secretariat functions
for the Council from 1998 until 2000.635 Iceland hosted the Conservation of Arctic Flora and
Fauna working group as well as the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment working group
while Norway hosted Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (and the Arctic
Contaminants Action Program, or ACAP) and Canada hosted the Sustainable Development
Working Group as well as the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response working
group.636 Finland, Russia and Sweden did not host any secretariats. In 2000, the United States
began hosting a temporary secretariat to facilitate the creation of the Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment.637 Each secretariat had between two and six employees. The question lingered as to
whether this arrangement would be workable.
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In 1999, the Nordic countries wanted the Council to institute a stable budget and a
permanent secretariat to improve the functionality of the Council. Their views had not changed
since the negotiations to found the Council. Norway first raised the issue and made a statement
advocating a permanent secretariat at the May 1999 Council meeting in Anchorage, Alaska. At
this meeting, in discussions concerning the Council’s secretariat functions, Denmark’s delegation
raised the point that the country gave the IPS $110,000 in 1999 and that other states should
contribute greater funds.638 In response, the Canadian delegation suggested that the indigenous
peoples’ secretariat “pursue funding sources from the private sector.”639 The delegation from
Norway then “reiterated its belief that the Council needs a common budget and that the members
should share all the costs.”640 The United States’ objection to such capacity had not changed and
its delegation vetoed further discussion of a permanent secretariat or stable funding as it
immediately “repeated its position that it could not support mandatory funding for the secretariat
or make the Council a formal ‘international organization’ but that it was currently trying to
solicit funds from the private sector,” such as the MacArthur Foundation.641 Other delegations
did not state their views.642 Discussion continued at two other Council meetings. First, at the
October 2000 Ministerial Meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the Norwegian delegation again argued
“the need for a permanent secretariat.”643 It called for a “more balanced sharing of financial
responsibility for the working group secretariats.”644 It also indicated that states should discuss
the Council’s structure.645 Other states did not address the Norwegian statement. States drafted
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and released a statement at the close of this meeting to restate their support for the Council. The
resulting Barrow Declaration did not indicate interest in a secretariat but stated “strong support
for achieving reliable funding for all Arctic Council activities.”646 Second, further discussion of
the structure of the Arctic Council occurred in June 2001 at the Council meeting in Rovaniemi,
Finland, during an agenda item reviewing the Council’s administration. To open these
discussions, the Danish delegation indicated its support for a permanent secretariat.647
Delegations from Norway and Sweden echoed Denmark’s support for a permanent secretariat,
along with “more standing financial arrangements.”648 Before other states could state their
opinions, the United States and Russia both opposed such “drastic changes” in the Council,
vetoing a permanent secretariat or standing contributions.649 The United States and Russia next
indicated some willingness to entertain changes in the composition of the working groups, a
small concession in response to the calls for a permanent secretariat and stable funding.650
Nordic delegations advocated that the Council needed greater institutional capacity, which the
United States and Russia vetoed.
A problem with Nordic lobbying for greater institutional capacity is that they failed to
demonstrate why a secretariat and stable budget were necessary. The statements above suggest
these countries sought institutional capacity for its own sake. This failure reversed in 2001, after
Finland became Council chair. Its government commissioned an independent consultant report
that advocated states expand Council institutional capacity. It recommended a re-organization of
Council working groups and identified that a permanent secretariat and stable funding could
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solve long-term problems of institutional memory, capacity to fulfill instructions and
outreach/communication.651 States responded that they recognized “the need to reinforce efforts
to finance circumpolar co-operation due to Russia and the United States’ clear opposition to
discussing the structure of the Council” in the 2001 Inari Declaration.652
The debate changed in 2003 as the Nordic countries abandoned the lobbying of states for
a secretariat and stable budget and a second debate emerged over a new idea, a “project support
instrument,” to increase the institutional capacity of the Council. In early 2003, ahead of the
April Council meeting in Reykjavik, policy-makers from the chair country, Iceland, sought to
develop new proposals to improve the institutional capacity of the Council. They asked the
chairperson of the Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation (NEFCO), Harro Pitkanen, to give
a presentation to the Council about the potential for the corporation to fund Council projects or
manage a “trust fund” for Council projects.653 The presentation occurred in April and state
delegations, unsure about the utility of the idea, mutually agreed to hear more about the proposal
after the preparation of a detailed proposal.654 The NEFCO is an international environmental
granting agency consisting of the five Nordic countries. We can view the NEFCO as an
extension of Nordic interests and policy rather than as an autonomous body. The next step in the
policy-making process occurred in October 2003 at the Council meeting in Svartsengi, Iceland.
At this meeting, the NEFCO gave a presentation and formally proposed that states establish a
Council trust fund. The NEFCO proposed a simple system in which states would contribute to a
NEFCO fund and administer that fund as an “assembly of contributors.”655
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The proposal theoretically had the support of the Nordic states, as NEFCO members, but
lacked the support of Canada, Russia and the United States. Immediately following the
presentation, the United States expressed opposition to this system, because it would “potentially
change the way the Arctic Council was organized as a consensus forum, since not all the member
states were likely to become contributors.”656 Canada echoed this concern and Russia held back
its opinions, as a veto had already occurred.657 In response, Pitkanen promised more details but
rejected the United States’ assertion that a trust fund would change the nature of the Council.658
The NEFCO proposed that it set up an expert group to develop the proposal further, which no
state rejected.659 The prospect of a trust fund did not look particularly promising.
The policy-making process to construct the trust fund continued in 2004 and 2005. At the
May 2004 Council meeting, Iceland announced an “ad-hoc expert group” led by Pitkanen and
the NEFCO.660 Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United States appointed representatives to the
group.661 The United States participated, although it opposed changes to the Council’s structure,
which at first glance seems curious. United States policy-makers likely participated to ensure
they influenced the process and protected state interests. The group developed the proposal
during the summer of 2004, with United States policy-makers warming to a project-oriented
fund. It updated the Council about its progress at the November 2004 Council meeting in
Reykjavik, Iceland, and emphasized that the fund would be “action-oriented,” “complimentary”
and “voluntary.”662 States then mutually agreed to set up a trust fund pilot project specifically to
fund Arctic Contaminants Action Program (ACAP) projects. The NEFCO would hold the fund
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and contributors would allot the fund by consensus. The fund would be a “voluntary, nonexclusive mechanism for financing specific priority projects that have already been approved by
the Arctic Council.”663 The Council would not use the fund for operating costs but rather specific
projects.664 A Council trust fund appeared in the offing. However, states did not agree on the
importance of a trust fund and so the project ran into obstacles. To become operational, states
agreed the fund would require 3 million euros.665 Three major events took place at the April
2005 Council meeting in Yakutsk, Russia.666 First, delegations from Finland, Norway, Iceland,
Sweden and Russia announced contributions to the fund, though Russia did not specify how
much it would contribute.667 Second, delegations from Denmark and Canada stated that they
would not contribute.668 Third, the United States delegation did not offer contributions. The trust
fund had trouble obtaining necessary funds and so was not operational by October 2006.669
In regards to the second question, as to the positions of various actors, we can see earlier
divisions over Council institutional capacity reflected in this era. In the first debate, Canada,
Russia and the United States opposed a permanent secretariat and stable budget, leery that these
institutions would compromise state autonomy and ensure the Council reflected European
interests. The Nordic states desired a strong Council to hold Russia to account in the Arctic. As
to the second debate, Finland, Iceland, Sweden and Norway strongly supported a Council trust
fund as a means to accomplish some of the goals of a stable budget. It would provide some stable
funding needed to increase the institutional capacity of the Council. In addition, it would be a
way to hold Russia accountable for environmental issues, as most funding would go to the
663

Ibid.
Ibid.
665
Arctic Council, Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Yakutsk, Russia, April 6-7, 2005: Minutes
(Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2005).
666
Ibid.
667
Ibid.
668
Ibid.
669
Arctic Council, The Salekhard Declaration (Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council 2006).
664

194
ACAP projects concerning Russia. The United States was hesitant amid typical concerns over
autonomy, sovereignty and financial burden. The fund could increase the power of the European
countries in the Council, which seemed eager to contribute to the fund. Canada and Denmark
opposed a trust fund in which only contributors could allot funds fearing a shift in Council power
dynamics. In order to participate in the trust fund, states would need to provide funds. This
change could have impacted power dynamics in the Council. All states would have an equal say
in the allotment of funds, even though states would give different amounts of money. If a given
country could not make a financial contribution for any reason, it would not have a say in a key
area of Council decision-making. Denmark also was leery about the trust fund’s impacts on its
Indigenous Peoples’ Secretariat support. It already contributed money to the secretariat for
indigenous peoples’ organizations and did not want to contribute money to a new body.
Denmark opposed the project support instrument even though it was a member of the NEFCO.
Russia supported a trust fund if its officials could gear it to fulfill national interest and use it to
support projects in Russia. The fund would provide resources for the ACAP projects, which
mostly focused on Russia. However, it withheld information on its contribution because the
Russian government wanted clear guarantees that the funds would support Russian projects.670
In regards to the third question, as to which preferences prevailed, the United States
proved to be the most important country in the negotiations as its policy-makers blocked efforts
to give the Council greater institutional capacity. Yet, the Nordic countries, except Denmark,
also exerted influence. They were able to set up a trust fund pilot project despite resistance from
the United States and Canada. Denmark proved less influential, as the trust fund did not reflect
its preferences, despite its NEFCO membership. The trust fund was a step toward increasing the
capacity of the Council.
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What about the permanent participants? These groups had relatively little involvement in
discussions of a permanent secretariat and stable budget. They generally supported increasing the
capacity of the Council, but had to prioritize their involvement in Council projects due to lack of
funds, as Chapter 6 demonstrates. These groups simply cannot participate strongly in every
Council project. The establishment of a permanent secretariat was not a top priority, whereas
stable funding for their own participation and projects important to human development were.
4.2.3 – 2007-Present
From 2007 onward, the Nordic countries successfully negotiated to increase the
institutional capacity of the Council. States opted to create a permanent secretariat to deal with
the increasing workload of the Council, confident that such an institution could be tailored to suit
state interests. This section answers two questions. First, when did the debate around the
Council’s institutional capacity change and what were the positions of the various actors
regarding institutional capacity? Second, why did the preferences of some actors prevail over
others and who exerted the most influence?
In regards to the first question, the debate around the Council’s institutional capacity
shifted in 2007 when three Nordic states opted to host a joint secretariat. At the April 2007
Council meeting, without much warning, the delegation from Norway proposed that it would
host a “joint secretariat” on behalf of Norway, Denmark and Sweden for six years.671 Denmark
and Sweden accepted the proposal. Other member countries were not able to veto this action, as
it was not a Council decision. The rules of procedure gave the host country the right to organize
the secretariat and to establish a joint secretariat. The rules of procedure did not prohibit a joint
secretariat and did not specify how states must host the secretariat.
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As a result, at the May 2012 deputy ministers’ Council meeting, Sweden initiated a
discussion of the effectiveness of the temporary secretariat and all of the assembled ministers
mutually agreed this secretariat could become a permanent one.672 Despite earlier opposition to a
secretariat, the new institution came together smoothly. The negotiation process took place in
2011 and 2012 outside of Council meetings. States did not discuss the matter openly in Council
meetings. The main disagreement in these negotiations was the location of the secretariat as the
governments of both Iceland and Norway sought to host the new body. In negotiations, policymakers from the United States and Canada made it known they wanted it in Iceland, because it
was about halfway between Europe and North America and thus an appropriate location.673
Norway, however, promised to invest more resources in the secretariat.674 Russian policy-makers
supported Norway’s proposal because Norway was closer to Russia than was Iceland.675
Ultimately, in early 2012, the government of Norway sent communications to the government of
Iceland and convinced the country to withdraw its bid by promising that the chair of the
secretariat would be Icelandic.676 There was a strong Russian candidate who many policy-makers
believed would make a good chair, but United States officials did not want a Russian in the
position, amid lingering distrust between the countries.677 The government of Norway wanted to
host the secretariat to establish Tromsø as the “capital of the Arctic” and a base for companies
(as well as researchers) that operate in the Arctic region.678 It is already the home to several
Arctic institutions. The Barents Council, for example, is already located in Tromsø. The
government of Iceland wanted to host the secretariat because many policy-makers believe its
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economic future is in the Arctic.679 Icelandic policy-makers believed the secretariat would give
Iceland prestige and power.680 Iceland wants Reykjavik to be the “Arctic capital.”681 Ultimately,
Iceland gave up its bid for the secretariat because it gained an acceptable compromise.682 The
secretariat became operational in 2013.
Why did states come to accept the utility for a permanent secretariat? Support for a
permanent secretariat among Nordic countries has been consistent, stemming from the
preference for the Council to be a robust international body. The reason that policy-makers from
Norway, Denmark and Sweden wanted to create the temporary secretariat was to demonstrate the
utility of a more permanent body.683 Why did the United States, Canada and Russia reverse
earlier opposition to a permanent secretariat? There were two major reasons. First, United States,
Canadian and Russian policy-makers had experiences in other organizations that led them to
realize that states could control secretariats and that they could be useful,684 such as the Antarctic
Treaty Secretariat.685 Some Council policy-makers became convinced that a secretariat would
benefit the Council, as secretariats had been useful in other contexts.686 Second, policy-makers
realized the Council’s work was becoming more complex and had to accept the benefits of a
permanent secretariat, based on experience working with the temporary secretariat. As
previously noted, the Council had 57 projects ongoing at a time from 1998 until 2004, which
increased to 159 projects from 2005 until 2013, including 12 major projects. A permanent
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secretariat increased institutional memory and eliminated the “learning curve” that a host country
must address.687 The Council formed a secretariat when the mutual value of such an institution
became apparent.
The debate around the Council’s institutional capacity further changed when Council
states began creating the project support instrument (PSI), which came into being in 2014.
Progress to create a trust fund had stalled in 2006 and so states renamed the fund to emphasize
that it would not be a tool to fund general Council operations. States first began to refer to the
fund as the PSI in 2007. The implementation of the PSI proceeded in five rounds of negotiations.
In November 2007 at the Council Senior Arctic Officials’ meeting in Narvik, Norway, Russia
announced it would provide funds to the PSI, but that it had “decided to focus on 1-3 projects
beneficial to the [Russian Federation] to make the PSI operational.”688 In response, the Nordic
Environmental Finance Corporation (NEFCO) said that this was not acceptable and that
countries would need to raise three million euros to make the project support instrument
operational.689 Russia’s proposal would alter the intent of the PSI to support its interests. As of
November 2007, the fund had collected only 340,000 euros, from Norway with the Saami
Council.690 The rest of the donors said they would not donate until Russia made its contribution
clear.691 Russian delegates said it would need to know other contributions before making its
contribution known.692 At the conclusion of the Council’s 2007 meetings, a Council project
support fund did not seem to be a promising prospect.
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Following these failed negotiations, Russian policy-makers realized no trust fund would
move forward until it announced its contribution and so at the next Council meeting, Russia
pledged to contribute 2 million euros a year to the PSI for five years (2009-2013), but only for
projects in Russia and only if other countries would contribute as well.693 Finland had pledged
200,000 euros, Norway 237,000 euros, Sweden 200,000 euros and Saami Council 100,000
Norwegian krones.694 Discussion subsequently turned to how the NEFCO would administer the
money if all of the projects were in Russia.695 After Russia’s statement of intent, Norway said it
would increase its contribution and Iceland announced it would contribute.696 The project
support instrument still did not have the minimum funding needed to proceed. The process to
bring the PSI into operation was far from complete.
Negotiations continued in November 2008 at the Council meeting in Kautokeino,
Norway. Russia stated it was ready to move forward with the PSI and had terms of reference
ready for approval. The United States then stalled negotiations by asking,
Given that all [Arctic Council] funding is voluntary and that project steering groups are
subsidiary to the [working group secretariat] why the PSI committee should be limited only to
those who financially contribute and suggested that no member of the [Arctic Council] should be
prevented from participating in the PSI.697

The United States delegation stated it would need more time to review the project support
instrument (PSI), leery of potential corruption in Russia. In response, all states agreed to
postpone approval of the PSI until December, to give the United States time to complete an
internal review.698
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This deadline passed as the PSI hit new roadblocks in Russia. The PSI was not
operational because Russia had not finalized “its inter-agency process”699 to determine how it
would administer the funds from the NEFCO within the complex structures of its government.
After two years, in November 2011 at the Council meeting in Lulea, Sweden, the NEFCO said
Russia had completed the inter-agency process.700 Russia was to be transparent with money
provided by the trust fund. The United States delegation supported the Arctic Contaminants
Action Program working group and hosted its secretariat. The NEFCO would ensure that the
money would not be wasted by the Russian government or lost to corruption. With this, after the
NEFCO’s assurance of Russian accountability, the United States delegation said it would donate
$1 million USD by the end of 2011, even though the trust fund would allot funds by
consensus.701 Its contribution assured it would have involvement in the PSI. The trust fund now
had the money it needed to continue.
States contributions increased and the PSI became operational in 2014, with 16 million
euros at its disposal.702 The fund is not for any Council project. It is for “action-oriented Arctic
Council projects focusing on pollution prevention in the Arctic.”703 Russia is contributing a total
of 10 million euros. The remaining contributors are Finland, Iceland, the NEFCO, Norway, the
Sámi Parliament, Sweden and the United States.704 According to the NEFCO, “The PSI will be
financing project preparation activities, such as project identification and concept development,
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feasibility studies, environmental impact assessments, business and financing plans, preliminary
design, preparation of tender documents, tendering and evaluation.”705 In addition, “The main
focus of the fund is to finance initiatives that can mitigate climate change and reduce releases of
hazardous substances.”706 The PSI is similar to a stable budget as it provides money states can
rely on to fund projects, regardless of the whims of individual countries.
In regards to the second question as to which state was the most influential in
negotiations, Norway became most influential, as it was a leader in the movement to increase the
Council’s institutional capacity. The United States exerted influence in ensuring that the Council
is not a more powerful body. It led the case for a weak secretariat. It appears unlikely the
secretariat will become extremely powerful because each state only contributes $125,000
annually.707 Norwegian policy-makers wanted the institution to be more powerful;708 however,
with its small budget, it will not have the ability to hire a large research staff or policy-makers to
influence states. Norway found a means to reduce the influence of the United States by using the
Council’s terms of reference to create a situation that demonstrated the utility of a permanent
secretariat. It also created a tool similar to a stable budget, but which won approval from all
states. The fact that a stronger fund or a stable budget did not result from efforts to better fund
the Council reflects the preferences and interest of the United States. Overall, Norway led the
cause to create a permanent secretariat, while the United States became a leader against the
secretariat.
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Returning to the literature, a new understanding of the evolution of the Council’s
institutional capacity is necessary. In contrast to work by authors such as Oran Young,709 the
Council is a stronger institution than ever before. Belen Sanchez Ramos is correct in arguing that
new “challenges and opportunities” in the Arctic as well as increasing “complexity” is partly the
cause of the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity, as seen in the increase in the
volume of Council projects.710 The Council secretariat arose partly due to the Council’s more
complex mandate. However, the Council’s secretariat and project support instrument did not
arise automatically and rationally. Rather, resistant countries only agreed to a stronger
institutional capacity when it became clear they could control the institution. In addition, the
Nordic policy-makers desired increased institutional capacity in order to have a means to control
Russia and increase the credibility of the Council. This chapter contributes a new understanding
of the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity.
Scholars that advocate that the Council carry out more work than it does now would be
wise to address the deficiencies in the institutional capacity of the Council.711 The Council lacks
the capacity either to compel states to undertake any action or to enforce international
agreements. Currently, the secretariat has less than one dozen employees. States have
deliberately structured the Council secretariat and PSI to ensure it will remain a weak institution
that states can control. These authors should examine what projects the Council can add to its
workload given the current political situation.
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4.3 – Analyzing the Evolution of the Arctic Council’s Institutional Capacity
The hypotheses of functionalism do not explain the evolution of the Council’s
institutional capacity.
H1: States are allowing the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to expand because they
all stand to gain something through expansion.
This hypothesis has support as all states gain through institutional capacity expansion.
Further, these gains are absolute. The Council’s work is more complex than in the past and the
expansion of the institutional capacity is a response.
H2: The institutional capacity is expanding automatically to fulfill a mutual technocratic goal
around a less political issue area.
This hypothesis has limited support as some states have different, political goals in
institutional expansion. It is not an automatic process. The United States is expanding the
institutional capacity of the Council to fulfill technocratic goals. It wants the secretariat to help
transmit information and make the Council more efficient. The project support instrument (PSI)
enhances legitimacy because states structured it in such a way that accountability is guaranteed
as states transfer money to Russia to address contaminants issues. The United States, Canada and
Russia do not want the Council to become an organization that has independence from state
control. The Nordic countries favour institutional expansion as many policy-makers hope that the
Council can become an independently powerful institution, a political goal contrasting with the
predictions of functionalism.
The expansion was not automatic. Norway and the Nordic countries lobbied for years to
expand the institutional capacity of the Council. The United States resisted this expansion until it
was sure a secretariat could be contained. Norway has ambitions that the secretariat and project
support instrument might make the Council into a powerful regional actor.
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H3: The institutional capacity is expanding because the Arctic Council has proven itself
competent.
This hypothesis has support. The Council has proven itself a reasonably competent
institution. States are investing more resources in the Council because it has proven that it can
use those resources effectively. Policy-makers are investing new money and capabilities with the
Council so that it can become a stronger organization that is even more competent. The
temporary secretariat demonstrated the utility of such an institution. There are political processes
that explain the reasons for the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity. The Nordic
countries want the Council to be a powerful international actor. Canada, Russia and the United
States do not share this goal but have determined that a stronger Council is necessary and states
can structure it so as not to threaten the power of states. Russia initially resisted calls for a stable
budget, but supported the notion of an Arctic trust fund when it was clear the money would
benefit Russia. Yet, states would not invest resources into an institution that did not work.
Neorealism provides insights into the expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity.
H1: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council because it does not
have an impact on state autonomy.
This hypothesis has some support because states constructed the secretariat and the PSI to protect
state autonomy. The United States and Russia clearly sought to maintain autonomy and feared
that a secretariat, as well as a stable budget, could threaten their international autonomy. Canada
saw that a stronger Council could be European-centric, which could make it harder for Canada to
accomplish its international goals. However, the Nordic countries advocated a stronger Council
even though the secretariat and budget their policy-makers envisioned would threaten their
regional autonomy. The end result was the construction of a secretariat and the PSI that states
could control, which would not develop the powers to challenge the autonomy of states.
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H2: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council to balance power in the
region.
This hypothesis has support. Maintaining a “balance” is clearly a goal of the Nordic
countries in enhancing the power of the Arctic Council. The Nordic countries sought that a
secretariat could keep Russia accountable and ensure it addressed the contaminants issue in its
environment. The same is true of the project support instrument. The Nordic countries were to
administer the fund and ensure that Russia addressed its contaminants issue. In spite of a
weakening economy, Russia, in the 1990s, was stronger internationally than the Nordic states
and there was little these countries could do to ensure that it addressed trans-boundary pollution
issues. Other countries did not share these goals. Russia could see a secretariat as a direct threat
to its power. The United States had less concern for these issues and for maintaining regional
balance so it did not support a strong Council. The same is true of Canada. The evolution of the
Council’s institutional capacity is partly intended to create regional balance, for some countries.
H3: The evolution of the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council must reflect the preferences
of great powers.
This hypothesis has support because the evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity
reflects the preferences of great powers, despite Nordic influence. The United States and Russia
resisted a powerful Council for more than a decade. They could have vetoed the creation of a
permanent secretariat. Russia supported a Council trust fund when it became clear that it would
provide funds for Russia. The Nordic countries sought a strong Arctic Council bolstered by a
strong secretariat. The secretariat that emerged is weak, in keeping with the preferences of the
United States. Canada opposed a secretariat, but had a limited impact on the process. Canada did
not oppose the notion of a permanent secretariat, but rather it was concerned that the secretariat
could make the Council European-centric. Outcomes clearly reflect the desires of great powers.
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Neoliberal institutionalism provides insights into the growth of the Arctic Council’s
institutional capacity.
H1: States are expanding the institutional capacity of the Arctic Council because they all stand
to gain something through expansion.
This hypothesis has support because all states stand to make absolute gains in the
evolution of the Council’s bureaucracy. The Council’s work is more complex as the institution’s
mandate and policy-making role expands. A permanent secretariat and stable funding create
smoother transitions between chairs and ensure institutional memory. For the Nordic countries,
increased institutional capacity could be a first step to make the Council the type of strong
institution they seek. For Canada, Russia and the United States, the bureaucracy of the Council is
set up in such a way that it is possible for states to control. All of the states gained something by
increasing the institutional capacity of the Council although their goals were somewhat different.
H2: The form of negotiation (such as coalitions, information and persuasion) affects the
development of Council institutional capacity.
This hypothesis has support because the form of negotiation was important in the
evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity. Norway and the Nordic countries successfully
negotiated to ensure that the Council developed a permanent secretariat. Norway cleverly
established a temporary secretariat. The United States, Canada and Russia could not veto that
proposal. The utility of this secretariat led to the creation of a permanent secretariat. When
discussions over a stable budget floundered, the Nordic states organized “project support
instrument” that would operate in a similar way to a stable budget. Nonetheless, other countries
were able to ensure that the Council is not an overly strong body due to their successful
negotiation tactics. The secretariat is an administrative body and a true stable budget does not
appear to be in the offing.
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H3: Path dependence and norms will temper and challenge the evolution of the Council’s
institutional capacity.
This hypothesis does not have support. Path dependence and norms did not hinder the
evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity, although they may have affected its evolution.
Today, the Council is a stronger international body than ever before. States found that the status
quo, a weak Council, did not serve their interests; hence, they chose to increase its institutional
capacity. Momentum had been building toward this development since the birth of the Council.
It is possible that path dependence or norms will stop the secretariat and other bureaucratic
elements from becoming too powerful, in that the understanding that the Council is to be a weak
body will become entrenched. The Council has evolved as a weak institution with a limited
bureaucracy. It is possible that path dependence or norms did not exist in the Council’s case. Yet,
it seems probable that these factors existed.
In summary, the Council’s institutional capacity has evolved. Functionalism is correct in
predicting that institutional capacity is evolving due to absolute gains and institutional
competence. Neorealism is correct predicting that the evolution is occurring in response to
“balance” concerns and great power interest, but somewhat incorrect in the prediction that the
maintenance of international autonomy was a concern for all states. Neoliberal institutionalism is
correct in predicting that absolute gains inspired states to increase the Council’s policy-making
goal and that the form of negotiation was important to this process, but incorrect in predicting
that path dependence and norms impacted the process. No theory explains the contention by
some interviewees that policy-makers in the Nordic countries have less apprehension toward
bureaucratic bodies than their counterparts in Russia and North America. None of the theories
examined allows that culture could impact state decision making at the international level, as
each assumes that states are rational entities influenced by interests and material gains.
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Table 4.2 summarizes the results and shows that each of the theories examined provides
some insights.
Table 4.2: Analysis
Theory
Functionalism

Hypothesis
H1: States are allowing the institutional
capacity of the Arctic Council to expand
because they all stand to gain something
through expansion.

Supported?
Supported – Council is
expanding in response to
expanding Council
workload

Functionalism

H2: The institutional capacity is expanding
automatically to fulfill a mutual technocratic
goal around a less political issue area.

Not supported – Nordic
support for institutional
expansion highly political

Functionalism

H3: The institutional capacity is expanding
because the Arctic Council has proven itself
competent.

Supported – Council has
demonstrated competence

Neorealism

H1: States are expanding the institutional
capacity of the Arctic Council because it does
not have an impact on state autonomy.

Not supported – secretariat
and budget could threaten
autonomy

Neorealism

H2: States are expanding the institutional
Supported – grew from
capacity of the Arctic Council to balance power Nordic interest in
in the region.
controlling Russia

Neorealism

H3: The evolution of the institutional capacity
of the Arctic Council must reflect the
preferences of great powers.

Supported – secretariat
weak, reflecting United
States and Russia interests

Neoliberal
institutionalism

H1: States are expanding the institutional
capacity of the Arctic Council because they all
stand to gain something through expansion.

Supported – Council is
expanding in response to
expanding Council
workload

Neoliberal
institutionalism

H2: The form of negotiation (such as
coalitions, information and persuasion) affects
the development of Council institutional
capacity.

Supported – Nordic
manoeuvring (i.e.
temporary secretariat)
convinced states of
usefulness of secretariat

Neoliberal
institutionalism

H3: Path dependence and norms will temper
and challenge the evolution of the Council’s
institutional capacity.

Not supported – little
evidence of path
dependence or norms at
play
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Table 4.3: Theoretical Explanations for the Evolution of Council Capacity
Event
Functionalism
Neorealism
Neoliberal
Why?
1991-1998
Nordic interest in
X
X
Interest in
permanent
controlling
secretariat/stable
Russia, ensuring
budget
strength of new
Council
Nordic “cultural”
No theory
interest in
anticipates role
bureaucracy
of culture
United States
X
X
Mainly
/Russia/Canadian
concerned with
resistance
autonomy/power
of secretariat
1998-2007
Nordic interest in
X
X
Interest in
permanent
controlling
secretariat/stable
Russia, ensuring
budget
strength of new
Council
United States
X
X
Mainly
/Russia/Canadian
concerned with
resistance
autonomy/power
of secretariat
Nordic
X
X
Main desire to
innovation of
strengthen
trust fund
Council and
control Russia
Resistance to
X
X
Mainly
trust fund
concerned with
autonomy
2007-Present
Nordic
X
X
Main desire to
temporary
strengthen
secretariat
Council and
control Russia
Development of
X
X
Mutual interest
permanent
of all states,
secretariat
despite autonomy
concerns
Development of
X
X
Mutual interest
project support
of all states,
instrument
despite autonomy
concerns
2
7
9
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Table 4.4 reviews the necessary and sufficient conditions for the institutional capacity of
the Council according to each theory. In regards to functionalism, is the Council’s institutional
capacity evolving automatically in response to issue spillover and clear issues demanding a
policy response? The evolution of the Council’s institutional capacity has not been automatic,
falsifying this hypothesis. In regards to neoliberal institutionalism, are states allowing the
Council’s institutional capacity to evolve to fulfill absolute gains, tempered by the form of
negotiation? States are responding to absolute gains and the form of negotiation is very
important. In regards to neorealism, are states allowing the Council’s institutional capacity to
evolve to maintain a regional balance and accommodate great power interest? Relative gains
were not important, but “balance” and great power interest were key variables.
Table 4.4: Dependent and Independent Variables Analysis
Dependent variable: expansion Necessary Fulfilled Why fulfilled
of the Arctic Council’s
(n) /
(Y/N)
institutional capacity
sufficient
(s)
Common ind.
variables

Likely less
political issue
area
Economic
gains

S

N

Expansion of the institutional capacity
of the Council highly political process

S

Y

Expansion of the Council helps
improve economic potential of Arctic
region by supporting new mandate

N

Y

All states gain from establishment of
project support instrument and
secretariat

Issue spillover

N&S

N

Independent
institution
Interest group
or epistemic
community
lobbying

N&S

N

N

N

Nordic states pushed expansion of
institutional capacity for years before
successful, rather than due to an issue
Council is not a strong institution in
itself
No evidence of influence of groups
lobbying the Council

Functionalism Absolute
ind. variables gains (i.e.
gains mostly
equal)
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Neoliberal
ind. variables

Neorealist
ind. variables

Institution has
proven
competence
Automatic
response

N

Y

Success of reports such as ACIA
demonstrated competence of Council

N&S

N

Expansion came as a result of political
negotiations, not automatically

Absolute
gains (i.e.
states gain
something)

N&S

Y

All states gain from establishment of
project support instrument and
secretariat

Shadow of the
future
Lack of path
dependence

N

Y

N

?

Lack of
contrary
norms

N

?

All states must work together in the
future due to regional proximity
Council is evolving, which indicates
lack of path dependence; perhaps
should have been present
Council is evolving, which indicates
lack of contrary norms; perhaps should
have been present

Form of
negotiation
(i.e.
information,
coalitions)

N&S

Y

Evolution came as a result of political
process between Nordic countries and
Canada/Russia/United States

Relative gains
(i.e. states
gain more
than rivals)

N&S

N

All states gain from establishment of
project support instrument and
secretariat

No security
ramifications

N

Y

Secretariat and project support
instrument are purposely weak

“Balance”
motivations

N&S

Y

Nordic countries seek to exert
influence on Russia

Great power
preference
reigns
supreme

N&S

Y

Secretariat and project support
instrument are purposely weak
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Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter showed that the institutional capacity of the Council is
growing as it establishes a permanent secretariat and project support instrument. The first section
examined theoretical predictions by functionalism, neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism.
The second section analyzed the negotiations pertaining to the Council’s institutional capacity.
The third section analyzed the results. It concludes that neoliberal institutionalism explains the
expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity, because it was a result of protracted and highly
political negotiations. However, neorealism provides insights in that great power interest was an
important factor in negotiations and the Nordic countries sought to increase the institution’s
capacity to exert control against Russia. Overall, the Arctic Council’s institutional capacity is
growing because it is in the interest of all of the states in the Council, as it supports the region’s
economic potential by helping it carry out its expanded mandate. However, states are increasing
the institutional capacity to ensure that the Council will not be an overly powerful actor. The
Nordic countries and their political manoeuvring proved to be a key factor, as well.
This chapter contributes to literature as it proposes a new understanding about the
expansion of the Council’s institutional capacity as a highly political process inspired by power
concerns. Earlier work by Belen Sanchez Ramos saw the expansion as a simpler process. This
case study shows the explanatory power of neoliberal institutionalism. It demonstrates that states
have a greater concern for absolute compared to relative or mutual goals internationally.
However, neoliberal institutionalism argues that institutions will be relatively unlikely to evolve.
Neorealism provides insights that explain that “balancing” concerns also are important, as well
as the interest of great powers. Functionalism provides the insight that states appear likely to
invest new powers in institutions that show they are competent.
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CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING THE ROLE OF OBSERVERS IN THE ARCTIC COUNCIL
International institutions and non-state actors can become observers in the Arctic
Council, which are able to attend Council meetings and participate only with the consent of
member state delegations.712 Why would a non-Arctic state seek to be an observer in an Arctic
regional institution? Would it not be like Canada seeking membership in the African Union? The
Council is a regional institution, but it addresses important issues for the entire world
community. The melting of Arctic ice will raise sea levels around the world and cause coastal
flooding. At the same time, the melting of ice will make the Arctic more accessible for potential
economic development. In 2013, China, India, Italy, Japan, Singapore and South Korea sought to
become observers in the Arctic Council. Media outlets reported that these countries cared mainly
about the “trade and the energy potential of the planet’s Far North.”713 A large number of new
observers primarily motivated by economic gains could shift the Council’s priorities away from
the environment and change the dynamics within its meetings.
This chapter answers three related questions: 1) why do actors seek to join the Arctic
Council; 2) why would member states agree to admit new observers, and; 3) once admitted, how
influential are observers? It answers the research question by testing the hypotheses of three
theories (functionalism, neoliberal institutionalism and neorealism) on why and how states cooperate. For functionalists, an actor would want to become an observer if the Council is working
on problems it has an interest in solving. Functionalists would predict that member states allow
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new observers in the Council if these actors can contribute to the work of the institution.
Observer influence should be equal to member states because members will accept all
information and perspectives necessary to solve international problems. Neoliberal
institutionalists would expect actors seek to become part of the Council to gain something. States
would allow new observers to make a gain, as well. For these theorists, observers can be as
influential as member states based on agency. Neorealists would expect that actors seek to
become part of the Council to enhance their position. Member states would allow a new observer
for the same reason. For neorealists, the influence of observers should be less than Council
members.
This chapter concludes that neoliberal institutionalism, with its emphasis on the
importance of absolute gains, best explains the interest of observers in becoming part of the
institution and the reason states admit these new actors. However, neorealists, with their
tempered expectations of observer influence, best explain the actual influence of observers in the
Council. The chapter argues that observers are weak actors in the Council. Despite this
weakness, actors seek to become observers for two reasons. First, they want to contribute to the
governance of environmental issues of global importance. Second, actors seek to benefit from
the economic potential of the Arctic region. Existing literature overemphasizes the importance of
observers in the Council and their interest in Arctic economics to explain Council participation,
as is discussed later in the chapter.
The chapter contributes to literature on the Arctic Council in two ways. First, it helps
settle a debate on the impact of observers in the Council. Most work sees observers as the
weakest actors in the Council, whose contributions hinge on the will of member states. Authors,
such as Evan Bloom, Terry Fenge and Oran Young, see observers as practically inconsequential
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actors.714 In contrast, political scientist Timo Koivurova argues that Council observers are
influential because they are re-defining the region as a global concern.715 This chapter confirms
that observers are weak actors in the Council and that these actors strive to gain expanded
influence; thus, we can consider these actors relevant in the Council’s affairs because their
participation impacts Council dynamics. Second, this chapter helps settle a debate in literature
about the reasons actors seek to become Council observers. Koivurova argues that actors are
interested in becoming observers because of the importance of Arctic environmental issues,
namely climate change.716 However, news reports717 as well some academic work by political
scientist James Manicom and historian Whitney Lackenbauer,718 argue economics (namely
resources such as oil, gas and trade routes) are more important than environmental protection as
a consideration of potential observers, particularly China. This chapter argues that neither of
these perspectives adequately explains increased interest in the Council. It argues that
environment and economic gains are equally important in explaining this increased interest.
The first section of this chapter discusses the contribution of this research to academic.
The second section reviews the history of observers in the Council, while the third section
analyzes the utility of the three theories in explaining outcomes.
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5.1 – Theory on International Co-operation and Observers
Functionalists would make two predictions about observers in the Council, the first of
which explains state preferences while the second explains outcomes.
H1: Observers want to contribute to the Council to help solve important problems; other states
will not hesitate to allow contributions if observers can help solve problems.
Functionalists argue that the goal of any international actor is to solve problems and thus would
seek to join an international institution to address a pressing issue and make an absolute gain,719
likely in a less political area.720 An example would be climate change, which is an exogenous
issue that changes states’ interest vis-à-vis the Arctic. Admission should be automatic,721 as soon
as a contribution is clear.
H2: Observers can be influential, based on their ability to provide quality information and
contributions.
Functionalists assume that observers’ influence in an institution is based on their ability to
contribute to problem solving and to provide quality information,722 acting as (or similar to) an
interest group.723 It is likely that other states would be unable to stop observers from
contributing, as functionalists predict that institutions “attain ever-higher levels of policy-making
autonomy.”724 For functionalists, petty politics will not stop state contributions to solve
problems. The theory would be disproven if states did not add observers that can help solve a
problem automatically.
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Neoliberal institutionalists would make two predictions about observers in the Council,
the first of which explains state preferences while the second explains outcomes.
H1: Observers want to contribute to the Council to make an absolute gain; other states will not
hesitate to allow contributions if they perceive a gain.
Neoliberal institutionalists argue that primary goal of international actors is to make gains and
predict that actors would want to join an international institution to “jointly benefit from cooperation.”725 Actors seek to join the Council due to path dependence, namely that it is the
recognized forum to participate in Arctic governance. Functionalists, in contrast, argue states
seek to solve problems, which may or may not result in immediate gains. States accept these new
observers to make gains in a recognized forum with strong rules. According to neoliberal
institutionalism, states will accept observers with whom co-operation will be necessary in the
future.726 Governments might not accept an observer if relations are strained over other issues.
H2: Observers can be influential, based on their ability to use agency.
Neoliberal institutionalists would argue that any actor could be influential in an international
institution based on its agency.727 Agency (which is the ability to ally with states, employ
successful negotiation tactics and draw on useful information) can be limited by institutional
rules that limit the influence of some actors. Functionalists argue that influence should be
automatic for any actor that can help solve problems. In contrast, neoliberal institutionalists
argue actors must successfully employ tactics to meet their desired ends. The theory would be
disproven if the gains from the addition of observers were not absolute. The theory also would be
disproven if agency and the form of negotiation were not important to explain outcomes.
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Neorealism would make two predictions about observers in the Council, the first of
which explains state preferences while the second explains outcomes.
H1: States want to become part of the Council to enhance their position; current states accept
other states to enhance their position, as well.
Neorealists argue that the goal of a state at the international level is to protect its position and
thus a small power would seek to join an international institution to increase its influence728 and
ensure regional balance.729 Great powers would seek to join to dominate the organization.730
Member states would admit new observers to dilute the influence of a great power or enhance
their own position. Functionalists and neoliberal institutionalists explain that states co-operate to
make gains and solve problems. For neorealists, states seek power and to enhance their position.
H2: Observers will be less influential than great powers or full Council members.
Neorealists argue that observers would be less influential than member states in an international
institution. Great power preference will reign supreme in any interaction and that states are
concerned with their position relative to other states.731 Member states will structure rules and act
to thwart potential observer influence. A great power observer could challenge other states, but
for neorealists, it is unlikely member states would allow such a situation to unfold. The other two
theories explain that states can overcome such concerns by providing information or exercising
agency. Neorealists would not believe that non-member states or non-state actors could exercise
influence as observers in an international institution, present mostly to respond to domestic
pressures and democratic expectations. Such assumptions would be disproven if balance
motivations were not important or great power preference did not reign supreme in outcomes.
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5.2 – The Evolution of the Council’s Observers
The evolution of the role and interest of observers in the Arctic Council has proceeded in
three periods. From 1991 to 1996, state policy-makers created the Council to address
environmental issues and promote Arctic co-operation. The question of which actors could
participate in this process naturally emerged. In the second period, from 1996 to 2004, state
policy-makers debated the role of observers and these actors emerged as weak Council
contributors, able to participate with the consent of member states. In the third period, from 2005
until the present, observers became more assertive in the Council as the severity of the problem
of climate change became clear. A greater number of actors, especially non-Arctic states, sought
to become Council observers.
5.2.1 – 1991-1996
In the first period of Council history, from 1991 to 1996, the question of whether the
institution would have observers emerged. This section answers three major questions. First, why
did observers seek to be part of the Council and how did the question of their participation
emerge? Second, why did state policy-makers allow actors to become Council observers? Third,
what were the major debates about observer participation? In regards to the first question, at
some level, states and non-state actors sought to become observers in the Council because it was
clear the institution would promote co-operation around issues that were of global consequence
when states founded the institution. Examples of such issues include the establishment of ties
with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the improvement of relations between former
Cold War rivals and the betterment of the poor state of the Russian environment. The Council
was to address issues that had transboundary consequences.
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In regards to the second question, as to why policy-makers allowed Council observers,
non-Arctic actors became part of the institution because these entities could make a contribution
to Arctic science. After the Rovaniemi conference in September 1989, states created the Arctic
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in three rounds of fairly straightforward
negotiations.732 The AEPS was to be a research strategy in which state scientists came together to
share information about the environment. In negotiations, representatives from several states and
organizations asked to be involved. The AEPS included eight observers, three of which were
indigenous peoples’ organizations (namely the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Nordic Saami
Council and the USSR Association of Small Peoples of the North).733 The other observers
included three European states (Britain, Poland and West Germany), two international
institutional bodies (the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and the United
Nations Environment Programme) and one non-governmental organization (the International
Arctic Science Committee).734 Actors other than the indigenous peoples’ organizations sought to
become observers for one reason: to contribute to Arctic science. The states outside the Arctic
included in the AEPS have engaged in Arctic exploration and science for centuries. It made
sense for other actors with an interest in Arctic science to participate in the AEPS. There is no
evidence non-Arctic actors had an expectation of becoming full members. The AEPS rules of
procedure make it clear that observers have limited power. These groups can attend and
participate in meetings only with state permission.735 Observer status in the AEPS presented an
opportunity to contribute to Arctic science.
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By 1996, the AEPS had found out much information about the poor state of the Arctic
environment and human security and so policy-makers began discussing whether the AEPS
should be formalized into an international institution. That the AEPS observers would have a
similar role in the Arctic Council was never in question. The Ottawa Declaration, the document
establishing the Arctic Council, grants observers the same powers as they had with the AEPS.
Observer status was open to all states and non-state actors “that the Council determines can
contribute to its work.”736 The Ottawa Declaration creates two categories of observers.
Accredited observers (often called permanent observers) can attend all Council meetings unless a
member state excludes them.737 Ad-hoc observers must apply to attend each Council meeting in
advance. A key difference between the AEPS and Arctic Council is that indigenous peoples’
organizations successfully lobbied for an enhanced role, greater than observers but less than
member states, termed permanent participant status.738 Chapter 6 examines this process in detail.
For non-Arctic states and non-state actors, participation in the Arctic Council was a means to
contribute to Arctic science, as these actors had in the AEPS.
In regards to the third question, there was one minor debate around observers in the 1996
negotiations to create the Council. Policy-makers from Denmark, Iceland and Norway were
against allowing environmental groups opposed to whaling to participate in the Council, which
the other Arctic state policy-makers supported.739 For example, Greenpeace would criticize
Norway and Iceland for allowing whaling during Council meetings.740 There also was a more
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general concern that observers such as Greenpeace would be disruptive.741 The ultimate result of
these negotiations was a compromise: organizations such as Greenpeace would not be part of the
Council, while more moderate organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund would have a role.
There was some debate about whether to allow institutions such as the Red Cross to become an
observer, based on whether it carried out enough activity in the Arctic.742 That organization did
not become an observer in 1996, but received the status later. Overall, the negotiations to include
observers proceeded with little controversy.
5.2.2 – 1996-2004
This section answers two questions. First, how influential were observers in the Council?
Second, what were the major debates around observers? In regards to the first question,
observers were not overly influential in the Council from 1996 to 2004. After its founding, the
Council became an environmental research institution that held two meetings a year, similar to
the AEPS, with member states, permanent participants and observers sending delegations to
share the results of research projects and plan new activities. The Council instituted 57 projects
from 1998 to 2004, such as research on climate change, Arctic contaminants and the state of
Arctic human security, one of which was co-sponsored by an observer. The observer project was
a report co-authored by the United Nations Environment Programme, the Arctic Monitoring and
Assessment Programme and the European Environmental Agency “about the relationship
between the Arctic and Europe.”743 Observers did not frequently take on leadership roles during
the early history of the Council.
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Whereas state delegations made on average 3.3 comments per meeting on 2.6 agenda
items, observer delegations made an average of one comment on one agenda item. Further, only
about a third of observers made comments at all.744 Not all observers commented equally. The
most frequent commenters were the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the World Wildlife
Fund. Observer comments fall into three categories. First, observer delegations provided updates
on their general Arctic activities to help coordinate research action.745 Second, observers
provided suggestions about Council projects, sometimes verging on small criticisms. For
example, at the May 1999 Council meeting in Anchorage, Alaska, the delegation from the
Netherlands suggested that the Council include “something” “that dealt with socio-economic
development of indigenous people in the North,” advice Council states did not heed.746 Third,
observers provided technical suggestions. For example, at the November 1999 Arctic Council
meeting in Washington, D.C., the delegation from the United Nations Environment Programme
provided advice about applying to the Global Environmental Facility to obtain project
funding.747 Observers had little impact on Council activities.
In regards to the second question, about the major debates around observers, the question
of European Union observer status presented some controversy. Denmark and Finland called for
“closer co-operation” between the European Union and Arctic Council at the October 2000
Council meeting in Barrow, Alaska.748 However, other Council states were less interested in
close co-operation. It would become a more controversial issue later in the Council.
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Despite a lack of influence, we can see increasing interest in the Council by some nonArctic states and non-governmental organizations from 1996 to 2004. At the October 2000
ministerial meeting in Barrow, Alaska, the Council accepted one state, France, as a new
observer.749 The number of observers that attended meetings doubled between 1998 and 2004.
Fifteen additional international organizations and non-governmental organizations became
permanent observers, all of which engaged in significant Arctic activity. More actors sought to
be a part of the Council as its profile increased due to its good quality work advancing Arctic
science. Economic motivations were not important before 2005.
5.2.3 – 2005-Present
From 2005 until the present, the role of observers in the Council presented controversy.
This section answers two questions. First, how influential were observers in the Council and at
what point did their influence change? Second, what were the major debates around observers
and how has their role evolved?
The role of observers expanded slightly in 2005 at the April Council meeting in Yakutsk,
Russia. Three important events took place. First, observers made eleven statements, which
marked an increase.750 Second, the European Union announced that it would be a lead sponsor
on a project for the first time. The project was the Large Marine Ecosystem research project,
sponsored by the European Union, Norway, Denmark and United States.751 It was a project to
research “pertinent assessment strategies for assessing and improving ecosystem conditions.”752
Third, the United Kingdom stated opposition to the creation of a project support instrument to

749

Ibid.
Arctic Counci, Arctic Council Meeting of Senior Arctic Officials, Yakutsk, Russia, April 6-7, 2005: Minutes
(Tromsø, Norway: Arctic Council Secretariat, 2005). l
751
Ibid.
752
Ibid.
750

225
ensure stable council funding, the first time an observer had made an overt statement on Council
reform.753 The influence of observers began to shift as state and international institution
observers started to act more assertively in the Council by generally increasing their level of
participation. Why did observers increase their activism at the April 2005 meeting? This change
took place after the release the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment in 2004, the Council’s major
four-year report that identified climate change as a global issue. It found, for example, “The area
of the Greenland Ice Sheet that experiences some melting has increased about 16 per cent from
1979 to 2002,” which will lead to a rise in global sea levels.754 The Council also has become a
stronger policy-making body, creating agreements on search and rescue in 2011 and oil spill
response in 2013. The observers became assertive after it was clear the Council dealt with key
issues.
This new activism and participation did not constitute a sea change in the Council. On
average, each observer made 1.375 comments, an increase from the previous era but not a large
one. Observers began to sponsor projects more frequently. For example, the Nordic
Environmental Finance Corporation co-sponsored five projects under the Council Arctic
Contaminants Action Program.755 The amount of sponsorship is not large, since the Council has
an average of 159 projects ongoing at a time.756 The observers were more assertive in demanding
a role in the Council. At the November 2008 Arctic Council meeting in Kautokeino, Norway,
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and the Netherlands stated that “observers wish to co-operate not only on science but also
decision-making.”757 It went on, “The possibility of observers to co-fund Arctic Council projects
is more likely if observers are involved early at the project development phase.”758
In regards to the second question, there were two major debates around observers after
2005. First, the question of whether the European Union should become an observer in the
Council was particularly controversial. European Union leaders have long made it a priority to
address climate change. In 2001, European Union officials, as part of their activities to address
climate change, began research on the Arctic environment and work on an “action plan” to
mitigate the effects of climate change in the Arctic. They provided updates to the Council on the
European Union’s progress in the ensuing years. The action plan was finally completed in 2008,
the same year the European Parliament voted to ban the import of seal products, save those
harvested by indigenous peoples.759 In 2009, European Union policy-makers sought permanent
observer status, to compliment its program to address Arctic pollution. The negotiating process
unfolded in two steps. First, in February 2009, the United States Mission to the European Union
organized a private meeting with all the Council states to discuss the possibility of accredited
observer status for the European Union. At this meeting, all of the Council country officials
supported the notion, though Denmark and Russian officials both stated some reservations.760
However, all state policy-makers knew that the Inuit would oppose permanent observer status
because of the seal ban.761 Seal harvesting is an important part of the Inuit economy and culture.
Despite an exemption for seal products harvested by Inuit peoples, many leaders believed that
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the ban eliminated the demand for their products in Europe, which is the where most of the
fashion industry is headquartered.762 They believed the ban greatly decreased the possibility that
fashion designers would incorporate seal fur into their designs. Even outside Europe, knowledge
of the ban can stigmatize possessing seal furs, which hurts domestic demand. The United States
has a similar ban in effect in its 1972 Marine Mammals Protection Act.763 Inuit leaders are
critical of this ban,764 but do not oppose it with as much vigour as the European Union ban. Inuit
leaders emphasize that they strongly oppose the European ban because it has eliminated a crucial
market for their products.
The European Union officials responded that they were sure they could overcome such
opposition.765 Norwegian officials had previously called for an enhanced European Union
role.766 Nordic policy-makers wanted the European Union included because “they would be able
to contribute a lot of funding to the various scientific projects that were being undertaken.”767
The second stage in the negotiation process to include the European Union in the Council
occurred after the February meeting, in September 2009, as Finnish policy-makers sent
communications to all of the Arctic governments, and in particular the United States Department
of State, emphasizing that the European Union should be a permanent observer.768 Meanwhile,
Canada challenged the European Union seal product ban in the World Trade Organization by
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arguing the ban constituted a discriminatory trade practice.769 The United States, Russia and even
Canada did not oppose European Union observer status, as it was to be a weak actor.
Inuit opposition to European Union observer status, due to its seal ban, has delayed
accreditation. The issue of observer status for the European Union came to the Council table in
2013, four years after the discussion began, typical for a Council decision of this type. The Inuit
Circumpolar Council led the charge against granting the European Union observer status,
privately demanding and convincing Canada to block its permanent status in preparations for the
May 2013 Council Ministerial Meeting in Kiruna, Sweden.770 Other permanent participants were
more open to its membership, optimistic about the opportunities partnerships might afford.771
Canada supported the Inuit group due to domestic pressure and the economic impact of the seal
ban. The issue was further deferred at the Council Ministerial Meeting in April, 2015.
The second controversy was whether to allow non-Arctic, non-European states,
particularly China to become permanent Council observers. The Council’s profile had increased,
as up to 22 observers were attending Council meetings. For example, after 2005, Spain became a
Council observer. After 2007, states such as China, South Korea, India, Italy, Japan and
Singapore began to attend Council meetings and demanded to become accredited observers. It
took longer for states to accredit non-European observers (for example, seven years to accredit
China, South Korea and Japan, whereas France became an observer after attending meetings for
two years). Policy-makers from all states wondered whether increasing the number of observers
in the Council would make the institution less workable.772
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There was a particularly large amount over concern over the status of China, which began
attending Council meetings in 2008. A lot of news coverage argues that China’s Arctic interest
stems from its interest in exploiting Arctic energy resources.773 If its interest is mostly economic,
it follows that Chinese officials will have limited interest in environmental protection. China is
energy-hungry and the Arctic region contains 90 billion barrels of oil and more than 1,600
trillion cubic feet of natural gas.774 Yet, Chinese officials sought to be part of the Council for
both economic and environmental reasons. China has a history of polar research and is home to a
polar institute and icebreakers.775 China’s production of maze, rice and wheat will fall by more
than 35 per cent in the next 50 years because of Arctic climate change.776 Coastal flooding, due
in large part to the melting of Arctic ice and the resulting rising sea levels, will impact more than
20 million people in China during the next century.777 Similar concerns explain why other states,
such as Japan and Singapore, sought observer status after 2008.
For policy-makers from all Council states, three concerns hung over the decision whether
these states should become observers. First, there was concern that permanent participant power
“could be diluted in a growing sea of observers.”778 Second, Russian policy-makers had concerns
that China could present an economic rival in the Arctic region.779 Third, there was a concern
among some policy-makers that more observers would make it difficult to organize meetings.780
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Ultimately, state policy-makers knew that it would not be politically possible to deny
accredited status to China and the other non-European states without a clear reason, such as a
diplomatic tiff with China over a key policy or a key concern. There was general agreement that
it would be good to include these countries as part of the Council. By 2010, state policy-makers
knew that there was an expectation that a decision on whether to accredit the non-European
states would be forthcoming. The process of deciding how to admit China proceeded in two
stages. At the 2010 Deputy Ministers Meeting in Copenhagen, Canada proposed that the Council
work on articulating an appropriate role for observers, which Russia and the ICC supported.781
Second, in 2011, at the Nuuk Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, states resolved to set out
criteria for observer status in the Council.782 States created this document during the five Council
meetings held between 2011 and 2013.
The end result was an observer manual. It is not a complex or contentious document, reemphasizing the existing rules of procedure.783 Observers must re-assert their interest in being an
observer in the Council every four years by making a submission to the chair.784 Observers must
agree to recognize the “Arctic states’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the
Arctic.”785 They also must agree to respect “the values, interests, culture and traditions of Arctic
indigenous peoples and other Arctic inhabitants” and support their work.786 All of the Council
states showed unity and agreed on the role of the observers. Why, then, did states create the
manual and delay the decision to accredit China and the other non-European observers? China,
for example, had not indicated it would use the Council to challenge the role of the permanent
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participants or the sovereignty of states. Nonetheless, the document allowed time for states to
assess the impact of these new observers. It allowed time see if their participation would hurt the
participation of indigenous peoples, challenge the Council states or make the Council too
unwieldy. State policy-makers wanted China to be a part of the Council. Yet, there was a level
of mistrust toward China that led state policy-makers to proceed with caution.
Why were state policy-makers interested in granting China and the other non-European
states observer status? Policy-makers reported the allure of potential investment was too great for
all Arctic states.787 Russian policy-makers decided it was in their country’s interest to co-operate
with China as its companies have undertaken numerous projects in Russia’s Arctic.788 China is
the second-largest trading partner for both Canada and the United States. It is the biggest Asian
trading partner for both Sweden and Finland. Policy-makers in Denmark have long held hopes
that Chinese investment in Greenland’s offshore oil would lead to that country’s independence
and end the annual $586-million payment from the mainland.789 The governments of Iceland,790
Norway791 and Russia792 have each deliberately stated they hope to expand China’s already hefty
investments in their various resource industries. Including China as part of the Council helps
foster international relationships and potentially expands economic activities.
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Has the increased number and greater diversity of observers had an impact on the
Council? The observers continue to make fewer comments than permanent participants and
states. This pattern applies to both state and non-state observers. They sponsor relatively few
projects, and participate in meetings respectfully. Increasingly, there are special meetings with
observers (as sideline events) at Council meetings, which have not had an appreciable impact on
the institution. The arguments against their inclusion all ultimately seem ill founded. The
observers participate more in the Council than they did prior to 2005, but it is difficult to point to
a case in which observer had a great impact on a Council decision or action.
The United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the World Wildlife Fund continue to be the
most frequent commenters at Council meetings. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands are
both countries with strong histories of Arctic exploration. Its policy-makers believe that these
countries can make strong contributions to Arctic science, climate change and the governance of
the Arctic region. The World Wildlife Fund is an activist organization with members that expect
a certain level of action. Its comments are respectful, mainly consisting of technical suggestions
and a general urging of stronger action. It has sponsored some events around Council meetings,
intended to raise awareness on issues. For example, during the Whitehorse Council meeting in
October 2013, the World Wildlife Fund co-sponsored a daylong conference on corporate social
responsibility in the Arctic. The first day of Council meetings are closed-door with top
delegation officials. The Council holds Sustainable Development Working Group meetings
before Senior Arctic Officials meetings, and so there are a reasonable number of policy-makers
with a day off between meetings. Events such as the one in Whitehorse provide an activity for
these policy-makers and give the World Wildlife Fund an important venue to showcase its ideas
and research.
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In sum, the power of observers in the Arctic Council has evolved over time. From 1991
to 1996, Arctic governments sought to improve Arctic governance and non-Arctic states sought
to contribute. From 1996 until 2004, observers exerted little influence. After the release of the
2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Council observers became more assertive. Seven nonArctic actors sought observer status, creating controversy. These actors sought to participate in
the Council to help protect the environment and make economic gains. Six new observer states
joined the Council in 2013, accepted due to potential new Arctic investment. Table 5.1
summarizes the current Council observers
Table 5.1: Council Observers as of 2015

States

China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland,
Singapore, South Korean, Spain, United Kingdom

International
Organizations

Nordic Council of Ministers, Nordic Environmental Finance Corporation,
North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, Standing Committee of the
Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe, United Nations Develop Programme, United
Nations Environment Programme

NonGovernmental
Organizations

Advisory Committee on the Protection of the Seas, Arctic Cultural
Gateway, Association of World Reindeer Herders, Circumpolar
Conservation Union, International Arctic Science Committee, International
Arctic Social Sciences Association, International Union for Circumpolar
Health, International Union for the Conservation of Nature, International
Work Group for Indigenous affairs, Northern Forum, University of the
Arctic, Red Cross, World Wildlife Fund
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This work contributes to literature because it confirms that Council observers are weak
actors, a contested assessment in Council literature. Observers seek influence by making
comments and contributing to Council projects. Observer weakness does not indicate they are
irrelevant. For example, as demonstrated, officials from the Netherlands have used the Council
as a venue to advocate for action on issues it considers important, which impacts Council
discourse. This work contributes because it shows that Council actors are interested in Council
participation to address environmental issues and make economic gains, in contrast to arguments
by authors such as Whitney Lackenbauer and James Manicom that emphasize non-economic
motivations. Media reports and academic literature need not be so alarmist about the prospect of
non-Arctic states joining the Council. In some ways, Council observer states show greater
concern for the Arctic environment than member states. The states that have sought to become
Council observers thus far have a significant interest in protecting the Arctic environment.
5.3 – Analysis Using International Relations Theory
Functionalism does not provide a useful account of Council observers.
H1: Observers want to contribute to the Council to help solve important problems; other states
will not hesitate to allow contributions if observers can help solve the problem.
This hypothesis does not have support because the addition of new observers has not been
automatic. States such as Britain sought to become Council observers to contribute to Arctic
science and to benefit by helping to solve problems. However, other states did not automatically
allow contributions. In 2008, Council member states resisted adding countries, such as China, on
the grounds that they would complicate the execution of the agreed-upon agenda. The amount of
time required to admit observers increased by five years due to uncertainties over the emergence
of potential rivals and mistrust.
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H2: Observers can be influential, based on their ability to provide quality information and
contributions.
This hypothesis does not have explanatory power because the influence of observers is very
limited. It is difficult to point to any strong outcomes observers have achieved, aside from the
sponsorship of a few projects. Various observers have sponsored Council projects and have
sought to express positions, but this action has not resulted in strong outcomes.
Neoliberal institutionalism gives a somewhat useful explanation for Council observers.
H1: Observers want to contribute to the Council to make an absolute gain; other states will not
hesitate to allow contributions if they perceive a gain.
This hypothesis has support because states add observers to the Council to make an absolute
gain. States accept observers when it is clear that these actors can contribute to the Council. In
China’s case, it became an observer because it had promised to invest in the Arctic region. The
main reason that China sought to become an observer is to make economic gains and improve
the Arctic environment in the preeminent Arctic forum. There are other possible motivations, but
these two are foremost. Organizations that oppose whaling have been blocked from Council
membership by Denmark, Iceland and Norway, as they will criticize these countries.
H2: Observers can be influential, based on their ability to use agency.
This hypothesis has limited validity because agency does not seem to help observers achieve
outcomes in the Council. The influence of observers in the Council has been small. Council rules
allow observer influence, as they can participate in most of the institution’s work. Actors have
tried to use agency by providing information and contributing to Council projects. Agency has
not helped observers influence the Council. It is possible that observers have not utilized agency
to its full potential. It is likely the influence of new observers will be similar to observers in
previous eras as their legal rights and responsibilities have not changed.
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Neorealism provides a somewhat useful explanation of Council observers.
H1: States want to become part of the Council to enhance its position; current states accept
other states to enhance its position, as well.
This hypothesis does not have strong explanatory power because positional concerns are not
overly important. Russia demonstrated concern about adding China to the Council as an
observer, which does indicate some concern for balance in the region. The prospect of absolute
gains proved more important as Russia eventually decided to accept China as an observer.
H2: Observers will be less influential than great powers or full Council members.
This hypothesis has support because it explains the limited power of observers. Member states
have structured the Council so that observers have far fewer formal rights and privileges than
they do and they have ignored the observers’ requests for action. They have been apprehensive
about adding new members, seeking to protect their own autonomy and interests and only
admitting new observers once the gains of so doing are clear.

Functionalism
One

Table 5.2: Results
Observers want to contribute to the Council to help
solve important problems; other states will not
hesitate to allow contributions if observers can help
solve the problem.

Not supported – addition of
new observers is not
automatic

Functionalism
Two

Observers can be influential, based on their ability to
provide quality information and contributions.

Not supported – observers
have little influence

Neoliberal
Institutionalism
One

Observers want to contribute to the Council to make
an absolute gain; other states will not hesitate to
allow contributions if they perceive a gain.

Supported – states add
observers to make an
economic gain

Neoliberal
Institutionalism
Two
Neorealism One

Observers can be influential, based on their ability to
use agency.

Not supported – observers
have little influence

States want to become part of the Council to enhance
its position; current states accept other states to
enhance its position, as well.

Neorealism Two

Observers will be less influential than great powers
or full Council members.

Not supported – states add
observers to make an
economic gain at the
expense of balance
Supported – observers have
little influence
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Conclusion
This chapter discussed the evolution of observers in the Arctic Council. It argued that
observers are weak Council actors that seek influence to help solve Arctic environmental issues
and make economic gains. Member states see the acceptance of observers as being conducive to
furthering the formers’ economic gains. Neorealism provides the best explanation for observer
influence in the Council, while neoliberal institutionalism explains the interest of states in
Council participation. Neorealists are wrong to emphasize the importance of relative gains for
motivating state behaviour as absolute gains prove to be the more potent motivator in this case.
In a way, non-Arctic states are more interested in protecting the environment than Arctic states in
this case. New observers want to help address climate change in the Arctic. Member states are
more interested in their own economic interests than in helping these new observers to fight
global warming.
What are the major implications of this research? The Arctic Council is changing from
being a strictly regional organization to being a body with a more global outlook as the relevance
of the region becomes more widely recognized. More states seek to participate in Arctic
governance, reconstituting its invisible boundaries. Commentaries that emphasize the economic
interests of non-Arctic actors in the Arctic are overly alarmist. The presence of non-Arctic states
in Arctic Council will not necessarily further shift the Council from an environmental body to an
economic body. If anything, non-Arctic observers, that have demonstrated an interest in the
Arctic environment and climate change, will slow the evolution of the Council from an
environmental body to a body with strong economic interests.
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CHAPTER 6: THE EVOLUTION OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL PERMANENT
PARTICIPANT’S STATUS, RIGHTS AND INFLUENCE
When states created the Council, there was debate about whether indigenous peoples’
organizations should be equal in status and rights to states.793 The Arctic Council that emerged is
the only international institution that grants indigenous peoples’ organizations a second-tier role
that is comparable to states. Indigenous peoples’ organizations, termed permanent participants in
the Council, have quite similar rights to states, but importantly cannot vote on Council decisions.
The institution is important to these groups because it is charged with promoting co-operation on
environmental and sustainable development issues that are vital to indigenous peoples.
Indigenous peoples’ organizations are important to the Council because they provide a conduit
between Arctic communities, the Council and governments. Arctic governments serve a wider
constituency than Arctic residents. As noted in Chapter 1, there are six indigenous peoples’
organizations in the Arctic Council: the Aleut International Association (AIA), the Arctic
Athabaskan Council (AAC), Gwich’in Council International (GCI), the Inuit Circumpolar
Council (ICC), the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) and the
Saami Council. All together, these groups represent approximately 659,000 indigenous peoples
from every Arctic country, 794 with the exception of Iceland.795
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What is the role and influence of the permanent participants in the Council? How has
their role and influence evolved over time? When are the permanent participants successful (or
unsuccessful) in exerting influence on the Council? The major goal of this chapter is to answer
these questions. Influence refers to the ability to sway or direct outcomes. The first section
discusses expectations of functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism about the
influence of non-state actors. We can consider the permanent participants non-state actors. The
second section of this chapter traces the role, influence and evolution of the permanent
participants and shows that these groups have had influence in many cases. The third section
concludes that neoliberal institutionalism, with its tempered expectations of non-state actors in
international institutions, provides the best explanation for the influence of the permanent
participants. Permanent participants have less role and influence than states in the Council, but
nonetheless have significant influence based on their evolving agency.
This chapter contributes to academic literature because it examines which of three
perspectives on permanent participant influence best explains the current situation in the
Council. Several news articles from the founding of the Arctic Council in 1996 anticipated that
permanent participants would be roughly equal in influence to states.796 In 2010, political
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scientist Timo Koivurova rated their influence very highly, writing, “The fact that the Council
has accorded a unique role for the region’s original occupants has certainly served its legitimacy
and also contributed to a new way of perceiving how indigenous peoples should be involved in
international policy making.”797 In contrast, in 1997, lawyer Jennifer McIver disagreed with the
view that permanent participants could be influential actors and argued that the rights and status
that states invested with these groups do not enable them to be influential in the Council.798 She
argues, “Excluding indigenous peoples from holding equal status in the Arctic Council is a shortsighted approach to environmental management of the Northern region, rendering the structure
of the Council obsolete before it even begins.”799 Beyond these perspectives, most authors,
including political scientists Terry Fenge,800 Olav Schram Stokke801 and Oran Young,802 argue
that the Council is a state-centric institution that provides an important role for permanent
participants in dialogue. In 1999, United States State Department policy-maker Evan Bloom
agreed and wrote that indigenous groups “participate in all aspects of the Council's work.”803
Historian John English argues the institution is state-centric, though he says the “lobbying and
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pressure” of indigenous peoples’ organizations has “had an impact” on Arctic governance.804
None of the existing literature systematically explains the role and influence of the permanent
participants, or its implications for our understanding of non-state actors in international
relations, a task this chapter undertakes. It argues that none of the existing perspectives
adequately explains permanent participant influence, though the third, state-centric perspective
of Fenge and others comes closest. Beyond their legal rights and status, the permanent
participants have influence in the Council, though less influence than states. They demonstrate
most influence when they convince a state to veto an undesirable policy, or to reverse an earlier
veto, but demonstrate less influence when it is required to convince a number of states to
undertake a desired course of action.
This chapter contributes a case that assesses the reliability and validity of the predictions
that functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism make about the influence of nonstate actors. Functionalists would expect that non-state actors could influence international
institutions, while neorealists would argue it is not possible. Neoliberal institutionalists would
provide an explanation between the two theories, as they would argue that non-state actors could
have influence that stems from their agency. Agency refers to the ability to effectively research,
organize, communicate, lobby and ally with states. Major international relations theories do not
anticipate that non-state actors will be influential global actors. In the post-Soviet world, that
possibility seems greater than ever before. This chapter reinforces the predictive power of
neoliberal institutionalism due to its emphasis on the importance of agency.
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6.1 – Theoretical Predictions on the Influence of Non-State Actors
Functionalists hold that permanent participants can influence the Council by providing
information and perspectives states and the institution itself find compelling.
H1: The permanent participants can have influence in the Council because they provide useful
information that impacts state decision-making; their influence will evolve based on the quality
of the information they provide.
Functionalists argue that states automatically and rationally respond to issues, including external
international issues that demand co-operation where state interests intersect.805 Thus,
functionalists conclude that non-state actors become part of international institutions when they
provide information that makes states aware of issues, “interests, beliefs and expectations.”806
According to functionalists, “international institutions attain ever higher levels of policy-making
autonomy.”807 Functionalists stress “the role of interest groups (especially organized business
and trade unions) in this self-expansive integration process.”808 Non-state actors can form an
interest group that can pressure the Council to undertake certain action.809 Functionalists argue
that states create institutions independent of states to promote efficiency; these institutions can
then make decisions automatically, independent of the will of any particular state.810 Thus, for
these theorists, the demands of non-state actors, such as indigenous peoples’ organizations,
influence international institutions even when their arguments conflict with state interest.811
These groups contribute local knowledge to solve problems. According to functionalists, the
influence of non-state actors evolves when they provide new information to states.
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Neorealists argue that the influence of permanent participants will not evolve because
states will never grant them rights and status that will allow competition with states.
H1: The permanent participants will not be a strong actor in the Arctic Council and their
influence will not evolve.
Neorealists would argue that the permanent participants have not influenced states to do anything
they would not have otherwise done. This argument stems from the fact they assume that states
are the pre-eminent actor in the international system.812 In an anarchic world system, states are
the most important actor, following their rational material, positional self-interest.813 In this
system, no actor can force states to undertake action without the threat of force.814 Neorealists
contend that, “States are the only actors that really ‘count.’ ”815According to neorealists, nonstate actors do not have the means to impact how states operate. Neorealists argue that permanent
participants can give states credibility and information, but cannot impact states’ material selfinterest. They do not process territory or sovereignty so they cannot use force against a state. The
question is thus, why would states allow the permanent participants to be part of the Council in
the first place? Neorealists would expect that states did not see non-state actors as a challenge to
their interests, prosperity or security. Including permanent participants may have addressed
domestic political concerns that do not impact vital state interest.816 For small powers, permanent
participants help dilute the influence of great powers. States could use non-state actors to
promote their interest. Thus, it could appear that non-state actors are influential, though in fact
this would not be the case. Neorealists would not expect that permanent participants would be
able to influence states in the Arctic Council.
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Neoliberal institutionalists argue that the permanent participants can have some
influence, but their influence will never be equal to states.
H1: The permanent participants will be a secondary actor in the Arctic Council, occasionally
demonstrating influence based on their agency (that is, their research, organization,
communication, lobbying and coalition-building ability).
Neoliberal institutionalists would expect that non-state actors are more influential than
neorealists predict, but less influential than functionalists predict. For neoliberal institutionalists,
the modern world order includes “increasing linkages among states and non-state actors.817
Including permanent participants also ensures institutional legitimacy. Neoliberal
institutionalists, like neorealists and functionalists, believe states co-operate when it is in their
interest to do so.818 Unlike neorealists, they argue that norms819 and the form of negotiation820
impact state behaviour. Neoliberal institutionalists argue that non-state actors can convince states
that a given action is in their interest,821 if they can overcome any norms and path dependence
that inhibit their contributions.822 They can use agency to influence states, or a keen ability to
research, organize, communicate, lobby and build coalitions. Neoliberal institutionalists argue
that states will undertake action as long as they secure an absolute gain.823 This prediction stands
in contrast to functionalism, which argues that in independent institutions non-state actors can
rival states for influence. Neoliberal institutionalists argue the influence of permanent
participants can evolve as they gain new strategies to convince states a action is in their interest.
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Table 6.1 summarizes theory on non-state actors in international institutions.
Functionalists predict that the influence of non-state actors in international institutions will
evolve when they obtain new information that makes international institutions or states aware of
important issues. Neoliberal institutionalists predict that the influence of non-state actors in
international institutions will evolve when they use their agency to convince states of the utility
of a desired action. Neorealists do not believe the influence of non-state actors in international
institutions will evolve because states will not invest non-state actors with influence to challenge
states.

Theory

Table 6.1: The Importance of Non-State Actors in International Institutions
Can non-state actors
When will non-state
When will their
influence international actors influence
influence evolve?
institutions?
international
institutions?

Functionalism

Yes

When they provide
compelling
information about an
important issue to
states

When they obtain
compelling
information about an
important issue for
states

Yes

When they provide
compelling
information about an
important issue to
autonomous
international
institutions

When they obtain
compelling
information about an
important issue for
autonomous
international
institutions

Neorealism

No

They will not, as
states are the
important actors in the
international system

They will not, as
states will never give
them rights and status
that challenges the
power of states

Neoliberal
institutionalism

Somewhat

When they use their
agency to convince
states of the utility of
their position

When they develop
new or better agency
to lobby states
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6.2 – The Evolution of the Permanent Participants
There are four eras of permanent participant involvement in the Arctic Council. In the
first period, from 1991 to 1998, indigenous peoples’ organizations successfully lobbied
governments to be included in the Arctic Council. They accomplished this goal by winning the
support of countries because states did not perceive them a threat to state influence. In the second
period, from 1998 to 2004, permanent participants participated in the Council significantly less
than states and were able to initiate only limited Council projects. The third period comprises one
year, 2004, when the participants successfully allied with like-minded nations to force the
Council, and particularly the United States, to increase its action on climate change, which
created new promise that they might be influential Council actors. In the fourth period, from
2005 to 2013, the permanent participants were able to influence the Council significantly in two
cases. However, overall, states continued to limit the influence of permanent participants and
their ability to achieve desired outcomes appeared weaker than ever. Authors that argue that the
permanent participants are “full participants” in the Council overestimate their influence.
Likewise, authors who predict they will have little to no influence in the Council, such as
Jennifer McIver, underestimate their influence. The Council is a state-centric institution,
confirming the assessments of authors such as Oran Young. However, the permanent participants
are important actors in the Council, which contrasts some predictions made by state-centric
theories.
6.2.1 – 1991 to 1998
It is necessary to understand how states constructed the role, status and rights of the
permanent participants to understand how their role has evolved. Permanent participants had a
limited role and influence during the founding of the Arctic Council, from 1991 until 1998. Why
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did states allow indigenous peoples’ organizations to become permanent participants? States had
to consider two key questions. First, would indigenous peoples’ organizations be included in the
Arctic Council? Second, what would be their role in the Council, as well as their influence on
Council decision-making? In regards to the first question, there was no debate that indigenous
peoples’ organizations would at least be observers. The three existing indigenous peoples’
organizations, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) the Saami Council and the Russian
Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON), participated in the precursor
organization to the Arctic Council, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS),
although only as observers. This participation in the AEPS secured their role in the Arctic
Council.
As Chapter 5 demonstrates, the AEPS allowed observers and so indigenous peoples’
organizations found an avenue to participate in that status. The AEPS’s 1991 founding document
lists the ICC, USSR Association of Small Peoples of the North (later renamed RAIPON), and the
Nordic Saami Council (later renamed the Saami Council) as observers, along with Germany,
Poland, the United Kingdom, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the United
Nations Environmental Programme and the International Arctic Science Committee.824 The
document, in a clearly symbolic gesture, lists the indigenous peoples’ organizations before the
other observers. However, these groups could only comment on matters in the AEPS or
participate in meetings with the consent of states. The AEPS was a state-centric scientific
strategy and non-state actors, such as indigenous peoples’ organizations, had little input or role in
the process to create it.
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Indigenous peoples’ organizations increased their role in the AEPS by successfully
lobbying states. This lobbying created an expectation that indigenous peoples’ organizations
should have greater status and rights than other observers did when states opted to create the
Arctic Council. It was unacceptable to indigenous peoples that their organizations, which
represented Arctic residents, had the same status as non-Arctic countries in the AEPS. The
negotiation process occurred during the fall of 1993 when states held a meeting in Nuuk,
Greenland, to overview the activities of the AEPS. Indigenous peoples’ organizations could
attend the plenary meeting, but could not attend closed-door negotiations among the eight Arctic
countries. Leaders of the three indigenous peoples’ organizations demanded a side meeting,
conducted in private, with representatives of Arctic states. Indigenous peoples’ organizations
presented a united front and leveraged the fact that their groups together comprised significant
numbers of northern residents, particularly indigenous peoples. They jointly “characterized their
exclusion as unwarranted and contrary to the spirit of co-operation in the circumpolar world.”825
These arguments proved persuasive. The eight Arctic states agreed and “these organizations
were thereafter permitted to attend and intervene in all meetings of the AEPS,”826 although they
were still technically observers. In 1994, Denmark created the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat to
help all of the permanent participants participate in the AEPS, at a cost of more than $2.5 million
U.S. dollars per year.827 The Indigenous Peoples Secretariat was to “assist and provide secretariat
support functions to the permanent participants.”828 Its website says, “The role of the secretariat
has always been to facilitate contributions from the [permanent participants] to the co-operation
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of the eight Arctic states and to assist the [permanent participants] in performing
communicational tasks.”829 As shall be revealed, the permanent participants secured a role in the
Arctic Council based on their successful negotiation of a privileged role in the AEPS. The role of
indigenous peoples’ organizations proved to be the major difference between the Arctic Council
and its predecessor.
Indigenous peoples’ organizations did not enjoy greater status in the AEPS because states
created it to increase engagement with Russia, rather than as a forum to address issues important
to Arctic residents. There are numerous social issues in indigenous communities stemming from
unprecedented cultural change since first contact with Europeans during the 16th century.830 In
the 20th century, this cultural change continued as the rate of urbanization of indigenous peoples
increased. Meanwhile, traditional lifestyles and languages declined across the circumpolar
world.831 These changes have led to increasing activism among indigenous peoples in the latter
half of the 20th century as they sought the right to self-determination.832 Examples include the
rise of indigenous advocacy organizations, such as Canada’s Assembly of First Nations, the
United States’ Association on American Indian Affairs or the aforementioned Nordic Saami
Council. Further, there were significant human security issues in the Arctic in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. As noted elsewhere in this thesis, Russia saw a decline in life expectancy of
indigenous peoples in its North.833 Rates of suicide are higher than the national average in every
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part of the circumpolar north.834 Despite these issues, as other chapters make clear, the AEPS
emerged because of a growing willingness by the Arctic states to engage with Russia, rather than
indigenous peoples’ issues or activism.835 All of the Arctic states had an interest in scientific cooperation to deal with under-researched, yet very pressing Russian Arctic environmental
issues.836 Although there is a human element to these problems, the AEPS did not emerge due to
indigenous activism.
Regarding the second question, the role and influence of indigenous peoples’
organizations was a key point of debate and disagreement in the negotiations to establish the
Arctic Council. During informal 1995 negotiations, two major alignments emerged.837 The first
alignment supported making indigenous peoples’ organizations full Council members.838 Canada
led this alignment of indigenous allies, which also included Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway
and Sweden.839 Indigenous peoples’ organizations should have the same status, rights and
influence as states. The second alignment, led by the United States and including Russia,840
favoured a second-tier status for indigenous peoples’ organizations similar in status and rights to
observers.841 States sought to complete their negotiations on the creation of the Arctic Council by
the end of 1995.842 The status and rights of indigenous groups was the major obstacle that
delayed the creation of the Council until a founding meeting in Ottawa in September 1996.843
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The negotiating process on the rights and status of the permanent participants unfolded
during 1996 and 1997. During the June 1996 negotiations to create the Arctic Council, the
United States offered a compromise: it would support either adding security to the Arctic
Council’s mandate or making the aboriginal groups second-tier members.844 Lloyd Axworthy,
then Canada’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, later said that Canada chose to include the permanent
participants in the Council. Russia and the Nordic countries accepted this compromise.
Traditional military security was not a central concern in the negotiations that led to the
Council,845 so it seems like a plausible compromise. Thus indigenous peoples’ organizations
received a second-tier status as permanent participants, lacking a vote on Council matters
Ultimately, the role and status of the permanent participants would be similar to states,
certainly with fewer legal rights but able to have an impact on Council outcomes. The permanent
participants argued that they should be full members of the Council. The ICC and its president
Mary Simon, in particular, pressured Canada to support their full participation in the Council. At
the June 1996 negotiations, after finding out about Canada’s compromise, some indigenous
group representatives present were not happy the groups were not to be full members of the
Council. Simon, the leader of Canada’s delegation, told the indigenous peoples’ representatives
that if the groups could not accept permanent participant status, Canada would walk away from
the talks.846 Ultimately, the groups decided that the Council could accomplish good work with
indigenous peoples’ organizations groups as second-tier members and decided to accept
permanent participant status.847
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States had not yet defined the precise rights of permanent participants.848 The permanent
participant issue dominated December 1995 and April 1996 negotiations, which left two
meetings in June and August to negotiate the declaration creating the Council. At the first Arctic
Council meeting, in September 1996 in Ottawa, states set three goals for the next two years: 1) to
develop rules of procedure; 2) to develop terms of reference for the Sustainable Development
Working Group (SDWG), and; 3) to transition the work of the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy (AEPS) to the Arctic Council.849 The third task was straightforward; the first and second
tasks were more contentious.
On the first matter, the permanent participants sought to establish the strongest legal
rights possible for themselves in the rules or procedure. The 1995 and 1996 negotiations
established that permanent participants would not be able to vote on Council matters. States
negotiated the rules of procedure at five meetings, mostly held in Canada, throughout 1997 and
1998.850 Articles 4 and 5 of the Council rules or procedure state that permanent participants may
participate “in all meetings and activities of the Arctic Council.”851 It also says, “The category of
permanent participants is created to provide for active participation and full consultation with the
Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council.”852 The permanent participants can
help set the Council agenda,853 vote on delegation sizes854 and propose Council projects.855 The
rules of procedure protect some rights for permanent participants.
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Still, the rules privilege the rights of states in other ways. The Arctic states have the
prerogative to meet in private without the permanent participants.856 Only Arctic states can set
working group meeting agendas.857 Article 7 says, “All decisions of the Arctic Council and its
subsidiary bodies . . . shall be by a consensus of the eight Arctic states.”858 In the words of Terry
Fenge, “They are not listed as founding members of the Council, do not have a vote, did not sign
the declaration and are not considered ‘peoples.’ ”859 Most importantly, the Ottawa Declaration
caps the number of permanent participants at seven.860 The Arctic states can veto permanent
participant projects, as all must receive approval by Arctic Council ministers.861 In essence,
every Council state has a veto over any Council action because the forum operates by consensus.
The permanent participants had fewer rights in the Council than they would have preferred.
On the second matter, creating terms of reference for the SDWG, the permanent
participants sought the right to help set the agenda. The permanent participants sought a SDWG
in which indigenous peoples’ organizations would identify “shared priorities.” In general, the
other Arctic states supported this proposal. The United States, weary of an overly broad Council
agenda, opposed this approach, favouring an ad-hoc mandate that would see the working group
adopt specific projects as states saw fit. Ultimately, the Council that emerged from this process
was a Council that placed a greater influence on science and the environment than on human
security. Government and academic scientists dominated the Council during the period from
1998 until 2004, creating the majority of the Council’s projects.862
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What were the positions of the alignments in negotiations? Canada led the first alignment
and made five key arguments to demand full membership for indigenous peoples’ organizations.
First, some policy-makers referred to a norm to include Aboriginals as full members. In the
words of one government official, “You can’t speak of the North without involving Aboriginal
folk.”863 Second, there was some sense that it was logical to give indigenous peoples’
organizations, which represented northern residents, a special status above that of observers,
such as the Red Cross.864 Third, indigenous peoples’ organizations successfully lobbied for their
own inclusion.865 These groups wanted to be members of the Arctic Council. They each
increasingly viewed international co-operation and interaction as necessary to accomplish their
goals.866 The ICC, RAIPON and Saami Council each had representatives impress the importance
of indigenous representation as they participated in the informal negotiations throughout 1995.867
Fourth, and most importantly, there was a strategic advantage for the small powers to include
indigenous peoples’ organizations apart from states in the Council. If indigenous peoples were
mere observers in the Council, states would be responsible for including their views in their
international positions at the Arctic Council, because indigenous peoples’ organizations are
significant domestic actors. Giving these groups membership in the Council allows them to
express their views, themselves. It means that states do not need to do so in official positions.
Fifth, applying only to Canada, some Canadian decision-makers believed that Canada’s
constitution created an obligation to include the indigenous groups in the Council. Section 35 of
the Canadian constitution protects the responsibility to consult with Aboriginal peoples about
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issues vital to their interest.868 In the words of one Canadian policy-maker, Canada is “conscious
of involving our Aboriginal people” because there is an expectation to do so in the
Constitution.869 To quote a permanent participant representative, Canada had a “pious hope that
indigenous peoples had the same status as states.”870
In these informal negotiations, the second alignment (the United States and Russia) made
four arguments opposing full membership for indigenous peoples’ organizations. First, United
States policy-makers worried about the legal ramifications of their inclusion. The United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was under negotiation at the time of Council
negotiations.871 The United States argued that “granting Aboriginals full voting rights” in the
Council could create a legal precedent for “their right to have their own country.”872 The United
States sought to draft “neutral language” in all Council documents and avoid references to
“aboriginal peoples.”873 Part of the negotiation process in the United Nation was a question
whether to grant the right of self-determination to indigenous “peoples” and so the United States
sought to avoid this wording in all contexts, as well as any action that could support the
indigenous right to self-determination. The eventual Article 3 of the resulting declaration grants
this right of self-determination.874 One representative of an indigenous peoples’ organization
recounted that in 1996 Council negotiations, United States negotiators argued that recognizing
indigenous peoples would encourage the rise of “liberation fronts” and embolden aboriginal
leaders with radical politics.875 Russian policy-makers shared this concern as indigenous peoples
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in Russia mobilized interest groups to confront the government about worsening living
conditions in the Russian Arctic; this activism was new in the recently post-Soviet Russia.876 For
example, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North came into existence in
1990. United States and Russian policy-makers feared legal issues if permanent participants had
too many rights.
The secondary reason that the United States and Russia were reluctant to add indigenous
peoples’ organizations to the Arctic Council was a concern that they would have too much
influence. United States officials believed that indigenous peoples’ organizations would use their
domestic influence to impact their home country’s vote and then cast a vote themselves, which
would in essence give them two votes.877 Russia shared the United States’ concern. For example,
the Saami Council, based in Norway, could influence Norway to support its view on Council
matters. If the Saami Council also could vote, United States and Russian officials believed it
would have two votes. In this scenario, the United States or Russia could be out-voted. These
countries operated under the assumption that Arctic Council states likely would support the
views of their domestic aboriginal groups. This assumption is paradoxical, in light of the efforts
by the first coalition to have indigenous groups speak for themselves, expressly so they would
not have to do so. The permanent participants in general relied on states in the first alignment to
represent their interests against the second alignment and so communication was not always
face-to-face. More importantly, United States policy-makers believed it was inappropriate to
grant indigenous peoples the same influence as states.878
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Third, applying only to the United States, policy-makers feared that if permanent
participants received a vote in the Council, Alaska would demand a vote.879 The United States
policy-makers supported a role for indigenous peoples in the Council because the “input of the
community’s needs” was important in the Council.880 One former United States delegation
member summarized, "It may have looked like it was the United States against the indigenous
communities, but we were working for a Council that met our objectives, including our legal
requirements," such as avoiding strong language about indigenous rights to avoid previously
mentioned issues in the United Nations.881 The United States took the lead in opposing full
membership for the permanent participants; hence Russia did not need to make its opinions
clear.882 Russia supported the United States’ view, opposing indigenous group membership.
Fourth, applying only to the United States, policy-makers feared that indigenous peoples’
organizations would voice opinions contrary to United States interests. John English, in his book
Ice and Water, writes that the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) had been critical of the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act, which transferred various land rights to indigenous peoples. In a
1985 report, the ICC said the act sought to assimilate Alaskan natives into Western culture.883
Several Alaskan politicians mistrusted the ICC and its support for an Arctic council.884 In 1995,
the ICC published a report called Collapse of the Seal Skin Market, critical of the United States’
1972 Marine Mammals Protection Act and its ban on the import of seal products into the United
States.885 These criticisms raised suspicion of the ICC among United States policy-makers.
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It also is worth nothing that the lead negotiator for Canada during the creation of the
Arctic Council was Mary Simon, an Inuit leader. She was president of the ICC from 1980 until
1994 and had worked to negotiate the creation of the territory of Nunavut. In 1994, she became
Canada’s first (and so far only) circumpolar ambassador. The government of Canada appointed
her due to her northern experience, credibility and diplomatic experience. Her appointment to
lead negotiations no doubt annoyed many Alaskan politicians suspicious of the ICC.
In the ultimate outcome of the negotiations, the United States and Russia emerged as the
winners because they sought a lesser role for indigenous peoples’ organizations. They wanted
representation from indigenous peoples, but could not support the notion that indigenous groups
would have the same legal rights as states.886 Policy-makers in these countries believed that it
would be “inappropriate” to grant aboriginal groups equal legal rights.887 Canada and the Nordic
states lost in the negotiations because indigenous peoples’ organizations did not receive full
membership. The United States and Russia did not seriously consider the option of granting full
membership to indigenous peoples’ organizations.888 A United States government official
present in the negotiations said, “I don’t remember that there ever was a trade-off between
permanent participants and security.”889 This indicates that Canada did not present the permanent
participant position as vigorously as sometimes indicated. The indigenous peoples’ organizations
were somewhat successful in negotiations. The ICC, RAIPON and the Saami Council worked
together and presented a united front in negotiations. These groups have different domestic
situations and interests, but all shared the goal to gain influence in the Council. They have fewer
rights than states in the institution and are not “full members,” but they have a privileged status.
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In summary, from 1991 until 1998, indigenous peoples’ organizations secured a place in
the Arctic Council. Why did states allow indigenous peoples’ organizations to become
permanent participants? Would indigenous peoples’ organizations be included in the Arctic
Council at all? States allowed the inclusion of indigenous peoples’ organizations as permanent
participants because they had an elevated role in the AEPS. Indigenous peoples’ organizations
were mere observers at the onset of that largely environmental organization, but successfully
lobbied states to increase their role in 1993. What would be their role in the Council, as well as
their influence on Council decision-making? During negotiations to create the Arctic Council,
Canada and the Nordic states pushed to include indigenous peoples’ organizations as full
members due to perceived norms, recognitions and lobbying efforts, as well as for strategic
bargaining reasons. The United States and Russia opposed full membership for indigenous
peoples’ organizations for fear of the legal implications of their inclusion and concerns over
potential challenges to state power. A compromise emerged in which the status of the permanent
participants is similar to states, but without a vote on Council matters. They are members of the
Council, although they are second-tier members, below states. They can attend all Council
meetings, contribute comments, help set the Council’s agenda, vote on small matters and sponsor
Council projects. States have the ability to meet without the permanent participants and any
permanent participant comment, idea or project is subject to a state veto. This veto is the only
major right that states possess which permanent participants do not.
To return to the literature, overall, the influence of the permanent participants
disappointed some commentators, such as Jennifer McIver, leery that the Council was a statecentric institution. Others believed that the compromise meant they would be full members.
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6.2.2 – 1998 to 2004
To assess the growth of permanent participant influence on the Council, it is necessary to
establish a baseline by describing their level of influence at the beginning of the institution’s
operations. From 1998 until 2004, the permanent participants exerted influence on the Arctic
Council,890 though less than did states. This section provides less of a historical trace and more of
an overall assessment of influence. Actors can influence the Council in several ways. Council
members can initiate projects, such as a treaty, environmental assessment or technical project.
They also can provide comments to shape project content. States have a clear advantage in this
regard, because they can veto any Council project they do not support. Permanent participants
sought to actualize their influence outlined in the Arctic Council rules of procedure. Toward this
end, they sought: 1) to attend all Council meetings and participate in those meetings; 2) to add
new permanent participants to the Council through the creation of new indigenous peoples’
organizations, 3) to sponsor projects in the Council, and; 4) to provide significant contentshaping comments on projects. This section describes the ability of the permanent participants to
fulfill these goals and explains the reason for their success, or lack thereof.
In terms of the first goal, the permanent participants were successful attending and
participating in Council meetings, although they participated less than did states.891 As indicated
in earlier chapters, the Council holds between two and four meetings annually in which states
approve projects commissioned in previous meetings. Government bureaucrats and permanent
participant employees complete those projects between meetings. From 1998 until 2004, the
890
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Arctic Council held 18 meetings, hosted by four different countries, depending on which was its
chair. Five of the six permanent participant groups sent representatives to all 18 meetings.892 The
exception was the Aleut International Association (AIA), which missed two meetings in 2001,
but overall attended 16 of 18 Council meetings.893 A measure of participation is the number of
comments made by delegations at Council meetings. States decide on initiatives at Council
meetings. To participate fully, delegations must be able and willing to comment at Council
meetings. As a whole, the permanent participants provided comments an average of 11.72 times
per meeting, making their voices heard. Individually, on average, they provided fewer comments
than did states. United States delegates, for example, made remarks an average of 11.4 times per
meeting from 1998 until 2004. Counted individually, the most any one permanent participant
group spoke at a meeting was seven times.894 The more established groups, namely the ICC and
the RAIPON, make more comments than other permanent participants. At eight different
Council meetings, a permanent participant group did not make any comment, according to
meeting minutes. For example, at the November 1999 Council meeting, representatives from
neither the AIA nor the Saami Council made any comments, while the other permanent
participant groups provided several comments. On 18 occasions at these eight meetings, a
permanent participant group did not provide any comments.895
Another measure of participation to consider is the size of permanent participant
delegations, an important factor in a group’s ability to achieve outcomes. Permanent participant
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delegations at these meetings were smaller than those of states. For example, states sent an
average of 7.1 representatives to the June 2001 Arctic Council meeting in Rovaniemi, Finland,
whereas permanent participants sent an average of 3.8 representatives. Each group sent around
the same number of representatives. We can conclude that the permanent participants attended
and participated in Council meetings, though individually they commented half as much as did
states.
In terms of the second goal, permanent participants were successful adding new
indigenous peoples’ organizations to the Council. In 1996, at the first Council meeting in
Ottawa, the Council included three permanent participants: the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC),
Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) and the Saami Council.
These three groups helped form three new indigenous peoples’ organizations, which emerged
specifically to participate in the Council. Permanent participants sought to introduce groups to
represent the three major indigenous groups that did not have representation in the Council. All
of the Council states were receptive to including additional permanent participants in the Council
because the current groups did not represent every indigenous group. Existing permanent
participants contacted the major tribal councils that did not have representation to ask them to
form groups for the Arctic Council throughout 1996 until 1998. They shared information about
the Council and its objectives, arguments why a presence in the Council would be in an
indigenous person’s interest and expertise about how to organize appropriate groups. The Arctic
Athabaskan Council (AAC) formed from the 18 Athabaskan tribal councils in Canada and
Alaska.896 The Aleutian/Pribilof Islands Association, an Alaska native land claim corporation,
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formed the Aleut International Association (AIA).897 The Gwich’in Council International (GCI)
formed out of a union between six Gwich’in communities in Alaska and the two major Gwich’in
tribal councils in Canada.898 The AIA first participated in the Council in 1998, whereas the AAC
and the GCI began attending in 2000. There are now permanent participants representing most
major Arctic indigenous groups. The rules of procedure allow up to seven permanent
participants, as noted earlier. Indigenous groups successfully doubled their membership in the
Council between 1996 and 2000, content with six permanent participants.
Apropos the third goal, the permanent participants were somewhat successful sponsoring
Council projects. As noted, sponsoring a project entails conceiving of an initiative, designing the
specifics, funding all of the necessary costs and executing the agenda. Sponsoring a project
allows an actor to lead a Council initiative and direct outcomes. The Council initiated 57
significant projects from 1998 until 2004. Permanent participants initiated only five of these
projects, summarized in the next paragraph.899 The permanent participants were successful
executing all of the projects they sought to bring the Council as they pursued small-scale projects
states had no reason to veto.900 The three largest Council projects stemmed from the interest of
the Arctic states in understanding Arctic pollution. These were the Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment, a major climate change assessment, the Arctic Contaminants Action Program, which
sought to the address the aftermath of 180,000 tonnes of PCBs produced in the Russian Arctic
during the Cold War, and the Arctic Human Development Report, which collected statistics and
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information about human security in the Arctic region. The permanent participants did not
sponsor any of these large, ambitious projects.
The permanent participants were able to sponsor five projects that were small in scale.
First, in 2000, the ICC, the RAIPON and Russia sponsored a project to “assess pollution impacts
on the health of indigenous people of Arctic Russia, and to ascertain the level of ‘country’ food
contamination as a result of pollution from global and local sources.”901 The project was
completed in 2004 and created an assessment under the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Programme working group entitled Toxic Substances, Food Security and Indigenous Peoples of
the Russian North.902 The RAIPON and the ICC updated the Council about its progress at the
Council’s meetings between 2000 and 2004. The process to execute this project was
straightforward. States limited their comments to small technical suggestions and notes of
support. Second, in 2000, the RAIPON and Denmark sponsored a project in the Conservation of
Arctic Flora and Fauna working group entitled Biological Significance of Sacred Sites of
Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic: A Study in Northern Russia, which sought to identify
biologically and culturally important sites in Russia for possible protection by collecting
traditional knowledge in communities.903 Again, the RAIPON briefed the Council about its
progress at the Council meetings between 2000 and 2004. States allowed the RAIPON to carry
out the project without interference. This project was completed in 2004 and led to follow-up
projects in subsequent years.904 The Saami Council initiated the third and fourth projects. One
compared coastal fishery management systems in Norway, Greenland and Canada.905 The other
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was a “networking programme” that compiled a “compendium of best practices for teaching and
learning about sustainable development in the Arctic.”906 Both projects were completed in
2002.907 However, both projects largely occurred outside of the Arctic Council, without major
status updates or discussion at Council meetings. It is possible that if the Council did not exist,
the group would have been able to complete these projects in other forums. A fifth project was
initiated in 2000 by Denmark (with the Saami Council, the ICC, and the RAIPON), and resulted
in the Survey of Living Conditions in the Arctic.908 This project consisted of “comparative
investigations of the living conditions of the Inuit and Saami populations in the Arctic and the
indigenous people of Chukotka and the Kola Peninsula” in Russia.909 Permanent participants
briefed states about their progress between 2000 and 2004 and the report proceeded without
disruptive comments or vetoes. The scope of the survey expanded in subsequent years. These
five projects are small in scale compared to a project such as the Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment, involving hundreds of scientists and a secretariat.
Overall, the permanent participants sponsored less than 10 per cent of the Council’s
projects between 1998 and 2004. Of the five projects they initiated, three had states as cosponsors and providers of the major funding. Permanent participants were successful sponsoring
projects when they secured funds from a like-minded, supportive state co-sponsor. It is likely
that permanent participants would have sponsored more projects if they secured greater funding
from states for staff and logistics. Additional funds for these projects came from the Global
Environmental Facility, a World Bank funding agency affiliated with the United Nations, as was
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the case of the ICC/RAIPON toxic substances project.910 These projects focused on specific
areas of human development in the Arctic and were limited in ambition, as well as scope.
The permanent participants were somewhat successful in achieving their fourth goal to
provide comments on Council projects. The permanent participants provided comments on
projects at Council meetings, as seen in the number of agenda items on which they spoke. As a
point of comparison, the United States spoke an average of 11.4 times per meeting on an average
of 7.2 agenda items, or roughly half of the Council’s agenda.911 The permanent participants
spoke on seven or more agenda items only one time.912 The permanent participants made
significant contributions to two of the three major Council projects from 1998 until 2004:
namely, the Arctic Human Development Report and Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. The
former received state approval at the five Council meetings from April 2003 until November
2004. The permanent participants served on the project steering committee and contributed
community perspectives as well as traditional knowledge to the project.913 The next section
discusses the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment.
The permanent participants attempted on two occasions to change the course of action
decided upon by a state, on a project they had not sponsored. In one case, this intervention was
successful. The Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) was successful intervening in a project
introduced at the May 1999 Council meeting in Anchorage, Alaska. State delegations discussed a
project led by the United States National Science Foundation entitled the Inventory of Arctic
Research, which was a synthesis of the state of Arctic science. The project won quick support
from all states as delegations stated they would provide information to support the project. The
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ICC “intervened to stress the necessity of including local observations and traditional knowledge
in research and inventories.”914 The goal of the United States was to create a useful tool for
scientists. There was no reason to exclude the information requested by the ICC. The United
States delegation then stated that it agreed with the ICC’s request and pledged to involve
permanent participants in the collection of information to include in the inventory.915 This
intervention was successful because the leading state did not veto the change, because the
suggested alternation was relatively small and did not alter the purpose of the project.
At the next Arctic Council meeting, in November 1999, the ICC was unsuccessful in its
attempt to convince a state to reverse a course of action. In the plenary meeting, states heard an
overview of efforts in the Arctic Contaminants Action Program to understand the extent of the
unsafe storage of PCBs in the Russian Arctic. Norway and the Nordic countries, armed with
scientific information confirming the danger to human health from PCBs, proposed that the
Council create a formal policy to address Arctic contaminants.916 The United States’ response
was somewhat ambiguous. Canada vetoed a formal policy on contaminants, before Russia
indicated whether it supported the action and Norway detailed what sort of policy it
envisioned.917 The Canadian delegation was leery of the obligations that a formal policy would
create. It believed that it could achieve desirable outcomes without a policy.918 The ICC wanted
firm commitments from states and tried to convince Canada not to block attempts to create a
formal policy on the Arctic Contaminants Action Program. Its delegation stated that action on
contaminants would constitute “a concerted effort to look after needs of indigenous people in the
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Arctic.”919 This intervention was not successful because the ICC lacked the ability to compel
Canada to consider its view and the ICC did not address Canada’s concerns about sovereignty.
The Council did not undertake further discussion about the contents of a policy on contaminants.
The permanent participants also supported two minor Council initiatives. First, the
permanent participants jointly helped states write the Arctic Council’s submission to the 2002
World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. The goal of the
summit was to negotiate an international policy on sustainable development. At its May 2002
meeting in Oulu, Finland, the Arctic states prepared a statement to contribute to the summit and
pledged action on the reduction of contaminants, as well as defining the “Arctic as an indicator
region of global environmental health.”920 The ICC, in particular, contributed language to the
draft and urged language to “encourage further comprehensive environmental monitoring in this
region.”921 States stated they could not add the language to the submission for logistical timeline
reasons.922 The summit was not successful in creating international policy.923 Nonetheless, the
permanent participants contributed a lot to the Council’s submission to the summit.
Second, the permanent participants supported an attempt by Canada to encourage
“capacity building” projects in the Council, which were to promote bottom-up decisionmaking.924 Capacity building is the notion that “development” must give communities skills and
knowledge to be “authors of their own development.”925 Communities were to generate their
own projects for the Council under this approach. Canada encouraged this approach by co-
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hosting a workshop with Finland in November 2001. Indigenous groups participated in this
workshop, held in Helsinki, Finland.926 Canada sought to have “capacity building” identified as
an overall theme for all sustainable development projects, although it did not seek to introduce
this requirement into the Council formally. The permanent participants supported this notion,
although today in the Council capacity building is not an over-arching theme. In total, the
permanent participants made significant contributions to six projects they did not sponsor.
Returning to the major debate about the influence of the permanent participants in the
academic literature, neither accurately predicts the level of participation by the permanent
participants from 1998 until 2004. Jennifer McIver predicts that the permanent participants will
have little influence in the Council,927 while Evan Bloom predicts they will be “full
participants.”928 McIver underestimates their participation, while Bloom overestimates their
participation. The permanent participants were not “full participants” alongside states because
they contribute to only about one-fifth of the Council’s projects. Yet, they had greater influence
than observers, since observers did not sponsor Council projects or convince any member states
to take any particular course of action. Permanent participants have demonstrated the ability to
achieve some desirable outcomes.
Why did the permanent participants contribute to the Council less than many authors and
media reports predicted? The permanent participants contributed to 20 per cent of Council
projects and initiatives (or 11 projects out of 57). Why were they able to influence the Council
only to this extent? Indigenous peoples’ organizations blamed the lack of adequate funding from
states for their inability to send larger delegations to meetings and participate in or create more
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projects. Most groups lacked funds to attend every working group meeting. These groups rely on
state funding to participate in the Council, which amounts to $250,000 to $300,000 a year,
depending on the size of the group.929 Though travel and administration funds differ between
groups, the permanent participants work together on this issue. States provide money for their
domestic indigenous peoples’ organizations to attend meetings and hire experts to represent
them. For example, Canada provides funds for the Canadian branches of the Inuit Circumpolar
Council (ICC), the Gwich’in Council International (GCI) and Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC)
to attend meetings, while Norway provides funds for the Saami Council. These groups also can
receive funds from the Global Environmental Facility, although these funds are unreliable,
project-specific and difficult to obtain.930 Permanent participants are too small to rely on
membership fees or other donations. Funding that comes from states is often unreliable and
fluctuates year-to-year. Overall, 14 of 18 Council meetings held between 1998 and 2004 were in
northern cities, which are usually more expensive to travel to than southern locales. The financial
needs of the permanent participants vary. The Saami Council, for example, frequently possesses
adequate funds to attend meetings but seeks funds to hire more staff for its delegations. The ICC,
in contrast, seeks travel funds as well as funds for staff. Nonetheless, all of the groups require
additional funding and so work as a bloc to obtain additional funds.
Permanent participants raised the issue of funding eight times at Council meetings
between May 1999 and October 2004. For example, at a May 1999 Council meeting in
Anchorage Alaska, “The Saami Council stated that this may be the last Council meeting it would
be able to attend, and requested the chair to formally ask member countries to answer in writing
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what they were doing to help permanent participants participate in the Council.”931 The Aleut
International Association (AIA) raised the issue of funding at the October 2000 meeting in
Barrow, Alaska. The United States responded, “Financing for participation in international
meetings is a big problem, even for the United States.”932 Permanent participants impressed upon
states the need to increase their funding.
The major negotiations over permanent participant funding occurred at the October 2004
Council meeting in Svartsengi, Iceland. Canada, a financial supporter of the permanent
participants, proposed that all Arctic states contribute $300,000 a year to facilitate permanent
participant access to the Council, in response to the permanent participant request for more
funding.933 Sweden, strongly opposing the proposal, immediately vetoed this model before other
states could make their support known and stated its preference for a system of “assessed
contributions” that differed by state.934 The United States, seeking a compromise that would not
create a financial burden, offered that permanent participant funding would be “in the budget of
projects and other Arctic Council initiatives.”935 The Saami Council, the GCI and the Russian
Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) stated that the United States’ solution
would not solve financial problems.936 The chair said that the indigenous peoples’ secretariat was
to draft a paper on the two proposals to present to the Council for consideration.937 States did not
implement either proposal, instead pledging that working groups and states would consult with
permanent participants about funding before undertaking Council projects at the next Council
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meeting.938 States did not genuinely support increasing funding for the permanent participants in
these negotiations because their current level of participation suited state interests. Delegates of
the permanent participants did not believe that states genuinely intended to reform the Council
funding model, despite what appeared to be progress in pushing for solutions.939 The permanent
participants had not threatened state power but their involvement has provided some benefits to
member states. Their presence lends a degree of legitimacy to the Council and frees states from
having to include the positions of indigenous peoples in their Arctic Council policy. Increasing
the funding to groups other than states could present a challenge to state influence in the Council.
The influence of the permanent participants was further curtailed by the fact that states could
veto Council action. States did not need to address the views of permanent participants on vetoed
matters, as seen in the aforementioned Arctic Contaminants Action Program policy example.
These groups attended meetings, provided comments and contributions to Council projects,
created other projects and increased their membership in the Council.
Permanent participants were not satisfied with their influence as 2004 ended.940 In line
with most writers about the Council, such as Oran Young, the Council was a fairly state-centric
institution from 1998 until 2004 to which permanent participants contributed. It was necessary
for these groups to find ways to influence the Council that did not require additional funding.
Permanent participants developed a strategy to exploit domestic politics and increase their
influence in their response to the development of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, which
the next section describes.
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6.2.3 – 2004: The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
The permanent participants increased their role in the Arctic Council through their
influence on the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). They used domestic politics to
embarrass a state to reverse a veto. At the 2000 Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting, states
decided to create the ACIA climate change report. Government scientists and academics from
every Arctic country wrote the document outside of Council meetings.941 The document took
four years to assemble. At the November 2001 Council meeting in Finland, states decided that
along with a scientific assessment, they would create a policy document, proposed by Iceland.
Denmark, Canada, Norway and Finland expressed enthusiasm for an ACIA policy document.942
Russia, the United States and Sweden did not exercise a veto.943 At the April 2003 Council
meeting, the scientists creating the ACIA predicted that the policy document would be “at least
30 pages,” addressing “about eight different subject areas.”944 They also reported that the fourth
and final draft of the document would be ready by April 2004.945 The Arctic states stated that the
permanent participants would be part of the drafting committee.946 The first draft of the policy
was circulated on June 15, 2003, ahead of a set of negotiations to create a policy document in
Svalbard, Norway, during August 2003. The United States, in those negotiations, proposed a
policy document that was only one page, which the other seven Arctic states rejected.947 At this
point, the United States exercised its veto and ended the prospect of a policy document.948
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The permanent participants had previously contributed to the ACIA. It included
information from permanent participants and the inclusion of traditional knowledge. For
example, in 2000, representatives from the ICC travelled to Banks Island, Northwest Territories,
to collect observations about climate change; they presented a video of the observations to the
Council in October 2000.949 Contributors to the report believe that the traditional knowledge
improved the quality of the scientific information within the ACIA. For example, Aboriginal
groups collected observations about climate change that conventional science did not confirm for
several years.950 The permanent participants helped ensure the project included a chapter about
the “human and economic aspects” of climate change.951
The permanent participants promoted the addition of a policy document and did not
accept the veto by the United States. Sheila Watt Cloutier of the Inuit Circumpolar Council opted
to go before the United States Senate Commerce Committee and tell of the United States’
attempts to stifle the policy document on March 3, 2004.952 This testimony was embarrassing
enough for the United States that it reversed its veto in November 2004, at the next Arctic
Council meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland.953 All of the Council states initially supported the
inclusion of a policy document in the report, but the United States changed its view in 2004 for
fear of its implications ahead of its upcoming Presidential election.954 The policy document
ultimately came out three weeks after the election. The document that resulted from that meeting
is not strong, comprising only eight pages of vague platitudes about the need for action on
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climate change.955 Nonetheless, the permanent participants had demonstrated for the first time
that, acting alone, they could persuade the powerful United States to reverse its veto. The other
Arctic Council states did not play a role in this process. They could not go before the United
States Senate. The permanent participants supported a policy document because it highlighted
the threat that climate change poses to indigenous livelihoods.956 They were successful because
they found a tool of influence that did not require a veto or extensive funding and that worked
within the Council’s rule of procedure. They used domestic politics to force a state to reverse a
veto.
To return to the literature, the permanent participants did not act as full participants, and
sometimes they were forced to act outside the Council to achieve their objectives. However, they
found ways to work around those legal limits on their influence highlighted by Jennifer McIver.
This case represents an instance in which permanent participants increased their influence
because it was the first time that they convinced a state to reverse a veto on a major project.
Table 6.2 summarizes the activities of the permanent participants from 1998 until 2005.
Table 6.2: Permanent Participant Participation, 1998-2004
Average comments per meeting
Average delegation size (example)
Projects sponsored
Project contributions
Major project contributions (Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment, Arctic Contaminants
Action Program, Arctic Human Development
Report)
Total project contributions
Failed interventions (Arctic Contaminants
Action Program)
Successful interventions (Inventory of Arctic
Research, Arctic Climate Impact Assessment)
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All
11.72
3.8
5/57
6
3/3

RAIPON
2.8
3.6
3
4
2

ICC
3
5.6
2
6
3

AIA
0.55
1.4
0
4
2

AAC
1.5
5.25
0
4
2

GCI
1.57
2.25
0
4
2

SC
1.91
3.8
3
4
2

11/57
1

9
0

11
1

6
0

6
0

6
0

6
0

2

0

2

0

0

0

0
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6.2.4 – 2005 to 2013
The influence of the permanent participants increased between 2005 and 2013. They had
goals similar to those of the previous era. These groups sought to: 1) attend Council meetings
and comment at these meetings; 2) initiate Council projects important to their membership, and;
3) contribute to other Council projects. They added a fourth goal, based on their experience
influencing the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Permanent participants sought to intervene in
Council projects that proposed action contrary to the interest of indigenous peoples and their
membership. They did not actively seek to add new permanent participants to the Arctic Council
because there was a member representing every major indigenous group in the Arctic. Overall,
permanent participants continued to contribute to the Council less than did states.
In terms of the first goal, permanent participants attended Council meetings and made
remarks at those meetings, though they made fewer remarks than did states. State delegations
spoke an average of 3.3 times per meeting on an average of 2.6 agenda items between 2005 and
2013.957 Permanent participant delegations spoke an average of one time per meeting on one
agenda item. Their level of commenting was similar to observers. An average of 4.7 observers
provided comments per meeting, out of the roughly 15 observers who attended each Council
meeting. Observers who provided comments interjected the same average number of times per
meeting as permanent participants; namely, one comment on one agenda item.958 Based on a
sample of five meetings, states send an average of 7.4 representatives to each Council meeting;
permanent participants send only 3.5 representatives per meeting. An average of 15 observers
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attends each meeting, sending an average of 1.5 people per meeting.959 Permanent participants
provided fewer comments at Council meetings than did states, indicating that they did not
participate in the Council as “full participants,” to use terminology from academic literature.
Permanent participants attended all of the major Council meetings held between 2005 and
2013. However, in 2008 and 2010, states excluded permanent participants from major events
pertinent to Arctic governance. In 2008, Denmark sent diplomatic cables proposing a conference
to discuss Arctic oceans policy. Denmark volunteered to host proceedings due to an interest in
countering the perception that there was potential conflict in the Arctic.960 The United States and
Denmark wanted to limit participation to the five Arctic states that border the Arctic Ocean
(Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States) while Canada and Norway sought to
include the other Arctic states (Finland, Iceland, and Sweden), as well as permanent
participants.961 Denmark and the United States argued in diplomatic cables that the other actors
did not have the same set of interests as the five Arctic Ocean states, while Canada and Norway
sent cables arguing that that these groups and states still had significant interests.962 Russia was
ambivalent about the meeting and its composition.963 Norway suggested that the Arctic Council
would be the appropriate venue to have the meeting, which the United States resisted, informing
Denmark that, “We have at times considered the [Arctic Council] as unwieldy for political
discussions.”964 In May 2008, Denmark hosted the Arctic Oceans Conference in Ilulissat,
Greenland, with the other four Arctic Ocean states. This conference was significant because it
was the first instance of international Arctic governance to exclude indigenous group
959
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contributions since 1996. In March 2010, Canada held a second conference in Ottawa. The 2010
meeting was again controversial because Canada did not invite the permanent participants or the
non-Arctic Ocean states, despite arguing that the permanent participants should be part of the
2008 conference.965 According to media reports, United States Secretary of State Hilary Clinton
“skipped the closing news conference scheduled for the daylong session of five foreign
ministers” after indicating that aboriginal groups had contacted her and made her aware that they
did not receive invitations to the meeting.966 Some commentators, namely Mike Blanchfield of
the Canadian Press, questioned Clinton’s motivations for skipping the meeting since it was not
“clear why Clinton showed up for a meeting that in her view lacked key participants.”967 Why
did the United States change its view on including permanent participants? According to political
scientist Tornbjorn Perdersen, the United States had re-evaluated its Arctic policy under the
Obama Administration and decided that it was necessary to avoid controversy in the execution of
its Arctic policy.968 Between 2005 and 2013, states excluded the permanent participants from
some Arctic governance. Timo Koivurova writes that permanent participants have “contributed
to a new way of perceiving how indigenous peoples should be involved in international policy
making.”969 In these instances, states broke the principle of automatic participation by indigenous
peoples in Arctic governance.
In terms of the second goal, the permanent participants sponsored 12 Council projects
between 2005 and 2013. However, the proportion of Council projects they sponsored was similar
to the period from 1998 to 2004. The Council had an average of 159 projects ongoing at a given
time. Some of these projects took place without a state sponsor. Rather, working groups
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sponsored projects with universities or carry out projects within their general mandate. States
may fund a project without formally sponsoring it, especially in the case of small projects, such
as a factsheet about a particular bird in danger. States organize the majority of Council projects
by proposing the goal, structure, execution, personnel and funding. In 2013, for example, states
each sponsored an average of 15.25 projects. Permanent participants sponsored 12 of the
Council’s projects from 2005 until 2013, or two projects per group. Observers sponsored or cosponsored seven projects in the same timeframe.970
Table 6.3 summarizes permanent participant-sponsored projects. The projects sponsored
by permanent participants are small in scope, focused on local outcomes and human security.
States did not interfere in most permanent participant projects. These groups created the projects,
organized the funding and updated the Council about their progress. States limited their
comments to notes of support and technical suggestions for improvements. The exception was a
2007 project by the Arctic Athabaskan Council (AAC), Improving and Efficiency and
Effectiveness of the Arctic Council.971 The AAC presented a plan at the April 2007 Council
meeting in Tromsø, Norway, that the Council initiate a task force to reform the structure of the
Arctic Council and improve the standing of permanent participants. Russia, Iceland, the United
States and Sweden each vetoed the proposal, content with the current structure of the Council.972
States were not interested in revising the basic structure of the Council, which lead to the only
veto of a proposed permanent participant project in the history of the Arctic Council.
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Year
2005

Sponsor
RAIPON/GCI

2006

RAIPON

2006

AIA/CAFF

2007

RAIPON

2007

Saami Council

2007

AIA/U.S.A

2007

AAC/GCI

2007

AAC

2009

2011

RAIPON/
Russia/
Norway/
UNEP
AIA/Saami
Council
ICC

2013

ICC

2011

Table 6.3: Permanent Participant Projects
Name
Description
Indigenous Peoples
Training, education, removal
Contaminants Action
and storage of pesticides and
Program
contaminants in Arctic
Sustainable
To research and provide
Development of
education about development
Indigenous Peoples of
in Russia
the Russian North
Traditional Use and
Assessment on conservation
Conservation of Plants
status of plant life on Aleutian
from the Aleutian,
Islands
Pribilof and
Commander Islands
Sacred Sites Workshop Organize workshop to promote
conservation of culturally
significant areas in Russia
Community-Based
Encourage/enable local
Flora and Fauna
monitoring of flora and fauna
Monitoring
in Saami lands
Bering Sea SubCollection of traditional
Network
knowledge about environment
in Bering Sea area to assist
PAME
Vulnerability and
Project to monitor caribou
Adaptation to Climate
populations in
Change in the Arctic
Athabaskan/Gwich’in lands
Improving and
Proposed approach to Council
Efficiency and
reform
Effectiveness of the
Arctic Council
Integrated Ecosystems
Strategies for ecosystem
Management Approach management in Arctic

Survey of Arctic
Indigenous Marine Use
Biodiversity Trends
2010 Response
“A Circumpolar-Wide
Inuit Response to The
AMSA”

Understand marine use in
Aleutian/Saami lands
Statement on previous Council
report, “Biodiversity Trends
2010”
Inuit response to previous
Council report, Arctic Marine
Shipping Assessment

Ongoing
Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes
Yes (not
complete)
Yes (not
complete)
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In terms of the third goal, the permanent participants provided contributions to Council
projects that they did not sponsor, but they had less success than they had from 1998 to 2004.
They contributed to five Council projects they did not sponsor, compared to six such projects
from 1998 to 2004. First, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON)
co-chaired the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) with Norway from 2005 to
2007.973 The RAIPON chaired the SDWG meetings and organized the agenda for each meeting.
Second, the RAIPON organized a series of community workshops in Russia to communicate the
outcomes of the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme and the Arctic Contaminants
Action Program’s persistent organic pollutants program from 2004 until 2005.974 Third, the
Saami Council organized a series of workshops in Saami territory to collect traditional
knowledge for the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment in 2006 and 2007.975 Fourth, all of the
permanent participants helped states carry out the surveys necessary to complete the Survey of
Living Conditions in the Arctic, especially in 2010.976
Fifth, the permanent participants made a small contribution to the drafting of the Arctic
Council search and rescue agreement. At the May 2009 Arctic Council ministerial meeting in
Tromsø, Norway, Russia and the United States proposed that states create an agreement to cooperate on search and rescue in the Arctic, which won support from all member states. The
Council negotiated the agreement in a special task force at five meetings between 2009 and
2010.977 The drafting of the treaty produced few disagreements between states.978 Permanent
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participants did not have funding to send personnel to meetings.979 However, they sent some
information to the task force about the Canadian Rangers and their response to emergencies.980
The Canadian Rangers are a component of the Canadian Army that conducts patrols along
Canada’s northernmost frontier. It largely comprises First Nations. From reviewing the
provisions of the treaty, this information appears to have had little impact, but it nonetheless
constitutes a contribution to a Council project.
The permanent participants were less successful contributing to major, crosscutting
Council projects. The major Council projects from 2005 to 2013 were as follows:
- The Circumpolar Biodiversity Monitoring Program (initiated 2006) (Conservation of Arctic
Flora and Fauna working group, or the CAFF)
- Annual Arctic Monitoring and Assessment (the AMAP) working group pollution assessments
(2005-2013) (the AMAP)
- Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (completed 2006-2008) (the AMAP)
- Arctic Oil and Gas Assessment (published 2007) (the AMAP)
- Arctic Human Health Initiative (initiated 2008) (the SDWG)
- Agreement on Co-operation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic
(initiated 2009) (Task Force)
- Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (published 2009) (the Protection of the Arctic Marine
Environment working group)
- Arctic Biodiversity Assessment (published 2013) (the CAFF)
- Agreement on Co-operation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic
(completed 2013) (Task Force)
- Short-Lived Climate Forcers (initiated 2011) (Short-Lived Climate Forcers Task Force)
- Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost Assessment (published 2013) (the AMAP)
- Arctic Resilience Report (interim report 2013)
As previously indicated, the permanent participants only contributed to two of these projects,
namely the search and rescue agreement as well as the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment.
These are two of the Council’s most important reports. However, it is significant that they made
only a small contribution to the most pressing work of the Council in this era. Due to lack of
resources, the permanent participants had to prioritize their involvement and they chose to place
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a greater focus on vital development and environmental issues in communities.981 Thus, the
permanent participants determined that the major Council projects of the era did not contain a
strong enough human security element to consider within their vital interest.
An exception was one major project, the Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost Assessment
(SWIPA), in which states blocked contributions from the permanent participants. Norway
proposed a follow up to the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) at the October 2005
Council meeting in northern Russia.982 There was consensus among all of the Arctic states, until
the United States exercised its veto, citing opposition to “a second ACIA.”983 Norway proposed a
smaller-scale project at the November 2007 Council meeting in Navik, Norway, which became
the SWIPA.984 The SWIPA is an environmental assessment that is similar to the ACIA, which
tracks levels of snow cover, ice cover and permafrost in the Arctic. It is more limited in scope
and impact than the ACIA. Discussions about the SWIPA continued at nine Council meetings
between 2007 and 2012, with government scientists briefing the Council about the progress of
scientific research and synthesis.985 The permanent participants indicated that they wanted to
contribute traditional knowledge to the report on two occasions. The Inuit Circumpolar Council
(ICC) offered to contribute at the April 2008 Council meeting in Svolver, Norway, while the ICC
and the Saami Council said they would like to contribute at the November 2008 Council meeting
in Kautokeino, Norway. It perhaps seemed natural that since the permanent participants
contributed to the ACIA, they would contribute to the SWIPA as well.
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In the end, the permanent participants did not contribute to the SWIPA. Governments
instructed researchers on the SWIPA to use only peer-reviewed academic material in the
assessment. Thus, they did not seek information from aboriginal peoples and they did not draw
on traditional knowledge.986 This move is surprising, since the ACIA included aboriginal
traditional knowledge. Some policy-makers say that traditional knowledge can enhance scientific
knowledge and even provide information where gaps exist.987 The Arctic Council ignored
traditional knowledge because certain individuals within state governments were suspicious of
the use of traditional knowledge. The permanent participants often rely on non-indigenous
consultants to carry out negotiations, 988 which states do not trust to deliver honest traditional
knowledge. The permanent participants failed to convince all Council states that their input on
Arctic matters is essential.
Funding again explains why the permanent participants could only participate in the
Council as much as they did from 2005 until 2013. Canada is the only country that consistently
funds the permanent participants, as it has never denied a funding request from its domestic
aboriginal group (the ICC) and has pressured other countries to contribute more.989 Yet, even its
contributions to indigenous peoples’ organizations are below expectations.990 Discussions on
whether to increase permanent participant funding continued at every Council meeting, either
formally or informally.991 For example, at the Council meeting in November 2008, the Saami
Council stated that the Arctic Council states have an obligation to include permanent participants
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in the Council under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.992 At
the May 2009 ministers meeting in Tromsø, Norway, states pledged to increase the capability of
permanent participants to attend meetings.993 Nothing significant emerged from these efforts,
which led to questions about whether states genuinely wanted to increase permanent participant
funding.994 Why did states fail to support these groups consistently after 2004? The lack of
support corresponds with the 2004 demonstration by permanent participants of their potential
influence in their influence over the ACIA. States did not support these groups after they
demonstrated that they could challenge state power in the Council.
Can we argue that the influence of permanent participants increased from 2005 to 2013?
Table 6.4 summarizes the participation by permanent participants across the Council’s history.

Comments per meeting
Delegation size (example)
Projects sponsored
Project contributions
Major project contributions
Total project contributions
Failed agency
Successful agency

Table 6.4: Permanent Participant Participation
19982004RAIPON ICC
SC
2004
2013
11.72
6.1
1.7
1.3
1.5
3.8
3.6
3.6
5.6
1.4
5/57
11/159
4
2
1
(8.8%)
(7%)
6
5
5
3
3
3/3
2/12
1
1
2
12/57
16/159
10
6
6
1
0
0
0
0
1
3
2
3
2

AIA

AAC

GCI

0.7
5.25
3

0.7
2.25
2

0.2
3.8
1

3
1
7
0
2

3
1
6
0
2

3
1
5
0
2

Table 6.4 demonstrates that the influence of permanent participants has actually decreased both
in absolute terms and most especially in relative terms in six of the eight categories. They
commented less in meetings, sent smaller delegations, sponsored a lesser proportion of Council
projects and contributed to a smaller proportion of Council projects. Yet, their influence
increased in one category: the permanent participants intervened in Council affairs to block
action contrary to their interest in three cases. This situation was apparent in the Arctic Climate
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Impact Assessment case cited earlier, as well as two cases discussed in the following paragraphs.
In this one category, they have gained state-like abilities in the Council, even though the Arctic
Council rules of procedure purposely deny them a voice in consensus. Do these situations
represent a trend? They are important because these cases represent significant, public actions on
controversial issues. If the permanent participants had not successfully intervened, the outcome
of three major Council decisions would be different. The earlier intervention was minor, namely
including traditional knowledge in a relatively minor Council project. It is important not to
overstate their influence; the influence of the permanent participants has increased according to
one measure of influence.
They successfully blocked the European Union’s bid to become a permanent observer in
the Council. There are two categories of observers in the Council: accredited observers, which
have a standing invitation to meetings, and ad hoc observers, whose attendance states must
approve before every meeting. The European Union has been an ad hoc observer since 2001.
AMAP has collaborated on projects with the European Environmental Agency.995 The European
Union has given many presentations at Council meetings promoting its northern policy.996 In
September 2009, Finland informed the United States Department of State that the European
Union should be an observer due to its longstanding contribution to Arctic science.997 Norway
expressed interest in a greater role for observers, with a greater ability to speak in working
groups and at meetings.998 The United States’ Mission to the European Union held a meeting to
discuss European Union membership in the Arctic Council during February 2009. According to
diplomatic cables, all of the Nordic countries supported European Union observer status,
995
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including the two states that are not part of the European Union (Iceland and Norway). Denmark
had been “difficult” but was supportive. Canada, the United States and Russia also supported the
notion, though Russia “was most concerned.”999 The main obstacle in this meeting was
opposition among the Inuit, though the European Union was sure it could overcome this
problem.1000 Canada exercised its veto and blocked the European Union from becoming a
permanent observer at the May 2013 Council meeting in Sweden,1001 due to the urging of the
Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) in private consultations during this meeting. The other
permanent participants did not oppose EU observer status, but supported the ICC. The ICC had
made its opposition publically known prior to 2013.
The ICC’s position resulted from the EU’s ban on the import of seal products.1002 The EU
has a ban against the import of seal products, but has an exemption for products harvested by
Inuit peoples. The ICC nonetheless opposed the EU ban because it hurt demand for seal
products. As noted in Chapter 5, Europe is a major fashion centre and designers were not willing
to incorporate seal fur into their designs as a result the stigma that a ban created. Canada allowed
the ICC to block EU entry into the Council as part of a pattern not to publically rebuke positions
strongly held by permanent participants. The permanent participants can block Council decisions
if they oppose them strongly enough.1003 A former Canadian Senior Arctic Official said, “I can
never recall a situation at the table where the Canadian representative contradicted what the
permanent participant said.”1004 The Arctic Council operates by consensus, which can sometimes
be an advantage to permanent participants because they only need to convince one Arctic state to
999
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delay or prevent a decision.1005 In these cases, states and permanent participants generally
undertake further discussions “in an attempt to find a consensus position.”1006 The ICC
convinced Canada not to support European Union entry into the Arctic Council as a permanent
observer, even though the other member states were interested in an enhanced role for the
European Union. Would Canada have blocked European Union membership if the ICC had not
intervened? It is likely that Canada would have accepted permanent observer status for the EU,
due to limited legal rights that observers have in the Council.
Second, in 2012, permanent participants demonstrated their influence by overcoming an
attempt by Russia to ban its Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON)
group from the Arctic Council. The other Council states reaffirmed the importance of permanent
participants in the Council, regardless of the wants of any state. In November 2012, the Russian
Department of Justice deregistered the RAIPON. In Russia, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) must register with the government to operate; Russia can choose which nongovernmental organizations can operate. Commentators suggested that Russia deregistered the
RAIPON due to fears over its power,1007 foreign influence1008 and links to separatist
movements.1009 In addition, commentator Ron Wallace argues that Russia attempted to ban the
RAIPON due to its opposition to “oil production on the Arctic continental shelf in areas of
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traditional land use.”1010 Russia has a history of making sure that its non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) align with the overall goals of the state.1011 In the past, the Russian
government has asked NGOs, including the RAIPON, to re-register under new and often more
onerous regulations, a difficult task for the RAIPON.1012 It is likely that Russian policy-makers
were suspicious of the RAIPON because they received support from United States and Canadian
governments (as well as Aboriginal groups) and developed some policy positions based on that
influence.1013 The RAIPON, for example, adopted calls for co-management of indigenous
peoples’ lands based on the influence of North American aboriginal groups.1014 The influence of
the permanent participants appeared weak, as it seemed that Russia could unilaterally block any
permanent participant from attending Council meetings. In preparations for the next Council
meeting in November 2012, the permanent participants privately urged states to take a stand
against Russia.
In preparatory meetings, permanent participants insisted that states re-affirm the
importance of the RAIPON. States responded to Russia’s deregistration of the RAIPON from the
Council by asserting the group’s membership in the Council, under the rules of procedure, and
calling for its reinstatement at the domestic level. States simply refused to accept that the
RAIPON could not be part of the Council. Senior Arctic Council officials, including Russia’s
own Senior Arctic Official, issued a statement of support for the RAIPON at its November 2012
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meeting.1015 Following this international rebuke, the RAIPON received registration in April 2013
after adjusting its leadership slightly.1016 This example is significant for two reasons. First, it
forced states to reaffirm the importance of permanent participants in the Arctic Council, through
a letter of protest. Second, it forced states to acknowledge that indigenous peoples’ organizations
are Council members, regardless of the views of one state. The permanent participants
successfully intervened to support the membership of the RAIPON in the Council and reaffirmed
the importance of its membership.
In summary, from 2004 to 2013, permanent participants were increasingly able to achieve
desirable outcomes, though they remained weaker than states. In some cases, they appeared
strong, drawing on the influence they demonstrated in 2004 when they successfully intervened to
create an Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) policy document. A permanent participant,
the ICC, blocked the European Union from becoming a permanent observer in the Council due to
positions that conflicted with Inuit interests. In 2012, states re-affirmed the importance and
independence of permanent participants when Russia tried to block the RAIPON from attending
Council functions. They accomplished this influence by convincing states of the validity of their
position. In other cases, they appeared weak, as they lacked funds to participate in the Council
fully. In 2010, Canada failed to invite aboriginal groups to important international meetings. In
2012, the Council decided to publish the SWIPA without aboriginal input or traditional
knowledge in the final document. States limited permanent participants challenging state
influence. The Council is state-centric, as per the assessment of authors such as Oran Young.
Yet, the permanent participants have more influence than predicted by Jennifer McIver.
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6.2.5 – 2014: The Future Influence of Permanent Participants
The influence of permanent participants could increase because states increasingly
recognize them as legitimate Council actors, along with states. Several policy-makers have
expressed respect for the permanent participants and their contributions to the Council.1017
Representatives for the permanent participants said they feel a greater level of respect from states
in the Council. Earlier, they reported treatment similar to observers in Council meetings or
working group meetings.1018 Such instances are becoming less frequent as permanent participants
are increasingly treated with the same courtesy as states.1019 For example, earlier in the Council,
states seated the permanent participants with the observers in some meetings, separated from
state delegations. Today, permanent participants always sit at the same table as states. These
facts indicate that states have recognized the importance of the involvement of aboriginal groups.
States recognize that the permanent participants have a privileged place in the Council that
observers do not have.
Yet, the permanent participants will not become as influential as states in the Council for
at least two reasons, aside from the fact that the legal rights of the permanent participants have
not changed. First, all of the permanent participants face some ongoing financial problems.1020
By the estimate of one representative, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) does not have
resources to become involved in 80 per cent of Council priorities, which this thesis confirms.1021
One permanent participant representative said in interviews, “We often are there to listen and
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perhaps give very general comments.”1022 Second, they face human resource problems in that
states have larger delegations than permanent participants can afford. At Arctic Council
meetings, Canada and the United States may bring up to 15 delegates, while aboriginal groups
contend with four or five. The ICC, for example, has less than 20 full-time employees in the
entire world; with this staff, states expect them to represent people in communities spread across
more territory than in all of Europe.1023 The permanent participants sometimes employ outside,
non-aboriginal consultants to conduct their business in the Council. One former high-ranking
official with the government of Canada reported that these consultants are sometimes “not quite
on the same agenda as the people” for which they work, in that they express positions contrary to
the permanent participant groups.1024 As seen in this chapter, the lack of human resources forces
permanent participants to work together as one block. It makes sense for the permanent
participants to work together to achieve desirable ends, though the permanent participants are not
a monolithic group.1025 Many Inuit have historically relied on access to water to obtain their
livelihood, while the Athabaskan people historically live inland; as a result, these groups
developed different cultural traditions.1026 They jointly lobby for more funds, even though the
financial needs of each group differ greatly. Overall, it is important for the permanent
participants to be able to send representatives to meetings. There are policy makers in the
Council who do not share same goals as permanent participants. Some policy-makers have
condemned the morality of Aboriginals who engage in subsistence hunting or doubted whether it
was necessary to gather the input of aboriginals on every Council project.1027 One remedy to the
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situation of the permanent participants might be to work together to develop a solid agenda for
reform of their role and resources. They should do so in such a way to attract media attention.
Representatives from states have reported that they sometimes feel that the permanent
participants do not give clear, workable answers when states consult about means to increase
their role.1028 If the permanent participants constructed a clear plan and made that plan public, it
likely would be difficult for states to ignore their requests to play a greater role in regional
governance.
In conclusion, the influence of the permanent participants has evolved throughout the
history of the Arctic Council. From 1991 to 1998, aboriginal groups successfully lobbied to
become members of the Arctic Council. Canada and the Nordic countries supported adding
aboriginal groups to the Council as full members, to buttress bargaining power. The United
States and Russia opposed giving such rights for fear of having their influence reduced. From
1998 to 2004, the aboriginal groups participated in the Council to a lesser extent than states. This
situation resulted from a lack of finances to attend and participate in Council meetings. The
financial needs of the permanent participants differed, but all required additional funds. In 2004,
the permanent participants demonstrated influence by successfully convincing the United States
to adopt an Arctic Climate Impact Assessment policy document. From 2004 to 2013, the
permanent participants demonstrated influence to achieve desirable ends in the Council when
they only needed to convince one state to support their action, as seen in the European Union
observer status example. They had less success when it was necessary to influence multiple
states to change a chosen action, as seen in the Snow, Water, Ice and Permafrost example. The
permanent participants did not have enough money to contribute to all Council activities. Several
examples show their influence, such as the success of the ICC blocking European Union
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membership in the Arctic Council. As of 2015, it is possible that the influence of the permanent
participants will continue to increase. Permanent participants have demonstrated an ability to
exert influence on major Council decisions, despite the restrictions on their legal rights in the
Council. States recognize their privileged place in the Council. With limited resources and
without voting rights, they will remain less influential than states. The influence of the
permanent participants in the Arctic Council has evolved in two ways. First, at the onset of the
Council, the permanent participants had little influence over outcomes. Today, they are better
able to influence the Council when they use their agency. Second, at the onset of the Council,
there was great debate and controversy as to whether aboriginal groups should be allowed to
participate. Today, there is widespread acceptance of their role in the Council.
6.3 – Analysis Using Theories of International Relations
Functionalism does not provide a good explanation for permanent participant influence.
H1: The permanent participants can have influence in the Council because they provide useful
information that impacts state decision-making; their influence will evolve based on the quality
of the information they provide.
Functionalism does not provide a good explanation for the influence of permanent participants in
the Arctic Council because the process is more political than functionalists anticipate. They are
not merely providers of information. They influence the operation of the Council using agency.
States do not respond to the problems presented by permanent participants automatically. State
delegations have rejected quality information provided by permanent participants for political
reasons, as seen when the Council rejected including traditional knowledge in the Snow, Water,
Ice and Permafrost assessment. They have achieved desired ends by convincing one or more
Arctic Council countries of their position, sometimes contrary to the wishes of other states.
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Neorealism does not provide a good explanation for the influence of permanent
participants.
H1: The permanent participants will not have influence in the Arctic Council and their influence
will not evolve.
Neorealism does not provide a good explanation for the influence of the permanent participants
because it does not anticipate that the permanent participants could have any real influence over
great powers in the Council. In fact, the permanent participants have convinced the Council to
undertake action contrary to the desired outcomes of the United States, such as the adoption of
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) policy document. Neorealists would not anticipate
that the permanent participants would achieve rights to challenge great powers in the Council.
Neorealists would predict that states would work to limit the influence of the permanent
participants. Certainly, at various times, states have resisted the permanent participants. In
addition, neorealists cannot explain why the United States agreed to add permanent participants
to the Council.
Neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the influence of permanent
participants in the Arctic Council.
H1: The permanent participants will be a secondary actor in the Arctic Council, occasionally
demonstrating influence based on their agency (that is, their research, organization,
communication, lobbying and coalition-building ability).
States have usually resisted the influence of permanent participants. Canada supported adding
permanent participants to the Council to improve its relative bargaining position, freeing
delegations from having to represent the wishes of indigenous peoples and adding another voice
to compete with the United States, as well as Russia. The United States resisted the permanent
participants for fear of a challenge to their influence. It supported some role based on the
existence of a possible norm. States have denied the permanent participants adequate funding
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and challenged their role numerous times. However, the permanent participants exercised
influence over the Council by winning support for an ACIA policy document and blocking
European Union membership in the Council. The permanent participants were able to do so by
using their agency and convincing Arctic Council member states of the validity of their position,
as neoliberal institutionalism predicts. Functionalists would predict that states would respond to
quality information provided by permanent participants automatically. In fact, the agency of
permanent participants is of key importance. States have demonstrated their vulnerability to the
power of persuasion. The permanent participants are more influential in the Council than
neorealists would anticipate. Nonetheless, neoliberal institutionalism does not anticipate the
importance of domestic politics. The permanent participants won support for their position in the
2004 ACIA policy document controversy by appealing to the United States to overrule the
Presidential Administration. However, overall, neoliberal institutionalism does the best job
illuminating the reasons for the influence of the permanent participants.
The permanent participants have less of a role in the Council than states, but they have
influence based on their agency. Agency refers to their ability to research, organize,
communicate, lobby and ally with states. The goal of this chapter was to answer three questions.
First, what is the role and influence of the permanent participants in the Council? The permanent
participants are members that have a privileged role in the Council, but they cannot vote on
decisions. They have influence, but must exercise that influence through states. These groups
must convince state policy-makers to adopt their desired position. Second, how has their role and
influence evolved over time? They have grown more influential over time. They are increasingly
able to block action contrary to their interests. Third, when are the permanent participants
successful in exerting their influence? The permanent participants are most successful when one
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state is blocking a desired action. Permanent participants can use their agency to convince that
state to reverse its action. They have done so in multiple major cases. This scenario is clear when
permanent participants convinced the United States to adopt an ACIA policy document, or
Russia’s attempt to block the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North from the
Council. They also are successful when they must convince one state to veto a policy action they
do not desire. This scenario was made clear when the permanent participants convinced Canada
to block European Union permanent observer status. They are less successful when they must
convince multiple states to adopt their view. This scenario is clear in that permanent participants
have been unable to build a coalition to increase their funding. It also is clear that states
somewhat resist the growing influence of the permanent participants. None of the perspectives in
academic literature adequately explains the influence of the permanent participants, such as Oran
Young,1029 Olav Schram Stokke,1030 Evan T. Bloom1031 and Jennifer McIver.1032

Functionalism

Neorealism

Neoliberal
Institutionalism

1029

Table 6.5: Analysis
The permanent participants can have
influence in the Council because they
provide useful information that impacts
state decision-making; their influence will
evolve based on the quality of the
information they provide.
The permanent participants will not have
influence in the Arctic Council and their
influence will not evolve.
The permanent participants will be a
secondary actor in the Arctic Council,
occasionally demonstrating influence
based on their agency (that is, their
research, organization, communication,
lobbying and coalition-building ability).

Not supported – states do not
act on good quality
information from permanent
participants automatically.
Not supported – permanent
participants have
demonstrated influence.
Supported – permanent
participants influence stems
from agency.
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Conclusion
This chapter assessed the influence and role of the permanent participants in the Arctic
Council. The first section examined the predictions of three dominant international relations
theories, namely functionalism, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. Functionalists would
predict permanent participants could be influential if they provide the Council with good quality
information; neorealists would predict they could have no influence. Neoliberal institutionalists
predict that the permanent participants could have influence by persuading states of the utility of
their views, even though states will generally resist their influence. The second section discussed
their evolution from a weak Council actor to somewhat influential actor. The third section
concluded that neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the influence of
permanent participants. The permanent participants have less influence in the Council than
states, but they can exercise influence based on their agency.
This research has two important implications for international relations theory. First,
there is debate about the potential influence of non-state actors. This research shows that nonstate actors can exert influence in international relations if they can exercise effective agency
Second, it demonstrates that states are susceptible to the power of persuasion, rather than basing
their decisions purely on rational conceptions of state interests. This finding stands in contrast
with the expectations of rationalist theories such as functionalism. This research also has
implications for those interested in the workings of the Council. The permanent participants are a
crucial link between Arctic communities and the Arctic Council. This work finds that they are
not as influential as no doubt many would like. The Council operates according to state interest,
dominated by people who are not from the North and central governments located far away from
northern frontiers.
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CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUSION
This thesis has argued that the Arctic’s economic potential has created an incentive for
states to enhance governance through the Arctic Council. In this process, the great powers are the
most influential actors. The goal of this concluding chapter is threefold. First, it provides a brief
recap of the history of the Council to demonstrate the contribution of this work to the literature
through an understanding of how the institution operates. It recasts the Council as an
institutionally-strong, international, policy-making, research body that takes action on
environmental and economic issues. Second, it reviews the theoretical contribution of each
preceding chapter and demonstrates the overall theoretical contribution of this thesis. It
concludes that neoliberal institutionalism best explains state interests in international cooperation, but neorealism best explains outcomes. Third, this chapter points to directions for
further research.
7.1 – The History of the Arctic Council
This thesis presents a new understanding of the Arctic Council. Currently, the literature
understands the Council as a policy-recommendation body focused on environmental
conservation research. Authors describe it as an institutionally weak, state-centric, low-profile,
technocratic body. This work contributes a new understanding of the Council as a policy-making
body as well as a research body focused on environmental issues and economic issues. It is
becoming an institutionally strong, international body. It is a venue in which complex politics
and state interests intersect. The Council also is notable because indigenous peoples
organizations have the significant capacity to influence the institution.
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The Council emerged as a weak institution stemming from grand ambitions. It was
founded as a modest institution to encourage co-operation between two former Cold War rivals.
The capitalist and democratic United States stood in conflict with the communist Soviet Union.
Canada, Denmark, Iceland and Norway were on the United States’ side of the ideological divide,
while Finland and Sweden struggled to maintain neutrality.1033 Finland’s government desperately
wanted to improve relations between Russia and the United States, but it also had great concerns
about pollution in Russia’s Arctic. Policy-makers in all of the Arctic countries shared this
concern. Co-operation in an Arctic environmental institution would not only be a means to
encourage greater co-operation between West and East, it also would present an opportunity to
share information and take action to protect the Arctic environment.1034 The government of
Finland hosted meetings between relevant officials in September 1989 in Rovaniemi, which led
to three additional rounds of discussions.1035
The ultimate result of these talks was the creation of the Arctic Environmental Protection
Strategy (AEPS) in June 1991.1036 The group was a venue for scientists to share information on
Arctic environmental protection. It was not a robust institution. The AEPS led to the creation of
the Council. Government scientists met twice each year in four working groups to share
information and research.1037 Through these meetings, scientists learned of environmental and
human security problems in Russia that led many policy-makers to wonder aloud whether an
Arctic international institution was necessary.1038 Their work showed that there were large
quantities of cancer-causing coolants stored in the Russian Arctic region and that the life
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expectancy of Russian indigenous peoples was on the decline.1039 Indigenous peoples’
organizations, particularly the Inuit Circumpolar Council under the leadership of Mary Simon,
lobbied governments for an Arctic international institution.1040 This work led to the genesis of
the Council.
The process to create the Council was sometimes highly political. As detailed by
historian John English in his book, Ice and Water, the Prime Minister of Canada, Jean Chretien,
proposed an Arctic council to United States President Bill Clinton during a meeting in Ottawa in
February 1995.1041 Canadian officials brought aboard the other Arctic states and organized four
rounds of negotiations in Ottawa during 1995 and 1996.1042 The Canadian and Nordic
delegations1043 wanted the new Council to be a strong institution able to facilitate co-operation
on security, include a new emphasis on sustainable development and create policy, which policymakers from Russia and the United States resisted greatly.1044 The Nordic state delegations
wanted the new institution to have a permanent secretariat, which the delegations from Canada,
Russia and the United States could not agree to amid sovereignty concerns.1045 The Canadian and
Nordic delegations sought equal membership in the institution for indigenous peoples’
organizations, which raised concerns over sovereignty among policy-makers from Russia and the
United States. All of the governments involved sought to create an Arctic forum. Nordic and
Canadian policy-makers sought a strong Council, while officials from the United States and
Russia did not.
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The structure of the Council was the result of compromise. In June 1996 meetings,
Canadian and United States policy-makers held side negotiations. The Canadians proposed a
compromise that security would not be part of the Council’s mandate, but in exchange
sustainable development would be and indigenous peoples’ organizations would be second-tier
“permanent participants.”1046 The United States officials accepted, as did the other countries. The
understanding emerged that the Council would not be a policy-making body and the secretariat
would rotate between countries.1047 United States officials favoured a Council to share
information and ensure that other international bodies did not try to interfere in regional
politics.1048 Russian officials sought funding for projects it could funnel into other higher priority
projects.1049 Canada and the Nordic governments mainly sought to compel Russia to face its
environmental issues.1050 The Canadian government also faced pressure from its indigenous
peoples’ organizations to create more robust international Arctic governance to improve human
security.1051 The Arctic Council was intended to be a weak, environmental research body.
It is accurate to characterize the Council as a weak body in the early history of the
institution. The Council negotiated its rules of procedure and formal mandate in 1997 and 1998,
with the mission emerging that it would,
Provide a means for promoting co-operation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states
. . . with the involvement of the Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on
common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental
protection in the Arctic.1052
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There was some debate as to the meaning of sustainable development, with states opting to avoid
formally defining the term.1053 Media reports anticipated that the Council would be a robust,
strong governance body.1054 Scholars who wrote during this period, such as political scientists
Oran Young1055 and Rob Huebert,1056 disagreed with the media and understood the Council as a
small-scale environmental research institution. Some experts, such as diplomat Evan Bloom,
believed the permanent participants would be full participants,1057 which other scholars, such as
lawyer Jennifer McIver, doubted.1058
The Council carried out environmental and sustainable development work within its
mandate, launching 57 research projects.1059 Examples include the Arctic Contaminants Action
Program, the Arctic Human Development Report and the beginnings of the Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment. This situation does not indicate that matters were totally settled, as seen in
three major instances. First, at a meeting in May 1999, security came to the forefront as the
United States delegation suggested one of its officials brief the Council on its and Russia’s
efforts to reduce the environmental impact of its military vehicles.1060 Canada’s delegation
ultimately resisted, fed up with obstructionism by the United States and eager to get on with the
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work of the main Council mandate.1061 Second, at a meeting in November 1999, the Nordic
delegations tried to begin creating a Council policy to reduce Arctic contaminants.1062
Delegations from Canada, the United States and Russia resisted, citing sovereignty concerns and
unconvinced such action was within state interests.1063 Third, in October 2000, officials from
Russia and the United States worked to quash a report that might have called for policies to deal
with emergency situations, concerned about the implications for its sovereignty.1064
The Council began to shift in 2004 due to new research that brought Arctic
environmental issues to the forefront. In November 2004, the Council released its Arctic Climate
Impact Assessment, which showed that climate change caused by humans was profoundly
endangering the Arctic region.1065 The United States government tried to quash a policy
document, concerned that it might have an impact on the upcoming United States presidential
election.1066 Sheila Watt-Cloutier, from the Inuit Circumpolar Council, testified in March 2004
before the United States Senate Commerce Committee about the United States’ actions,
embarrassing its policy-makers into allowing a policy document after some further
uncertainty.1067 The Council began to change. Russian delegations began to advocate that the
Council increase its work on emergency preparedness.1068 The number of Council projects
increased, from an average of 57 in 1998 to an average of 159 in 2005.1069 The number of major
projects the Council undertook quadrupled, as well.1070 Nordic officials began to construct a pilot
project to provide more funds to the Council, which could increase the power and robustness of
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the institution.1071 The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment had highlighted that climate change
would make Arctic resources easier to exploit. Authors, namely political scientist Olav Schram
Stokke, began to see the Council as a soft-law body, or a research institution creating
international norms.1072
After 2008, the policy-making role and mandate of the Council increased. The United
States and Russia sponsored an Arctic search and rescue treaty in November 2008, negotiated
quickly in five rounds of negotiations.1073 In May 2011, Norway, the United States and Russia
sponsored a similar agreement on response to oil spills, also negotiated in five rounds of noncontentious talks.1074 For the first time, the Council was acting as a policy-making body as it
created its first formal agreements. Policy-makers agreed to create these treaties because cooperation and formal policy would benefit all states. These treaties would make the Arctic region
safer for investment. They arose due to requests from industry for increased regulations to
encourage regional investment amid warnings from the insurance industry that Arctic investment
was too risky.1075 For the first time, the Council was working deliberately to increase the
economic potential of the Arctic region. We see the expansion of the Council’s mandate into
economic areas.
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After 2008, the Council became stronger institutionally. In 2007, officials from Norway,
Denmark and Sweden created a temporary common secretariat between the three countries for
the six consecutive years they would be chair.1076 In May 2012, policy-makers decided to create
a permanent secretariat.1077 Nordic policy-makers wanted a permanent secretariat so that the
Council would be a strong international body that could hold Russia accountable for its
environmental issues. Canadian, Russian and the United States officials were leery such a body
would be too powerful. Authors explained that the new secretariat emerged “to face the rapidly
changing circumstances in the Arctic that have increased the challenges and opportunities in both
volume and complexity.” 1078 This work finds there is more to the story. By 2012, state policymakers became convinced they could control such an institution, assured it was necessary.1079
In 2014, the transition of the Council from an environmental body to a more
encompassing body was furthered. The Council saw the first-ever meeting of the Arctic
Economic Council, a new body independent of the Council designed specifically to allow
business an opportunity to address the Council.1080 It was the first time the Council had taken
such deliberate economic action, or a project without a strong environmental component.1081
Also in 2014, a project support instrument became operational, after years of political haggling
and delay.1082 The Council is now institutionally stronger than ever before.
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Scholars who wrote after 2008 understood the Council to be a soft-law body that makes
the Arctic a more international, global region. Examples include such as political scientists Timo
Koivurova, 1083 Leena Heinamkai1084 and David L. Vanderzwaag.1085 This work cannot identify
any soft law that has resulted because of work by the Arctic Council. Other work portrayed the
Council as an environmental research body, consistent with earlier conceptions, such as work by
Terry Fenge.1086 This work contributes a new understanding of the Council as a policy-making
body as well as a research body focused on environmental and economic issues, both as separate
and interrelated functions. It is becoming an institutionally strong, policy-making, robust,
international body.
Also notable after 2008 is that more actors are interested in participating in the Council.
In 2008, six new non-Arctic states sought to become observers in the Council, such as China and
India, creating controversy and suspicion.1087 The European Union was a controversial applicant,
whose bid to become a permanent observer was blocked by Canada. The latter’s position was in
response to successful lobbying by the Inuit Circumpolar Council, which convinced Canada that
European Union membership was unacceptable in light of the latter’s ban on importing seal
products.1088 Political scientist James Manicom and historian Whitney Lackenbauer argue that
the interest among non-Arctic states in the Council is largely economic.1089 This work finds that
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economics partly motivate the Arctic interests of these countries, but environmental motivations
also are important.1090 It is clear that the Council has become an international body of global
consequence.
A body of work emerged after 2008 that saw the Council as the antidote to every problem
of Arctic governance.1091 This work finds that this literature does not fully acknowledge the
political realities of the Council. The Council is not necessarily evolving to become an all around
governance institution for the Arctic region to address every issue area. It is becoming a body to
research environmental issues and encourage economic investment in the Arctic.
One notable finding of this work is information about levels of participation by
permanent participants. As noted, earlier work by authors such as Evan Bloom and Jennifer
McIver debated whether they would be full participants in the Council. Clearly, there are
instances in which the permanent participants have used agency to achieve objectives and thwart
the will of states, an impressive feat for non-state actors. An example is the adoption of a policy
document as part of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Yet, the permanent participants only
are able to contribute to about one-fifth of Council projects due to lack of funds and
personnel.1092 There does not appear to be tremendous political will to fix these financial
problems.1093
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7.2 – Contributions to Theory
The thesis argues that neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the
evolution of the Arctic Council, though modifications are necessary. Chapter 2 examines the
reason that the Council’s mandate is evolving. It argues that neoliberal institutionalism best
explains the evolution of the Council’s mandate, with its emphasis on the form of negotiation
and economic interest; however, institutional competence, as predicted by functionalists, also is
important. State policy-makers are undertaking economic work in the Council because they all
stand to gain by doing so. All states benefit by improving the Arctic economy, even though
Russia likely will gain more than other states. The form of negotiation was important, as seen in
the fact that prompting by Russian officials to increase the Council’s emphasis on emergency
preparedness led to the growth in the institution’s mandate. Russia discussed emergency
preparedness at several Council meetings and made the topic a theme of its turn as chair, which
led to new work on the topic.
Chapter 3 examines reasons for the expansion of the Council’s policy-making role. It
argues that neoliberal institutionalism’s focus on absolute gains explains why states want to
create policy in the Council, but neorealist balance politics and great power predominance
explains outcomes. All states stand to gain through the creation of agreements on search and
rescue, as well as oil spill prevention. These treaties improve Arctic economies. However, the
United States and Russian governments resisted all policy that would not directly benefit their
economies, as seen, for example, in resistance to an Arctic contaminants treaty in 1999.
Chapter 4 examines reasons for the growth in the Council’s institutional capacity, such as
the development of the new Council secretariat and the project support instrument. It argues that
neoliberal institutionalist absolute gains explain why states wanted to create a permanent
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secretariat, but neorealism explains state hesitation. The Council’s institutional capacity has
grown as it became clear that it was necessary to deal with the increasing complexity of the
Council’s work. It did not occur sooner because some state governments, most importantly
Russia and the United States, had concerns a strong Council would challenge state sovereignty.
Chapter 5 explains reasons for the increased interest of observers in the Council and
examines their influence in the institution. It argues that neoliberal institutionalism explains the
interest of observers in the Council and neorealism explains their influence. These actors are not
as powerful as states, but aspire to influence the institution. Governments and other actors seek
to become part of the Council to make absolute gains, such as increased economic investment.
However, state policy-makers carefully covet power and deny it to the observers.
Chapter 6 probes the influence of permanent participants in the Council and argues they
are not as influential as states, but still reasonably influential. It argues that neoliberal
institutionalism explains the role of permanent participants in the Council. Indigenous peoples’
organizations can exercise influence by exercising agency.
Overall, neoliberal institutionalism provides the best explanation for the evolution of the
Arctic Council. In every case, an absolute gain motivated states. There is little evidence that
states had great concern for relative gains. Evolution of the institution has not been automatic,
but rather the result of highly political processes. Economics proved to be the major catalyst for
evolution of the institution. Agency is important, in that it explains the influence of non-state
actors in the Council. Three tweaks to neoliberal institutionalist theory are needed. First, state
policy-makers are likely to want to evolve competent institutions. Thus, functionalist
institutional competence partly explains the evolution of international institutions. This tenet
explains why path dependence did not stifle Council evolution as neoliberal institutionalists
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predict. Second, great power preference is more important than the interests of other states. The
great powers demonstrated a concern for protection of their autonomy. They led evolution, such
as was the case when Russia and the United States sponsored efforts to create an Arctic search
and rescue treaty. This tenet of neorealism explains the outcomes of negotiations in international
institutions, in this case. Third, state officials pay attention to regional balance in making
decisions at the international level. Thus, balance is an important consideration for states. States
demonstrated concern for autonomy and sovereignty in the controversy over creating the Council
secretariat. This tenet of neorealism also explains outcomes in international decision-making, in
this case.
How does this fit in with other assessments of the theory? Political scientist Michael
Mastanduno finds that relative gain concerns are most important in explaining outcomes in
military matters, while absolute gain concerns are more important on economic matters.1094
Furthermore, political scientist Duncan Snidal finds that relative gain concerns are important in
situations with few actors, while absolute gain concerns are important in situations with many
actors.1095 This work finds absolute gain concerns explain state preferences and partly explain
outcomes, while neorealist great power preference dynamics and balance concerns partly explain
outcomes. Meanwhile, functionalist questions about institutional competence partly explain
preferences and outcomes.
7.3 – Directions for Future Research
There are at least six directions for further research stemming from this work. First, does
the evolution of the Arctic Council proceed in a way that is similar to the way that other forums
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evolve? To confirm the explanatory validity of neoliberal institutionalism, as demonstrated in
this analysis, new research could examine two questions. First, do the prospect of economic
gains and absolute gains inspire states to make institutions stronger in cases other than the
Council? Secondly, can agency overcome the resistance by great powers and balance
considerations in cases other than the Council? It could be fruitful to determine if the version of
neoliberal institutionalism advocated in this paper is applicable in higher-profile institutions that
deal with more difficult issues.
Second, new research could answer three questions to confirm the theoretical assertions
made in this chapter. Do international institutions evolve only when their competence is
established? Do great power preferences most frequently influence outcomes in the evolution of
international institutions? Thirdly, do states demonstrate consideration of maintaining regional or
global balance in patterns of international co-operation? An affirmative answer to these questions
would strengthen the theoretical arguments made in this thesis.
Third, new research could answer the following question: what is the impact of domestic
politics on the process of Council evolution? There is some evidence that domestic politics
influenced Council evolution. The United States government resisted the Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment out of concern it would impact the 2004 United States presidential election. It
allowed a policy document after representatives from the Inuit Circumpolar Council embarrassed
the United States. The role of the Inuit Circumpolar Council in the Canadian government during
the 1990s in part convinced Canada that an Arctic council was necessary. There are other
examples in this work, as well. The theories examined do not argue that domestic politics can
greatly influence international relations and state foreign policy.
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Fourth, research could ask the following question: where did the information about the
economic potential of the Arctic come from and is it valid? State policy-makers are acting as
though the economic future of the Arctic region is strong. This thesis did not probe whether these
claims were true. There are signs that indicate this situation might not be the case. There is a lot
of optimism about the prospect of shipping. The International Maritime Organization is
developing new Arctic shipping regulations, anticipating a bright future for Arctic shipping.1096
Still, studies from the Arctic Institute, a research think tank, find that only a few dozen ships
utilize Arctic passages each year, namely the Northern Sea Route, considered the most promising
sea route available.1097 There is a lot of interest in Arctic oil and gas resources. However, at the
current time, Russia is the only country that produces oil from platforms in the Arctic Ocean.
Attempts by Shell Oil to develop new offshore resources in the United States’ Arctic region have
thus far been unsuccessful and costly.1098
Fifth, further research could address the question: what is the value and worth of the
Council? The Council is in many ways a disappointment. It has not developed strong policy to
safeguard the Arctic environment. It was supposed to facilitate environmental action, but
politics, interests, power concerns and economics often stifle its work. Can an institution
motivated at least in part by economic gains be counted on to safeguard the environment? Do
trends spell trouble ahead for Arctic environmentalists? The Council has produced good
research, such as the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment. Is this work adequate for an
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international institution? Further, what impact has this work had on international policy outside
of the Council? As noted, work by Terry Fenge has highlighted how other international forums
have used Council work to create policy.1099 Is this contribution widespread, or are instances
isolated?
Finally, this work could help answer the following questions: what should the Council
do? How should it evolve in the future? Chapter 3 of this thesis concludes that a new conception
of the Council’s policy-making role must recognize the highly political nature of decisionmaking in the Council. What might this conception entail? It is clear that potential economic
gains motivate action in the Council, such as growth in the institution’s mandate, growth in its
policy-making role and institutional power. Thus, it seems that the safest course of action for
those who advocate a role for the Council should be to emphasize the economic benefits of
suggested evolution. Would such an approach work in reality? Environmental concerns do not
appear to greatly motivate policy-makers in Arctic governance, nor the very real human security
concerns of Arctic residents. The original concerns that led to the creation of the Council are not
motivating its evolution. Is it reasonable that advocates avoid such arguments?
Conclusion
This dissertation has sought to explain the evolution of the Arctic Council. At a time
when climate change threatens the future of the planet, the Council is evolving to help states
make economic gains and exploit Arctic resources. The Council still provides good quality
environmental research and policy recommendations. This situation is explained in that states
seek to make gains through international co-operation and economic growth is something on
which all Arctic policy-makers can agree. Further, states seek to protect their position in the
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international order and exploit their power position. For those who work in the resource industry,
it is a good time to have an Arctic portfolio. For those who care about the Arctic environment
and for Arctic residents, this situation could spell trouble.
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APPENDIX A
Sample Questions
General
How, if at all, has the Council evolved and changed during your time working for the Council?
Mandate
There is a case in 1999 in which Canada worked to stop discussion about a program called
AMEC. It was a program in which the United States and Russia wanted to increase the
environmental efficiency of their military vehicles in the Arctic. The two countries wanted to
make a presentation about the program. Canada stopped the presentation, saying that it was a
military matter and thus outside the prevue of the Council. Why do you think Canada would
do that?
Policy-Making
The European countries seemed particularly anxious to create an Arctic contaminants treaty
early in the Arctic Council, but Canada opposed such action. In fact, in 1999, Canada said,
“Canada could not support an imposition on national sovereignty.” Why do you think the
European countries favoured strong action while Canada opposed such action?
In 2000, EPPR wrote, “We have finalized the analysis of the adequacy and effectiveness of
agreements; we concluded that agreements in force are currently adequate.” Yet, less than a
decade later, the Council negotiated a new protocol on oil spills. What do you think changed in
regards to search and rescue and oil?
In 2008, the United States proposed the creation of a search/rescue treaty. Were other
countries surprised? Can you describe the process of negotiating that treaty? What obstacles
did states need to overcome when negotiating this treaty?
We see work underway to create an “oil spill response issue.” How did states come to decide
such a treaty was necessary? Can you describe the process of negotiating that treaty? What
obstacles did states need to overcome when negotiating this treaty?
Institutional Capacity
In the meeting notes, every country at one point or another acknowledged that the Council
needed more stable funding. Norway, in particular, has pushed for more stable funding and has
given a considerable amount of money to the Council. If everyone agrees the Council needs
more stable funding, why have countries not achieved stable funding?
In 2007, the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish delegations announced they would create a
temporary permanent secretariat in Norway to be in effect during their six years as chairs.
Why do you think they did this?
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In 2011, why did the Council decide to create a permanent secretariat after so long without
one?
Observers
Why do Council states seem reluctant to add China to the Council as a permanent observer?
Why do certain Council states seem reluctant to add the European Union to the Council as a
permanent observer?
Permanent Participants
I saw Lloyd Axworthy give a talk about the Arctic Council and he said that Canada really
wanted the Aboriginal groups to have full membership in the Arctic Council. He said that the
United States allowed the Aboriginal groups to be less powerful permanent participants in
exchange that security not be an issue on the Council. Is Axworthy’s account true? Why did
Canada want the Aboriginal groups to be full members of the Council?
RAIPON was recently banished from the Council by Russia. Why do you think this happened?
Some say it is due to a general Russian crackdown on NGOs, others say they want a more
streamlined foreign policy or accepting foreign funding or support for Ivan Moseyev,
supporter of Pomor brotherhood.
Has the involvement of the permanent participants been beneficial for the Arctic Council? Has
the involvement been beneficial for the organizations themselves?
What are the major accomplishments of the permanent participants?
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APPENDIX B
The following interviewees agreed to have quotes and facts attributed to them:
Name
Mikael Anzén
Tom Armstrong
Ray Arnaudo
Steven Bigras
Christopher Cuddy
Ben DeAngelo
Adele Dion
Terry Fenge
Bernard Funston
Chester Reimer
Sauli Rouhinen
Marideth Sandler
Tucker Scully
Russel Shearer
Harley Trudeau

Country/Organization
Sweden
United States
United States
Canada
Canada
United States
Canada
ICC and AAC
Canada
ICC
Finland
United States
United States
Canada
Canada

Department/Affiliation
Foreign Affairs
Global Change Research
State Department
Canadian Polar Commission
Aboriginal Affairs
Environmental Protection Agency
Foreign Affairs
Consultant
Northern Canada Consulting
Consultant
Environment
Government of Alaska
State Department
Aboriginal Affairs
Government of the Yukon

Interviews took place with 18 people who did not want to be identified or have quotes attributed
to them:














A Canadian environment official
Two Canadian foreign affairs officials
A Canadian Aboriginal affairs official
A Danish environmental official
A Finnish foreign affairs official
Two Icelandic foreign affairs officials
A Norwegian foreign affairs official
A Norwegian environment official
A Russian government official
A Russian scientist
A United States State Department Official
A United States Department of the Interior official
Four United States environmental official
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